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trAndeS Course Reader 
 
Taxation and Re-distribution in Latin America 
 
Aim and Scope of the course  
Latin American countries face severe challenges to sustainable development: high levels of 
social, political or socio-ecologic inequalities, (labor) informality, exclusion and poverty are 
just the most visible social challenges which ought to be overcome. Most scholars agree that 
solutions to these challenges won’t be implemented by market forces alone. State action has 
to promote policies which tackle these issues. In fact, most sustainable development goals 
named in the UN Agenda 2030 call for increased state action and public spending. However, 
to afford such public spending, states have to strengthen their fiscal capacity, i.e. their ability 
to collect revenue via tax or non-tax mechanisms. This makes taxation and public finance in 
general a vital part of sustainable development.  
 
However, even after several years of economic bonanza during the commodity boom, the 
fiscal and tax situation in Latin America remains complex and perplexing. Although progress 
had been made in the last decades, most countries still collect too little revenue compared to 
their level of development, and the revenue they do collect is biased. Tax systems remain 
being regressive, making no contribution to income re-distribution, and revenues from non-
renewable resources still are a dominant source of state income, enforcing economic and 
fiscal dependence on commodity exports. In addition, tax non-compliance remains high and 
tax exemptions are frequent suggesting a low interest of high income citizens or large 
corporations in contributing significantly to the public good. In sum, in many Latin American 
countries, taxation remains one of the principal obstacles to effective public engagement for 
sustainable development.  
 
But why does the Latin American tax situation remain suboptimal for sustainable 
development? This course offers materials, arguments and theories that can provide answers 
to this question. It also provides students with an encompassing introduction into the research 
on taxation from an interdisciplinary social science perspective. The course introduces the 
various facets of taxation and offers an overview of contemporary and classic scholarship on 
the topic within various disciplines such as economics, sociology, history, political science 
and philosophy. The aim of this wide perspective is to offer students – unfamiliar with 
economics – on the one hand an introduction to separate fundamental topics of taxation and at 
the same time to provide an encompassing view of how taxation can be studied and what kind 
of different perspectives on taxation exist, why they matter for Latin American societies and 
how they can improve our understanding of contemporary social, political and economic 
realities in the continent.  
 
On this builds the normative agenda of this course: reclaiming the pivotal role of taxation for 
social, human, political and economic development and change. This claim is twofold: 
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taxation may be used to observe and understand such change, for example in the form of an 
increase in state capacity because of increased taxation. Following the legacy of Joseph 
Schumpeter, taxation, however, may also be the very cause of such social changes. In other 
words, taxation is not only an instrument in public policy, it constitutes a strategic nexus 
between the state and society and can therefore enlighten our understanding of the social 
changes and dynamics resulting out of this interaction.  
 
This is also the reason why this course is introductory in nature as it combines, on the one 
hand, units which treat different topics highly relevant when speaking about Latin American 
taxation and sustainable development, like re-distribution, tax non-compliance and evasion, or 
the role and significance of revenues from non-renewable resources. On the other hand, the 
course also dedicates entire units to single perspectives on taxation, namely fiscal sociology, 
political science and (economic) history. This allows students to grasp the full potential the 
study of taxation may have for a deeper understanding of contemporary challenges in Latin 
America.  
 
Learning objectives  
1) Students will understand and reflect critically on the core concepts and theories of public 
finance and taxation. 
2) Students will understand and will be comfortable to work with data on public finance. 
They will be able to understand and interpret principal indicators in the public finance 
literature and taxation and understand concepts and techniques to measure, impute, or 
theorize economic, social and political effects of taxation. 
3) Students will have a comprehensive understanding of the characteristics and challenges of 
public finances in Latin America and are able to put these characteristics into a 
comparable perspective. Given the theories and arguments they have studied during the 
course they will be able to explain why these challenges persist and assess the prospects 
of Latin American taxation given certain economic, social or political changes.  
4) Students will gain a comprehensive understanding of what can be “measured” with 
taxation, tax data or behavior and how these “measures” relate to historic, social, 
economic or political phenomena found in the region and what this means for sustainable 
development.  
5) Students will have an idea about several macro approaches to public finances in different 
disciplines (economics, political science, sociology, history and philosophy), are aware of 
the principal debates in these disciplines and are able to apply these perspectives to study 
and explain selected topics of public finances and taxation in Latin America. 
6) Students will be able to present tax data and make presentations on key topics of taxation 




Organization of the course  
The course is organized in twelve units. Units one to five offer a disciplinary introduction to 
taxation and present the dominant debates, theories and perspectives on taxation in public 
finance and economics (Unit 1), history (Unit 2), political science (Unit 3), sociology (Unit 4) 
and philosophy (Unit 5). These units have a more general scope. They encompass discussions 
that go beyond the Latin American tax reality and take advantage of research in other areas of 
the world. However, the interest is more theoretical in nature, establishing the foundations for 
a multi-dimensional understanding of taxation. Unit six to eleven offer an introduction to one 
critical aspect of contemporary Latin American taxation. These units treat topics as diverse as 
tax policy reform (Unit 6), taxation and re-distribution (Unit 7), the transnational dimension 
of taxation (Unit 8), tax non-compliance (Unit 9), the taxation of non-renewable resources 
(Unit 10) or the challenges in local and regional taxation in Latin America (Unit 11). All of 
these topics entail major challenges for fairer and sustainable public finances in the region. 
But instead of providing uniform answers, the idea of these units is threefold: They aim to 
show the empirical tax realities in Latin America, teach the progress of existing research on 
these topics and the forms of how these topics are studied, and provide solutions which are 
deduced from this research that are relevant to the contemporary tax challenges. Instead of a 
course summary, Unit 12 proposes an exercise of knowledge transfer. Students can apply the 
knowledge they have learnt during the course thinking about the relationship between taxation 
and sustainability in the Andean context. They may choose some empirical example and 
theorize about the relationship between different aspects of sustainability (fiscal, social, etc.) 
and taxation, building on the group work of the previous units. 
 
In this course reader, each unit is presented in a short and general description outlining the 
main topics and ideas which can be discussed and the learning goals which can be pursued 
during the session. As it can be seen these are often very encompassing topics and 
presentations. This is why lectures may pick only some of the topics mentioned in the 
description or even opt to teach one unit during several sessions. Lecturers can also opt to 
teach one unit in two sessions, where the first session introduces the general theory of the 
topic and the second session is filled with the group exercise, i.e. the application of the topic 
to the Andean context. In addition, to the unit description the reader offers a list of 
publications which aim to represent the most relevant literature on the topic without any claim 
neither to completeness nor exclusiveness. It offers students as well as lecturers an overview 
of the topic’s literature, including classic as well as contemporary contributions.  
 
Finally, the course reader proposes – if feasible – exercises which students can solve and 
work in groups. These group exercises are optional and may be combined with standard tasks 
for students at an individual (individual presentations) or collective (text discussion) level. 
The aim of such group work is to provide space where students can apply their skills or 
knowledge to a specific topic and may share their results with the class. The proposed group 
exercises are also a valuable option to introduce the tax empirics of the Andean countries into 




Proposed student evaluation  
Reading load: approx. 35-40 pages / unit  
 
15% Participation in class  
 
15% Group work I and in class presentation 
 
15% Group work II and in class presentation  
 
15% Group work III and in class presentation  
 





Unit 1: Public Finance Theory: Functions, Concepts and Effects of Taxation  
Before getting started it is important to understand some key concepts of taxation. This helps 
to lay out the proper definitions used the realm of public finances and avoids 
misunderstandings. First, this section discusses what taxes are, what kinds of taxes exist and 
how they can be best described. As taxes are unthinkable without government, a short 
overview of how the classic public finance literature portrays government is presented. This 
enables us to understand how public finance scholars view taxation and what kind of role they 
reserve for it in their reasoning. The section goes on to describe the five principles of taxation 
highlighted in public finance textbooks (Stiglitz 2000, Gruber 2012, Rosen and Gayer 2007) 
and finally, as economists are principally concerned with the effects of government 
interference (here in the form of taxation) on the forces of the fee market, the (economic) 
effects of taxation named in this literature are summarized.   
 
Learning goals:  
 
1. Students are familiar with basic definition of the functions and concepts of public finance 
and taxation. 
2. Students know the principles that tax systems should fulfill and have considered them 
critically. 
3. Students understand the effects of taxes in the economic process, i.e. their effects on 
individual behavior, income and prices discussed in the economics literature. 
 
1.1 Key concepts of taxation  
Classic contributions ascribe three functions governments should pursue via fiscal policy 
(Musgrave 1972): secure (market) efficiency, maintain macroeconomic stability and enhance 
equity (via re-distribution). The first function refers to setting and enforcing the rules of 
market interactions and in doubt correcting market failures. This includes efforts to contain 
the powers of monopolies, secure the provision of public goods (research, defense, etc.) and 
limit negative externalities (for example air pollution). Secure macroeconomic stability - the 
second function - includes fiscal policy measures to maintain price stability and avoid high 
inflation or moderate business cycles (boom and bust). Finally, the third function is to engage 
in re-distribution to enable fair access to markets and secure social stability. We can think of 
forms of taxes or public spending which aim to contribute to one or all of these goals. 
However, to what extend these goals should be pursued, e.g. if the very rich should be taxed 
in order to reach the redistribution of income, is controversial. So, taxation and public 
spending can be seen as a major regulatory policy which affects all of these three functions as 
well as it can be used to pursue them. In the following section, we focus on taxes as one of the 
policies in public finances and discuss their use.  
 
What are taxes and how are they measured? In reality there are all kinds of mechanisms the 
states collect money from its citizens, for example via taxes, fees, contributions, duties or 
other fiscal payments, and one can easily get lost in the diverse concepts of domestic public 
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revenue system. However, there are some guiding principles that help to distinguish taxes 
against other revenue mechanisms (although frequently even some states do not apply them 
properly and frame non-tax revenues as taxes). 
 
Taxes can be defined as cash transfers, which are paid without being compensated with a 
specific service. Taxes are paid to a public-law entity with the aim to increase its revenue and 
the definition of who has to pay taxes is stated in the law. Thus, the main features of a tax is 
that it is (a) compulsory, it is (b) a contribution paid in money, there is (c) no return in 
services and that they are (d) levied by public entities and typically they are levied by reason 
of law. Maybe the most important difference between taxes vs. fees, contributions or duties is 
the kind of service which individuals receive for their payment. One can say that the more the 
service has a public good character, the better the contribution is designed as a general 
payment, i.e. a tax. The higher the service has a private good character; the better the payment 




This is a general definition of taxes but as we know there are several kinds of taxes. 
Generally, taxes can be differentiated by answering four simple questions: What is taxed? 
This describes the tax base. How is it taxed? This describes the form of the tax rate, the 
technique how the tax is levied, e.g. annually or permanently. Why is there a tax? This 
describes the aim of the tax. Who will receive the tax? Here is meant which level of 
government benefits from the payment, e.g. municipal, provincial or federal government. 
 
If we take all kinds of taxes (and often non-tax revenues) into account, we can speak of the 
tax system or tax regime. Here, along with the level of taxation, which is commonly measured 
in % of GDP (the total amount of revenues that are collected via taxation as share of GDP), 
another important aspect is the ratio between direct and indirect taxes. Direct taxes are levied 
directly to the economic subject (e.g. an income tax); indirect taxes are levied upon costs, 
receipts or transactions (e.g. a value-added tax or sales tax). As direct taxes, especially taxes 
on income and property are said to have the potential for a great redistributive impact, i.e. 
individuals with higher incomes may be required to pay a higher share of their income to the 
state in the form of tax (see also ability to pay principle, see Unit 5), this ratio is also a first 
frequently used approximation of the progressiveness of a tax system. Distribution and 
progressiveness will be treated in Unit 5 and 7 when taxation and inequality is discussed.  
 
Next to the ratio between indirect and direct taxes, tax rates are also of importance to 
characterize single taxes and the tax system. Of great importance in discussing tax systems 
are: the statutory tax rate, which describes the legally imposed rate – for example, an 
income tax can have multiple statutory rates for different income levels, where a sales tax 
may have a flat statutory rate; the average (effective) tax rate, which is the ratio of the total 
amount of taxes paid to the total tax base (taxable income or spending), expressed as a 
percentage. The effective tax rate: the average rate at which an individual is taxed on earned 
income (effective tax rate of the income tax) or the average rate at which a corporation is 
                                                 
1 Note here that the difference between private and public goods is determined by the two key concepts of non-rivalry and 
non-excludability in consumption. 
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taxed on pre-tax profits (effective tax rate of the corporate income tax). Note that these rates 
may differ from the statutory tax rate due to tax incentives, exemptions or tax credits (see 
Unit 9). The marginal tax rate, which is the tax rate individuals would pay on one additional 
dollar of income.  
 
1.2 Principles of taxation 
Classic economic literature highlights five core principles tax systems should comply (Stiglitz 
2000: 457). Obviously, these principles have their background in economic theory. However, 
as most contemporary discussions about taxes draw on one or more of them it is worth 
becoming familiar with them. Textbook advice is that tax systems design should aim to fulfill 
economic efficiency, administrative simplicity, flexibility, political responsibility, and 
fairness. In the following, all three of these principles are briefly described. It is 
recommendable to discuss them critically in class, e.g. based on the literature provided in the 
annex. 
 
(a) Economic efficiency. Under this principle, the tax system should not interfere with the 
efficient allocation of resources. Economists are especially concerned with the market 
distorting effects of taxes. They argue that in absence of market failure, the economy 
would automatically allocate resources efficiently. Information conveyed by market 
prices would lead to production, exchange, and product mix efficiency. No one could be 
made better off without making anyone worse off (in other words a pareto-optimal 
equilibrium). Taxes may affect this (theoretical) condition as they may alter (relative) 
prices and thus distort the allocation of resources (price effects) or they may alter the 
behavior of economic actors (behavioral effects) or affect the general economic 
equilibrium, as described above.   
 
(b) Administrative simplicity. This principle insists that the tax system ought to be easy and 
relatively inexpensive to administer. Administering a tax system entails significant costs. 
Such costs can be divided into direct, e.g. the cost of functioning of the national tax 
authority and indirect costs. Indirect costs are borne by the tax payer and may include 
various items such as time of processing the tax forms, cost of record keeping, etc. 
Generally, and especially in Latin America, indirect costs are far greater than direct costs.  
 
The costs of administration have been a major issue in tax reforms in Latin America, 
however, as they depend on various factors, some of which are exogenous to the 
administration, they are not easy to reduce. Administrative costs depend on the 
requirements tax payers have to meet (record keeping, reporting, etc.) to pay the tax. The 
second factor which determines the administrative costs is the complexity of the tax 
systems. In Latin America, especially during the 1970s and early 1980s, tax systems were 
very complex with lots of different taxes and multiple exemptions. Since then the 
complexity of tax systems has certainly been reduced but tax exemptions and other forms 
of tax incentives are still an issue in many Latin American countries, which raises the 
costs of administration (see Unit 9). Thirdly, administrative costs depend on what is 
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being taxed. Generally, it is said that such costs are higher for imposing taxes on capital 
than imposing taxes on income, because of the difficulties for tax authorities to 
distinguish between (capital) income and capital. Finally, the administrative costs also 
depend on the structure of the economy, for example the concentration of capital or the 
existence of a large informal sector (a pressing challenge in many Latin American 
countries).  
 
(c) Flexibility. Textbook advice maintains that the tax system ought to be able to respond 
easily (in some cases automatically) to changed economic circumstances. Changes in 
economic circumstances require changes in tax rates. Some tax structures adjust easily 
and automatically, but other adjustment depends on policy action. In the economic 
literature, there great importance is given to the existence of automatic stabilizers within 
the tax system to smooth economic cycles. For instance, if prices are stable (or tax 
brackets adjusted to inflation) a progressive tax structure can provide an “automatic” 
stabilization to the economy. When income drops during a recession the average tax rate 
is reduced and individuals face lower tax rates as their income is lower. Individuals will 
have more relatively money to spend and help to increase or stabilize demand. On the 
contrary, when income increases the average tax rate increases and can contribute to 




The goal of a flexible tax system includes also being able to adjust the tax system to 
changing circumstances quickly. However, as some adjustment involves an intensive 
political debate – which taxes to cut for whom during a recession – perfect timing may be 
difficult. During high economic volatility, the lag between decided changes, their 
enactment and the collection of the tax can have a negative impact on the efficiency of 
the measures taken. In Latin America, in a general perspective, tax reforms over the past 
50 years have been frequently undertaken as ad-hoc reactions to economic or fiscal crisis 
and boom times, highlighting the lack of government willingness to engage in long term 
tax planning and the importance of politics in taxation. This is why in Unit 6 tax policy is 
treated separately.  
 
(d) Political responsibility. Connected what will be discussed in Unit 3 and 4 in more detail, 
economic textbooks advise that tax system should be designed so that individuals can 
ascertain what they are paying, and evaluate how accurately the system reflects their 
preferences. First this means that tax systems should be designed in a way that they are 
transparent and understandable to tax payers. Tax system transparency is said to have a 
positive effect towards tax compliance and acceptance (see Unit 9). Moreover, 
transparency also empowers citizens to know how much they contribute to the state and 
compare their “sacrifice” with the benefits they receive and thus better enabled to hold 
the government accountable. Yet this is not always the case. Particularly in Latin 
America political responsibility of tax systems is not always met. This topic is linked to 
                                                 
2 However, during times of stagflation – times of economic expansion and inflation – tax brackets adjusted to inflation lose 
the built-in stabilizing effect of a progressive income tax. However, the effect works if prices rise during recession. 
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discussions in Unit 3 & 4, which include perspectives of tax systems as fiscal contract 
between citizens and the state. 
 
(e) Fairness. Finally, textbooks advise that tax systems ought to be fair in its relative 
treatment of different individuals. In terms of economists, tax fairness is frequently 
measured by two principal goals: horizontal equity and vertical equity. Note here that 
economists use the term of equity rather than speaking of equality, which is the focus in 
philosophy, law and sociology. Vertical equity means the principle that groups with more 
resources should pay higher taxes than groups with fewer resources. There are different 
reasons to back up this claim (see especially Unit 5). Economists however justify this 
principle by referring to the idea of a utilitarian welfare function (see also Gruber 2012: 
533). This approach claims that lower income groups gain higher utility from income 
than higher income groups as the marginal return on income (in the form of utility) 
decreases with increasing income (especially once the basic needs are covered). 
 
For economists, three problems arise if vertical equity of tax systems ought to be assured: 
defining who is in the position to pay more than other, i.e. on what grounds this decision 
is made (1), the problem of implementation (2), how much more should someone pay if 
he gains more (3). Different answers to these questions exist and some of them are 
discussed in the texts. One critical question is defining the “ability to pay” of tax payers. 
Here different measures are discussed concerning how this ability can be measured: a) 
income as a basis of taxation; b) consumption as a basis of taxation; c) lifetime income as 
the basis of taxation; d) cost-benefit principle as the basis of taxation; e) alternative 
approaches; f) critics of income as basis of taxation. 
 
Also critical is to find a measure which describes the vertical equity existent in a tax 
system. In the economic literature, three measures are frequently used to determine if the 
principle of vertical equity is met. They are also the subjects of the most commonly 
mentioned tax reform debates: Progressive tax systems, regressive tax system and 
proportional tax systems. Progressive tax systems describe tax systems in which the 
effective average tax rate rises with income. In regressive tax systems, by contrast, the 
effective average tax rate falls with rising income. In proportional tax systems, effective 
average tax rates do not change with income, thus all taxpayers pay the same proportion 
of their income in taxes.   
 
Horizontal equity refers to the principle that individuals who are the same in all relevant 
aspects but make different economic choices are treated similarly by the tax systems. 
This principle appears to be easy to understand and implement. However, it has some 
implications which cannot be solved by economic reasoning alone. For example, the 
principle does not specify which aspects, or (better) categories to distinguish individuals 
should be defined as relevant. Easily one might agree that categories such as race, color, 
age or even marital status (married, unmarried) should be counted as relevant aspects. 
However, most tax systems in the world make a distinction of tax payers in terms of age 
and marital status (see literature on the gender bias in taxation in Unit 4). In fact, it might 
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be easier to determine which aspects of comparing two individuals are not relevant. Take 
the example provided by Stiglitz (2000: 467-8) of two identical twins buying chocolate 
and vanilla ice-cream respectively. This ice cream is taxed with different rates. “Is the tax 
system treating the two individuals in a horizontally equitable manner if it taxes vanilla 
and chocolate ice cream at different rates?” (2000: 467). At first sight taxing ice cream at 
different rates appears to be unfair. However, the difference in tax payments of the twins 
is not based on a relevant aspect of their personality, but on different in taste. In fact, both 
individuals face the same “opportunity set” (for both it would have been possible to buy 
vanilla if they have wanted to). Thus, in this case the tax system did not discriminate, as it 
did not differentiate between the two individuals. This example can also be applied to 
“commodities” or other goods. Frequently governments tax goods differently, e.g. 
beverages with different degrees of alcohol. What becomes apparent here is that tax 
system design implies moral choices and reflects decisions about aspects which transcend 
the realm of pure economic thought or better quantitative thinking (see Unit 5).  
 
1.3. Economic and individual effects of taxation  
As mentioned in the economic literature, the effects of taxes are of special importance. The 
main idea is that taxes interfere in the pareto-optimal allocation of capital and labor. In order 
to gain a better understanding of the effects described in public finance textbooks the unit 
proposes a group work exercise (see box above). This is why in this text the effects are only 
mentioned briefly and a more thoughtfully discussion is reserved for the class exercise:  
 
(a) Behavioral effects. The basic idea is that any tax has an influence on the behavior of 
economic actors. Actors respond in some way or the other to the reduction of individual 
revenue which is caused by their tax payments. Economists speak of non-distortionary 
taxes, “if, and only if, there is nothing an individual or firm can do to alter his tax 
liability” (Stiglitz 2000: 462). Non-distortionary taxes are also called lump-sum taxes in 
the literature.
3
 One of the main distortions is caused by the attempt of economic actors to 
reduce their tax liability. i.e. the tax may induce a change of the (economic) behavior of 
the taxpayer. Most taxes however are distortionary. For instance, in the case of a tax on 
commodities (including services, etc.) a consumer of these commodities can reduce or 
shift his consumption. Taxes on income (salary) are distortionary because workers may 
opt to work less and thus reduce their tax liability. The distorting effects of taxes take up 
considerable room in economic tax theory, because under certain conditions more 
revenue could be raised with the same effect on individual welfare changing from 
distorting to non-distorting taxes. This is for example the case in discussions of optimal 
tax theory (see literature). Behavioral effects also include instances when customers, 
workers or producers aim to reduce their tax liabilities via other behavioral changes; for 
example, withholding or rejecting investment or changing the own saving behavior.  
 
                                                 
3 For example, a tax which is based on unalterable characteristics of persons (male/female) or a “head tax” that everyone has 
to pay independent of their income or wealth is a lump sum tax.   
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(b) Income and substitution effects. Income effects are best visible in taxes on 
consumption. For example, if an individual consumes less because of higher relative 
prices because of a tax. The amount by which his consumption is reduced is called the 
income effect. In addition, as the relative price of the good for which the tax applies 
increases, consumers may consume other goods (substitutes). The extent to which 
consumption of the taxed good is reduced because of the increase in relative price is 
called the substitution effect. 
   
(c) Other effects of taxation are financial effects, organizational effects, general equilibrium 
effects, announcement effects and capitalization. There are also other effects on more 
specific aspects of the economy mentioned in the literature. Without mentioning them in 
detail in this text, the main aim of public finance economists is to design the tax system in 
such a way that these effects and their impact are minimized. Thus, one research agenda 
of these studies is, next to determining the effect of certain taxes, to develop a positive 
theory of how to best design specific taxes as well as an overall tax system.  
 
 
Group work exercise: 
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group reads the description of one effect of taxation provided in 
Stiglitz (2000) as well as engages in individual research about the effect in question. A 
possible allocation of topics is one of the following effects to each group: a) substitution 
effect; b) price effect; c) consumption effect; d) other behavioral effects. In addition, one 
group can also summarize the principal ideas of optimal tax theory. The groups try to 
understand the effects and prepare a presentation (short PowerPoint 2-3 slides, or brief 
summary of max. 1 page) discussing the effect and – if possible - search for an empirical 
example (in Latin America). One or two members of the group will present the group work to 
the whole class in the form a five-minute pitch. After the presentation, the effects will be 
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Unit 2: Historical Dimension of Tax Systems: Latin America in Comparative 
Perspective 
Similar to other social, legal and political institutions, tax regimes have histories such as the 
social and political struggles that are shaping them. Understanding these histories offers 
valuable insights to the contemporary challenges of taxation in the region as well as to the 
specifics of the tax state in a particular country. This is of special importance as tax regimes in 
the region still suffer several shortcomings which put in question the sustainable financing of 
Latin American countries. Such challenges exist e.g. in the low level of tax collection 
compared to the level of economic development, volatile and disperse tax bases, a very low to 
zero contribution to income distribution via taxation, moderate to high dependence on 
revenues from non-renewable resources such as oil and minerals, and high levels of tax 
evasion and avoidance. All these contemporary features have historical roots and a look into 
history can help to understand their persistence. In addition, Latin American tax systems 
differ considerably among countries. Comparing the genesis of different tax systems in the 
region is an important perspective to account for these differences and determine the factors 
or events which are relevant to understand the particularities in tax regime design.   
 
The historical dimension of taxation has attracted important scholarly attention in Latin 
America and beyond. The aim of this unit therefore is twofold. First it provides a short 
introduction in the development of tax systems in the region, highlighting the particularities of 
this history in a comparative perspective. Secondly, it introduces several major discussions in 
the literature such as the colonial heritage of Latin American tax states, the imprint of 
(developmental) ideas, the relationship between war and the tax state or the particularities of 
the introduction of the Latin American income tax. Several of these topics are still relevant for 
contemporary analysis of tax regimes in Latin America and will therefore be treated in related 
units (see Unit 3, 4, 7).  
 
Learning goals:  
 
• Understand the origin of the tax state and its connection to the rise of the modern nation 
state.  
• Understand the differences between the formation of the tax state in Europe and Latin 
America and the implications of this difference. 
• Be able to recall the different perspectives on taxation in Latin American economic 
thought, particularly in modernization and structural economic theory.  
• Be aware of the long-term development of Latin American tax systems (periodization, 
critical junctures, differences between countries, etc.). 
 
2.1. Taxation in Latin America in a long run perspective 
The evolution of Latin American tax system has been by no means a linear process. To the 
contrary, we can detect critical junctures – events that marked a decisive inflection point in 
the tax system development – and macro-periods in which a common paradigm of tax policy 
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can be observed, as well as characteristics which have been considerably stable over time and 
which can be related to path dependent processes in Latin American history. The goal of the 
analysis of the historical dimension of taxation is to encounter all three of these aspects.  
 
Without neglecting the importance of national differences, it is useful to recall the trends in 
tax collection and the tax mix over the last decades for a first approximation of Latin 
American tax history. Comparable historical data is not easy to obtain for the whole of Latin 
American countries, and for the sake of illustration this introduction is limited to the 
exploration of the last 50 years. Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of Latin American tax 
revenues  based on the data on central government tax collection for 18 Latin American 
countries compiled by Morán and Pecho (2016) for the period between 1960-2014. In this 
figure, the rise of central government tax revenues by 6.5 percentage points of GDP during 
the last five decades, from an initial 9.7 % of GDP in 1960 to 16.2 % % in 2014 can be 
observed. Within this timespan one may distinguish five periods of the tax system´s 
evolution, reflecting distinctive approaches to tax policy, levels of tax collection and tax 
structure in the subcontinent. 
 
1. From the 1960s to the mid-1970s, the time of the oil crisis: The strong rise in tax 
collection (by 3.31 percentage points, from 9.54 of GDP in 1960 to 12.85 in 1975) was 
principally due to the paradigm shift in tax policy. In economic theory, public economics 
started to put relevance to taxation not only as a revenue collecting mechanism but as an 
important tool for economic development. The region also was affected especially by the 
Joint Tax Program, initiated by the Alliance for Progress, which became one of the main 
actors in tax reform in Latin America. Together with an overall positive macroeconomic 
environment, this program had a positive impact on increasing overall tax collection in 
the region. Taking a look at the average tax mix in this period, as seen in Figure 2, one 
can also appreciate these changes. The relative share of taxes on goods and services 
increased while the relative weight of taxes on trade, the bedrock of Latin American 
taxation during the early state building years through much of the first half of the 20
th
 
century, decreased. The relative weight of direct income taxes, principally corporate 
income tax (in this time frequently state-owned) and personal income remained also 
relatively high.  
 
2. From 1970s onwards to the end of the 1980s: Tax collection did rise at some points but 
also was highly volatile. This reflects the economic volatility during this period but also 
changes in policy ideas on taxation. Around 1973 with the oil crisis, certain ideas on 
taxation changed. The advent of supply side economics, which emphasized the reduction 
in efficiency losses inherent in taxation, propagated a downsizing of taxes, especially 
direct taxes. The overall political and economic environment (inflation, fiscal deficits, 
rising debt, frequent regime changes and the struggle for democracy) also reduced overall 
tax collection. Instead for many governments in the 1970s contracting foreign debt, 
which in a more abstract way can be seen as a tax on future earnings, was a handsome 




3.  In the 1980s as debt levels became unsustainable, solutions to the high and unsustainable 
debt levels frequently induced by the “Washington consensus” organizations included a 
series of tax reforms with an emphasis on simplification and efficiency. 
 
Figure 2.1: Evolution of average tax revenues as a percentage of GDP of 18 Latin American 
countries, 1960-2014  
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Morán & Pecho 2016, p.2; Central Government revenues. 
 
4. From the 1990s to the year 2001/2: This period is often described as the time of “liberal 
tax reforms” (although some of these reforms have already been enacted before 1990). 
Tax policy, in line with principal ideas of the Washington Consensus, set out to eliminate 
taxes on international trade and replace the lost revenue (at least partially) with a solid tax 
on goods and services (principally the VAT), decrease rates in income taxes, and broaden 
tax bases (i.e. delete exemptions). Nevertheless, the emphasis of liberal reforms does not 
describe all policy changes. Some Latin American countries also introduced new 
‘heterodox’ taxes, such as the tax on financial transactions or simplified regimes for small 
businesses, and the political independence of tax administrations was strengthened and 
modernized. The principal aim of these reforms was to bolster collection, encourage 
foreign direct investment – at the cost of distribution and progressivity – in order to 
decrease the fiscal deficits in the region. However, with frequent global economic shocks 
(Russia, Mexico, the Asian Financial crisis) and unsophisticated economic growth, 
increases in tax collection were modest, only by 1.44 percentage points on average and 
too low to satisfy social demands or stimulate long term growth. The re-shifting of the tax 
mix from direct and trade taxes to indirect taxes is also visible in figure 2.  
 
5. During the commodity boom period between 2002 and 2013/14: Average tax collection 
reached new heights and the average tax mix started to be re-balanced. Thanks to an 
almost unprecedented period of sustained high commodity prices and economic growth, 
tax collection rose up to 16.2 % of GDP. In policy terms, three trends stand out. 
Governments engaged in tax reform that modified the taxation of the extractive industries 
(see Unit 10). Some governments engaged in modifications in the taxation of personal 
























































































































































taxation more progressive (see Unit 7). Tax administrations were modernized and 
strengthened (including an increased interregional cooperation) and, in some countries, 
new heterodox taxes (such as the export tax in Argentina) were introduced. These were, 
however, except for some minor cases not structural tax reforms but rather a pragmatic 
adaption to the economic cycle. In fact, one may argue that the countries benefited in 
some ways from the reforms of the 1990s which put emphasis on indirect taxation (VAT) 
which naturally rises with economic growth. The increase in the relative share of direct 
taxation was especially due to the increase in corporate income tax, thanks to the positive 
economic cycle (see Figure 2.2).   
 
Figure 2.2: Evolution of Tax Structure of Latin American tax systems, 5- year average as a 
percentage of total tax revenues, 18 Latin American countries, 1960-2014  
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Morán & Pecho 2016, p.10; Central Government revenue  
 
2.2 Research on the historical dimension of taxation in Latin America  
 
With this short sketch of Latin American tax history in mind, two questions emerge: How can 
we explain changes in (tax) institutions over time and why different societies might develop 
different sets of institutional (tax) arrangements? These two questions lie at the heart of much 
research that explores the historical dimension of tax institutions in Latin America and 
beyond. While, as we will see, this research differs in many ways, it shares the conviction that 
the history of institutional development provides superior explanations as de-contextualized 
and a-historical models and explanations for tax changes and evolution. In the following some 
of the main ideas of the most influential perspectives are described briefly: 
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- Modernization theory and early development economics  
The question what drives the development of tax institutions has been the key question to 
early modernization theory and early development experts. Despite differences in their 
reasoning, their key answer was economic development. Perhaps the most classic form of this 
idea was already mentioned in the work of Albert Wagner, a member of the nineteenth-
century German Historical School of economics. Wagner linked a country’s level of 
economic development to the increase in the relative size of its public sector and, hence by 
implication, its revenue-generating abilities (Wagner 1890). This idea also known as 
“Wagner’s law” – the natural tendency that the tax state grows with economic expansion - 
was later re-discovered by modernization theory, however with a certain twist. Economic 
development would progress within stages (see Rostow 1960) and run from an agrarian 
society up to a “modern” industrialized society. Taxation would follow this trend, or as Edwin 
R.A. Seligman claimed “fiscal conditions are always an outcome of economic relations” 
(1895-1931:1). The heyday of development economics also encompassed the international 
advisory missions by development economists and tax experts, most prominently for Latin 
America connected with the mission of Nicholas Kaldor as part of US foreign aid policies 
during the Cold War. In the view of these experts Latin America needed to “learn to tax”, that 
is make taxation efficient, productive and equitable in order to support the transition of their 
economies, i.e. support the movement from one stage to another. In the most basic form this 
meant: there had been low taxation, mostly in-kind (e.g. as a share of harvest) in agrarian 
societies as little surplus was produced. Later, with the growth of markets and the 
development of industrial production, tax policy should be expanded to include new kind of 
taxes of the economic surplus, and as trade expanded, trade taxes could be introduced as well 
(despite taxes on the products of land).  
 
The second twist in modernization theory was that economic development also was expected 
to bring democracy (Lipset 1959). As democracy required governments to increase 
legitimacy, it was expected that governments would react with the introduction of modern 
taxes, including redistributive taxes, which on the one hand expanded the fiscal space of the 
state and thus its spending hand, increasing legitimacy through output (in services, 
infrastructure, etc.) but also expanded compliance via securing equality and thus increasing 
legitimacy in the lower income strata. Here an idea was expressed which later become of 
wider importance: the democracy – taxation hypothesis: democracy has a positive effect on 
taxation, as there is “no taxation without representation” (see Unit 3).  
 
The modernization theory, however, ran not only in the trap that it had a very specific 
normative and teleological underpinning but also that it lacked a way to account for the 
differences in tax system trajectories observable in non-industrialized countries. Why did tax 
systems evolve and remain different if there was supposedly a common path to modernity and 
by this a convergence of tax systems? The answers were not satisfactory and variation would 
be for example explained with different “cultures” which led modern societies to choose 
different policies. This critique highlights the weakness of modernization theory to provide a 
basic answer to actor choices in taxation, namely why would actors consent to a fiscal 
contract (paying taxes in exchange for services and rights) and how such a contractual 
18 
 
situation – today often framed as equilibrium - could be maintained. The elite theory 
approaches, prominent in public choice theory form the 1960s onwards, but also later in a 
different form of a revaluated neo-institutionalism, provided a better account for these 
questions. These approaches are discussed in Unit 4. Beside the fallacies of modernization 
theory, there are still authors who claim that a positive link between economic development 
and taxation is empirically observable (see Gupta 2007, and Pessino and Fenochietto 2010, 
among others).  
 
- Taxation and War – State-building literature 
One of the most prominent explanations of tax state development was already put forward by 
Joseph Schumpeter, an intellectual founder of the fiscal sociology school (see Unit 4). 
Schumpeter borrowing from his Marxist contemporary Rudolf Goldscheid posed the question 
why European societies developed a bureaucratic tax state in the first place. He found the 
answer in war and military conquest. Taxation and with it the construction of a bureaucratic 
state apparatus to collect these taxes was needed to finance standing armies. Standing armies 
financed by taxation were the answer to overcome the hurdles kings had to overcome in the 
light of military conflict. They provided a suitable alternative to the frequent pledges of 
support (in personal or finance) to royal allies (dukes, princes, earls, etc.) kings had to engage 
because their own military capacity was insufficient to confront military threats. 
 
In a seminal study, Charles Tilly (1992) expanded this idea to European state building in 
general. In their view the war-state nexus was the crucial, critical juncture, for European state 
building. As revenues were needed for war, rulers engaged in taxation. Taxation however 
implied the built up of an administrative corps, which was nothing less than the foundation of 
modern bureaucracies, the core of modern nation state. Wars and belligerent rivalry between 
European states was thus a critical juncture of both the rise of the modern nation state and 
taxation. Following Tilly (1985:180) “war, state apparatus, taxation, and borrowing advanced 
in tight cadence”. A follow up of this idea is that the tax state and especially (modern) direct 
taxation was the observation that rulers engaged in building up the tax system in order to 
service large amounts of short term debt which had to be repaid after the wars (Saylor and 
Wehler 2017). Wars were in this view not only crucial for the rise of the tax state but also for 
the modern state (namely the rise of mass income taxes).  
 
The problem with the war-taxation thesis is that its explanatory power was limited to the 
European state building history. In fact, war did not make states in Latin America. States were 
the result of the colonial independence in a particular post-colonial society. Scholars thus 
explored why the war–taxation nexus did not materialize in post-colonial countries in general 
and Latin America in particular. The answers where diverse: Some claimed that the frequency 
and depth of wars was not given in Latin America. More fine-grained explorations however 
showed that some wars indeed were very costly for Latin American countries and posed a 
significant revenue raising effort for these countries. In addition, after wars – for example 
such as the War of the Triple Alliance – countries had accumulated significant debt which 
needed to be repaid. Authors suggest that the war-taxation nexus did not apply well in Latin 
America because rulers had access to alternative sources of public finance. Access to foreign 
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credit provided an easily available alternative for states elites to access finance without 
increasing taxation during war times (Centeno 1995), and thus a consistent built up of the 
Latin American tax state was postponed.  
 
Contemporary research follows this idea but frames this failed war-state nexus as a voluntary 
decision of Latin American governments. It was not only that credit was readily available but 
also that ruling coalitions in Latin American countries, dominated by landed elites, favored 
rising debt levels over increased taxes, because of their ability to resist or take advantage of 
structural adjustment policies, like inflation. Thus, the internal power dynamics between elite 
groups explain the deliberative policy decision of governments to favor debt taking over the 
strong taxing institutions after war (Saylor 2015). 
 
- Economic dependency and post-colonial internal conditions  
The focus on the link between - what economists would call - the distribution of factor 
endowments, power relations in Latin American society and taxation is also the principal idea 
of scholarship which explains the unfavorable tax system development with the economic 
dependency or the post-colonial legacy of Latin American societies. This research also 
connects to the principal idea of dependency theory which stated that economic development 
of Latin American countries was frustrated by their specific insertion into the global economy 
as exporter of primary goods (commodities), resulting in negative terms of trade and a 
comparative disadvantage against their industrialized trading partners but also the social 
relations which resulted and were re-shaped by this economic insertion set by history, namely 
elite dominance, persistent inequality and exclusive citizenship.  
 
The negative influence of commodity dependence on tax systems is present in contemporary 
research of the challenges to tax extractive industries and to fiscal sustainability (see Unit 10) 
as well as in standard textbooks of Latin American economic history (Bértola and Ocampo 
2013; Blumer 2003). Most prominent, however, are two strands of reasoning, the resource 
curse literature, which states that rent generating export commodities (minerals or oil) 
dissuade the built up of the tax state and state building in general because they provide 
revenue windfalls. Rulers can satisfy their revenue needs without building an effective 
taxation apparatus, which would extract sufficient revenues from the society. but instead 
choose to use resource rents. In contrast to nonrenewable resources (oil, minerals), 
agricultural commodities are more auspicious for state building, since they arguably force the 
creation of greater extractive capability (Dunning 2008; Karl 1997, Ross 2001). Even so, all 
commodity exports can be taxed easily at ports, if not at the point of production. Such easy 
revenue is also said to enable fragile state building, including a weak tax state, among primary 
commodity exporters in general particularly compared to their resource-scarce counterparts 
(Doner, Ritchie, Slater 2005) (see also Unit 10). The resulting fiscal dependence on volatile 
commodity revenues makes countries more vulnerable for the future and unable to confront 
economic booms and busts with sound fiscal policy.  
 
The second strand of research points to the social relations inherited by the colonial period, 
namely the high levels of inequality. Such research explores how being a colony strongly 
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influenced mediating institutions such as schooling, suffrage and/or land distribution and thus 
created “paths of institutional development” detrimental to economic development. With 
respect to tax policy, Sokolof and Zolt (2007) in a seminal article, look at the impact of social 
inequality inherited by the colony on tax system development. Comparing the tax systems of 
Latin America with their North American counterparts, they find that “the initial distribution 
of wealth, human capital, and political influence seems to have had a profound impact on how 
tax and other government institutions and programs evolved” (p. 205). The principal 
mechanism behind this is that progressive tax and expenditure policies were obstructed at the 
local and regional level in Latin America due to high inequality and elite dominance. This 
stands in contrast to what happened in North America, where more egalitarian societies 
implemented progressive taxation and expenditure at the local and regional level. In Latin 
America, by contrast, inequality led to regressive tax systems and low levels of redistributive 
expenditure policies, thus perpetuating inequality. This focus on social configurations, 




Group work exercise:   
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have minimum of 2 and 
maximum of 5 students. Each group is assigned on of the following texts week ahead of class: 
Schneider 2012; Centeno 1997; Saylor & Wheeler 2016; Mares & Queralt 2015; Wagner 
1890; Seligman 1931; Sokoloff & Zolt 2007; Rostow 1960. The groups should read and 
discuss the text within the group. In class, they should give a short (5-8 min) presentation 
summarizing the main argument of the text. Emphasis should be given on a graphical display 
of the main argument using an arrow diagram or other forms of visualization. They also 
should give attention to the methodological strategy pursued in the contribution and the use of 
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Unit 3: Taxation and State Capacity, Representation & Welfare  
Unit 2 introduced the importance of taxation for state building processes in Europe and Latin 
America. We have seen that taxation is central for the rise of bureaucratic administration, the 
legitimacy of the state and the allocation of public and private resources. This unit reviews the 
inter-relationship between taxation and the state and presents theories and perspectives for 
nexus of taxation and (a) representation and political institutions and (b) state and 
bureaucratic capacity. 
 
Learning goals:  
 
• Students will become familiar with of how taxation is related with regime type, 
representation and state capacity.   
• Students will be able to apply the idea of fiscal contracting to explain tax regimes and tax 
dynamics.  
• Students will theorize about the effects of taxation on state capacity and the welfare state. 
 
3.1 Taxation and regime type and capacity  
One of main ideas of the historically centered literature discussed in Unit 2 was that taxation 
was a central part of the building of the modern nation state. Several authors claim that thanks 
to taxation, rulers were obliged to build modern bureaucracies and thus set in motion a state 
building process leading to states based on a rational-legal organization of public life. Within 
this literature, some authors did not only claim that taxation was central to the rise of the 
nation state, but was also a determinant for the form of government. Central idea is that for 
reaching (quasi voluntary) compliance of citizens to pay taxes, governments had to offer not 
only public goods but also representation. The popular slogan “no taxation without 
representation” expresses this idea to the present day. Based on the story of European state 
building, authors claimed that increasing taxation and increasing democracy thus go hand in 
hand.  
 
In the contemporary literature, this idea is present in writings which investigate the 
connection between taxation and regime type. The principal hypothesis is that a) democracies 
are likely to tax more and b) because, democracies increase the incentives for politicians to 
engage in winning the vote of the majority democracies will tax more progressively (i.e. tax 
the rich more heavily). Comparative large-n research on this topic, however, does not 
completely confirm this claim. Several factors may influence the taxation-representation 
nexus: a) access to rents from non-renewable resources may defer governments from 
bargaining with citizens b) the quality of democracy matters c) several other factors may 
influence the tax level (crisis, composition of the economy) d) with respect to the second 
hypothesis about a more progressive tax mix, progressive taxation may be circumvented if 
welfare spending is progressive, or if the claim for pro-progressive vote is ruled out by 
conservative votes which can better rally support for other issues (religion, etc.). 
Nevertheless, some comparative studies did show that regime type may have statistical 
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relevance, but that not democracy but the degree of liberal rule is crucial. The statistical work 
by James Mahon (2005) reported in Section 2.2 points the same way: the dependence of 
contemporary governments on general taxation is more strongly associated with liberal rule 
(i.e. institutionalized constraints on state power) than with democracy. 
 
In this line of research, some scholars, however, have pointed out that the direction of the 
taxation-representation link may be reversed. For example, Boucoyannis (2015) claims that 
representation occurred first in states with a well-developed state and tax capacity. This 
suggests that societal demands for accountability and better governance are more likely to 
emerge in response to tax regimes that are already effectively applied. However, the reverse 
has not been found to apply. 
 
A second prominent strand of research connects taxation with state capacity. This literature, 
also a result of the works on European state building literature, claims that taxation is a 
central measure for the capacity of the state. Capacity here is frequently linked to the 
definition of “infrastructural power by” M. Mann (1984). Infrastructural power of the state is 
central to penetrate society. In this concept, taxation is seen as a central aspect because it can 
show the extractive power of the state, i.e. the capacity of the state to extract revenue from 
citizens, for example elites. Several works thus used measured of taxation (tax/GDP, tax 
ratios, tax mix) as a proxy for state capacity (see Unit 4), not least  because tax data is one of 
the oldest available data for countries around the world.  
 
Contemporary scholarship in Latin America highlighted the fact that the expansion of VAT 
during the 1990s has improved the administrative capacity of the Latin American states 
(Mahon 2004; Bird and Zolt 2015). State capacity, in turn, has been seen to affect effective 
tax extraction, while low levels of extractive capacity feed back into low levels of state 
capacity (Centeno 2002; Kurtz 2013; Soifer 2013). 
 
3.2 Taxation and the welfare state 
A second research topic is the relationship between taxation and welfare politics. With the 
challenges of the welfare state in Europe from the 1980s onward, research on social policy 
and the welfare state expanded. Authors defined types of welfare states (or worlds of welfare) 
accounting for the important differences within industrialized countries (see e.g. Esping-
Anderson 2013), or connected these social policies to varieties of capitalism they identified to 
be present around the world. With the rise of globalization (see Unit 8) and rising fiscal 
deficits after the 1970s, the question of welfare financing and thus taxation was back at the 
table. 
 
Some scholars argued that types of welfare (and their evolution) can be explained by different 
patterns of tax system development. For example, it was argued that liberal welfare states 
have more progressive taxes than the conservative and social democratic welfare states 
(Wilensky, 2002; Kato, 2003; Lindert, 2004). Kato (2003) also argued that countries can only 
develop large welfare states if they first adopt regressive taxes. The prime example is the 
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USA, which adopted income tax as its major form of finance before the First World War, and 
because it resisted the VAT on several occasions, the financial basis for the welfare state was 
undermined (Morgan and Prasad, 2009). However, the sequence is not clear, since either the 
decision to adopt regressive taxes preceded, and enabled, the growth of the welfare state or 
policy-makers adopted regressive taxes because they wanted a form of finance that would 
allow the state to grow (Ganghof 2006, Lindert 2004).  
 
In any event, the tax mix is seen as determinant to the development of the welfare state in 
times of increasing globalization. The argument is that regressive taxation keeps the wealthy 
on the side of the welfare state and allows them to consent to within-class redistribution 
(Wilensky 2002). Meanwhile, progressive taxation raises frequent conflict over revenue 
generation (Prasad 2006) and thus puts the welfare state in question. As tax systems in 
Europe, shifted to rely on indirect taxation, authors argued that this was the reason the 
resilience of European welfare states in the face of globalization (Hays 2003). A ‘race to the 
bottom’ could be avoided because welfare states were financed with forms of taxation that 
were not subject to global competition, specifically, taxes on labor rather than capital (see 
Unit 8). In Latin America, the development of the welfare state was less successful and 
exclusionary welfare states are present until today. Research that aims to link the development 
of the welfare state and taxation is still rare for the region but some studies suggest that this 
may have to do with the frustrated expansion of taxes (principal income tax) from a class-
based tax (paid only by the wealthy) to a mass-based tax (Biehl and Labarca 2017) and thus 
private-financed insurance schemes (instead of state-financed) remained important, especially 
in the rural areas.  
 
3.3 Fiscal contracting  
Several political scientists make reference to the contractual nature of taxation. As discussed 
in Unit 4, taxation can be framed as a contract between individuals and the state (rulers and 
the ruled). Joseph Schumpeter, one of the first to highlight this idea, already posed the 
question the “fiscal contracting” literature later aims to answer:  
- Which particular form does the bargain over this contract take and which players are 
relevant?  
- What factors are most important to explain the outcome of (tax) bargaining?  
- How is the contract maintained, or what sustains taxpayers’ consent to be taxed on an 
ongoing basis? 
 
As drastic changes in modern tax systems (in the level of taxes collected as well as the tax 
mix) seldom happen overnight and significant changes are more due to long term processes, 
authors have suggested that taxation can be framed as a self-enforcing equilibrium, 
particularly if   different countries are compared with each other.  
 
‘Fiscal contractualism’ suggests that taxation rests on a contract between citizens and 
governments. The idea of the contract supposes that no actor can make a unilateral decision to 
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alter the contract (in a sustainable way) but has to negotiate with the other. Typically, scholars 
propose some solutions to change the fiscal contract: 
- “tit for tat”; or compensation: citizens pay more taxes if they have a clear and identifiable 
increase in service (Timmons 2005); 
- Change in initial conditions: the power relations which underpin the bargaining alter 
dramatically (war, revolution); 
- Increase in the number of players: another solution would be to increase the number of 
relevant players. For example, governments may be able to rally support by external 
actors (IMF, etc.) or strong civil society groups and thus increase the pressure for change; 
- Increase the bargaining issue: Another common strategy to negotiations is to increase the 
value of what is at stake. For example, governments, may link tax increases on the 
wealthy with incentives in other areas (deregulation in specific sectors); 
- Create credible channels of bargaining and credible commitment: There is an argument in 
the literature that political institutions which accumulate political interests (strong and 
stable parties) on the state side and coherent encompassing business organizations on the 
other side are decisive for the elite/business side. Other “organizational” forms are 
conceivable (based on culture, ethnic cleavage, etc.); 
- Overlap between political and economic interest. For example, the ruling coalitions of the 
19
th
 century in Latin America. 
 
Important to mention is that a successful bargain may not always mean more taxation and 
especially more progressive taxation, as the fiscal contract ultimately depends on the mutual 
interests of the parties involved.  
 
The crucial question is what defines these long-term equilibriums, and thereby explains the 
existing variation in tax composition among developing countries. Three arguments have been 
put forward: 
- Administrative and capacity constraints: For example, if “hard to tax” sectors exist, 
government and administration is seen as weak, or when bureaucratic quality is weak it is 
assumed that indirect taxes would be favored over direct ones.  
- Incentives for governments to tax more (political will): For example, some authors have 
argued that political considerations can shape the decision of political actors. A classic 
idea is that democracies are likely to tax more and more progressively, i.e. that regime 
type matters for taxation. However, in Latin American countries, formal political 
institutions (which are the ones likely to be measured) are frequently less important than 
informal ones in the policy process. 
- Elite and the state: elites are principal actors when it comes to taxation in “developing” 
countries (see Unit 6). Elites concentrate economic, political and social power and they 
are likely to see their interest threatened by higher taxation.   
Some authors argue that elite cohesion is decisive. The argument: more cohesive elites are 
more powerful to resist. Others argue, in contrast, that more cohesive elites are more 
likely to be a credible bargaining partner, if a credible actor on the political side exists as 
well (for example stable political parties, or if interests align, etc.) and compromise or 
identification is more likely, e.g. trading higher taxes for other state-financed benefits. 
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3.4 Political ideology and tax systems  
One particular strand of the taxation – state literature is research on the question of whether 
taxation is shaped by ideological preferences. For Latin America, this is still an emerging 
research field. The principal claim is that parties with a certain ideological preposition – e.g. 
“leftist” orientation – favor distributive policies, and thus take a pro-tax stand. There are 
several challenges to such research. First of all, in many ways so far research on ideology and 
taxation is very much inspired by crude one-to-one application of European concepts and 
categories. This is the case with the scales by which the ideology of political parties or 
political actors is measured, as well as the categories used themselves. Political parties in 
Latin America are difficult to compare to their European counterparts, and their frequently 
decentralized party organizations, personalistic features or clientelism may out rule 
ideological concerns as a centrifugal force. Informal politics and informal bargaining often 
count more than formal decision making processes within political parties. However, new 
studies based on expert surveys, for example surveys among parliamentary elites (PELA, 
project by the University of Salamanca) present alternative measures of ideology. The result 
is mixed at best: Some studies find that ideology influences local government expenditures 
but not taxes, or that left governments collect more revenue than right governments from 
business taxes, but less revenue from property taxes, or that left-leaning governments are 
more likely to implement tax reforms that seek to increase taxes, and, in particular, income 
tax revenues.   
 
Group work:  
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group should select an Andean country of its choice (if there 
are more groups than countries, groups can select other Latin American countries). The task 
for each group is to develop a map of actors relevant for tax policy in the country. Based on 
their own research from available sources, the group should visualize the relevant actors and 
their positions towards tax policy. Actors may include political parties, social organizations, 
business groups, worker unions or other forms of organized interest. Groups should present 
their results in front class. This group work can be connected with later group work, namely 
in Units 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and may provide the first step of an encompassing analysis of 
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Unit 4: Fiscal Sociology: Taxation & Society  
Taxation has not only been the domain of public accountants, quantitative economists or tax 
lawyers but also a principal object of interest in sociology and classical political economy. 
This sub-discipline called fiscal sociology has regained considerable attention since its rise in 
the early decades of the 20th century and its decline in the middle of the 20
th
 century. Fiscal 
sociology aims to explore the relational dimension of taxation. The basic concern of this 
approach is how tax systems are shaped by society and society (and social change) is shaped 
by tax systems. This unit provides an introduction in to the basic ideas of fiscal sociology and 
highlights its main themes. Special attention is given to the role of elites, one of the principle 
topics in the literature on Latin America. Note that the main ideas of fiscal sociology school 
have informed various other aspects studied in other units, regarding normative debates, tax 




• Students will learn the fundamental ideas of fiscal sociology. 
• Students will be able to use tax indicators as indicators for social change and know about 
the virtues and limits of such indicators. 
• Students will theorize about the social effects of taxation and how taxation may be related 
to other social phenomena.  
 
4.1 Principles of fiscal sociology 
The spirit of a people, its cultural level, its social structure, the deeds its policy may prepare – 
all this and more is written in its fiscal history, stripped of all phrases. He who knows how to 
listen to its message here discerns the thunder of world history more clearly than anywhere 
else.” (Joseph Schumpeter [1918] 1991)  
 
In Unit 3 we have seen that taxation is central for the powers and legitimacy of the state; the 
allocation of public and private resources and the rise of bureaucratic administration. Many 
sociologists today however are rediscovering the importance of taxation not only for these 
state-related aspects but as a central aspect of modern societies in general. For fiscal 
sociologists, taxation is more than a revenue collecting tools. As Martin, Mehrotra, and 
Prasad state in the introduction of a book on the “new” fiscal sociology in 2009: “taxes 
formalize our obligations to each other. They define the inequalities we accept and those that 
we collectively seek to redress. They signify who is a member of our political community, 
how wide we draw the circle of ‘we.’ They set the boundaries of what our governments can 
do. In the modern world, taxation is the social contract” (2009:1). Along the lines of the 
above quote of Joseph Schumpeter, the founder of what is now called fiscal sociology, taxes 
are seen as central to understanding modern societies but also are highly important because 





The relational perspective of taxation was first expressed most clearly by Joseph A. 
Schumpeter in the beginning of the 20
th
 century. His idea, very much part of a more general 
debate about the social, economic and civic role of taxation (among others with important 
contributions by the Austrian Marxist Rudolf Goldscheid, Max Weber, and others) was based 
on a classical political economic perspective, combining the social, historical, political and 
economic spheres of life. Schumpeter proposed to see taxation as a “symptom” and a “cause” 
of large-scale changes in the economy and society (see also Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 
2009). He claimed that “The public finances are one of the best starting points for an 
investigation of society, especially though not exclusively of its political life” ([1918] 1991: 
7).  
 
4.2 Taxation as an indicator for social change  
After Schumpeter, several scholars treated taxation as a symptom or an indicator of social 
change. For example, it can indicate to what degree taxpayers consent to pay taxes and thus 
accept the state that they are living in, or in other words, how much they accept the state as 
the legitimate order that they are living in. It has also been taken to indicate the degree to 
which capital owners or the rich are taxed, which in turn could be interpreted as a measure for 
the value, desire or acceptance of a more egalitarian society and the capacity or power of the 
state to extract resources. To the present day, tax data is used as an index for different 
concepts like democracy, capitalism, the rise (see Unit 2) and fall (see Unit 8) of the state or 
the modernization of society. Using tax data as a proxy for these phenomena may not always 
be convincing on its own but there are good reasons to use taxation as an indicator in large 
scale analysis. One of the most important is that tax data is largely available, has historical 
depth and is comparable across time and space. Within working groups in this course, the 
relevance of tax indicators, their influence and use should be critically discussed (see group 
work).  
 
4.3 Taxation as a cause of social change  
The second Schumpeterian idea, that taxation is also a cause of social changes only recently 
has been re-explored. Scholars of what some have claimed “new” fiscal sociology argue that 
for several reasons taxation ‘has also a theoretical or causal importance for modern life, 
because (Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad 2009: 3-4): 
 
- “Taxation establishes one of the most widely and persistently experienced relationships 
that individuals have with their government and – through their government – with their 
society as a whole. This makes taxation a crucial element in the development and 
formation of the society into an  ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) of the modern 
nation-state. Taxation enmeshes us in the web of generalized reciprocity that constitutes 
modern society.” (p.3) 
 
- “Taxation establishes a dynamic relationship between the taxpayer and the state, in which 
there always exists a potential conflict of interest. The state, the very guarantor of social 
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order in the modern world, depends on a relationship that always contains the latent 
possibility of conflict and disorder.” (p 4). This is the reason why most authors in the field 
of fiscal sociology speak of (temporary) fiscal contracts when they describe a particular 
state of a tax regime. These contracts are the (temporary) outcome or result of this 
conflictive bargaining relationship. 
  
- Taxation is not comparable to other sacrifices (e.g., compliance with traffic laws) or state 
extractions (e.g., conscripted military service) that the state demands from its citizens. 
This is because at the very heart of taxation lies the idea that taxes are, and should be, paid 
without receiving a concrete service in return: “The resources extracted through taxation 
are exchangeable for other resources; they make possible not just one state action, but 
most if not all of the state’s activities. And the more extensive the activities of the state, 
the more extensive the reliance on taxation – and the broader the potential ramifications of 
changes in tax policy […] In modern states, therefore, taxation is not only a dynamic, 
potentially conflictual relationship, but one whose changing forms may have potentially 
far-reaching implications. The taxpayer’s decision to evade or resist taxation may 
challenge the existing social order, as well as the very basis for enforcing social order – in 
a way that decisions to evade or resist speed limits, social policies, or sumptuary laws do 
not. The state’s mode of establishing and enforcing taxation may shape the social order in 
its turn.” (p.4). 
  
Identifying taxation in this relational dimension (as cause and symptom) has led scholars to 
question several common understandings, for example of the origins of Western democracy,  
the welfare state, civil war or ethnic conflict, the extension of democracy, the formation of the 
family, the perpetuation of gender relations, or other social outcomes. However, the research 
in fiscal sociology which investigates the second Schumpeterian claim (taxation as cause) for 
Latin America is still following in its footsteps and much is left to be explored (Atria, Groll 
and Valdes 2017). Until now scholars have not found compelling answers to one of the wider 
questions Schumpeter already had raised in his work: how did taxation and the particular 
ﬁscal bargains which it represents affect civilizations, cultures, and “forms of life” 
(Schumpeter [1918] 1991: 100)?  
 
Nevertheless, one of the most important and fruitful contributions of fiscal sociology to the 
Latin American tax debate is the focus on elites and taxation. Already in the work of 
Schumpeter, taxation was framed as an (existing) social contract. This contract was the result 
of a historic bargain between rulers and ruled forged in a particular time and place. His 
interest was then to explore several key questions about this contract. For example, the 
particular forms of the bargain, how the bargain is maintained, or the causes of what sustains 
the taxpayers’ consent to be taxed on an ongoing basis (Schumpeter [1918] 1991: 100)? 
 
This idea, that tax policy was basically an “elite affair”, or in classic terms a struggle among 
classes, was also present in the writings of Weber, Marx, Engels as well as Rudolf 
Goldscheid. Weber went so far to claim that modern democracies were more and more 
cautious toward the propertied classes “because governments increasingly must compete with 
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one another to attract a tax base of mobile capital” (1968: 352). Later Margaret Levi’s (1988) 
seminal study emphasizes how rulers use norms and ideology as a means to motivate tax 
payment through quasi-voluntary compliance. But in general, Latin American elites have not 
pressed for robust tax systems (Centeno, 1997). Within the region, Soifer (2015) highlights 
how varying elite ideologies produced divergent fiscal systems in Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Peru. Schneider (2012) similarly points to differing levels of elite cohesion and 
dominance to account for variation in Central American tax regimes. Finally, Lieberman 
(2003) offers a cross-regional analysis of how the elite’s racial and regional attachments 
influence fiscal policy. Each of these studies highlights how elites and broader social currents 
combine to chart the fiscal course of Latin American countries. The role of elites is central to 
understanding taxation in the region and we will therefore address their role in several other 





Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group should select an Andean country of its choice (if more 
groups than countries, groups can select other Latin American countries). The task for each 
group is to interpret as much as possible social phenomena via tax indicators (with the help of 
taking a look into the literature). The groups should discuss which indicators are useful and 
why, what they can explain and what not, and which alternatives may exist. Students should 
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Unit 5: Justice, Ownership and Taxation 
This unit reviews taxation from a moral and philosophical point of view. Being one of the 
most fundamental and influential institutions in all modern societies taxation raises normative, 
ethical, and moral question. All discussions and designs of taxation and specific taxes are 
connected with assumptions about what is just and morally right. Take for example the debate 
about whether taxation should help to redistribute income. How can a tax system be justified 
in which richer people pay more taxes than poor people?  
 
Answers to such questions do not refer to technical aspects or abstract economic models 
alone. They also embrace moral standpoints about underlying concepts which are connected 
with tax matters. For example, a morally grounded answer to the above question would entail 
specific ideas about the role of the state (do we favor an interventionist state or a state which 
is limited to its basic functions?); our conception of property and ownership (is private 
property to be protected by any price?); the idea of citizenship (are tax payers part of the 
political community and thus bearers of rights?); and of our idea of justice and fairness (what 
is a just society and how should we reach it?). All of these topics have been subject to their 
own extensive and ongoing philosophical, moral and normative debates. This unit will not 
dwell on these debates but instead introduce the principal moral arguments surrounding 
taxation and its underlying concepts. It also presents modern movements that advocate for 
more justice and fairness in taxation in Latin America and beyond. 
  
Learning goals:  
 
• Students will become aware of the moral questions and grounding concepts which underlie 
taxation and tax design. 
• Students will understand the concept of tax justice and be familiar with moral perspectives 
and foundations of taxation, ownership, justice and fairness. 
• • Students will be able to reflect on and analyze current tax systems in Latin America in 
terms of justice. 
 
5.1 Moral and philosophical issues of taxation  
Taxation is one of the fundamental mechanisms the state imposes in society and establishes a 
very personal relationship with citizens in taking away part of their private property. 
However, the extent and depth of this intervention is highly disputed. Such disputes are not 
only motivated by private interests but are also influenced by moral views. Moral and ethical 
considerations can not only guide taxation and tax design; they may also help to increase the 
public acceptance of taxation and decrease tax avoidance or evasion. This is important as the 
good functioning of a tax system also depends on the tax behavior of individual taxpayers, 
which importantly depends on their moral view of taxes. Finally, in tax policy debates, moral 
and ethical arguments can play an important role to rally support or legitimate arguments, 
although frequently they are not spelled out clearly. These are all reasons why ethical, moral 
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and normative question related to tax systems have their relevance and are of importance 
beyond the limited role they are assigned in the quantitative public finance literature.  
 
Several topics have been widely discussed in the literature and engage in this discussion. One 
of the most important is the question of tax fairness: Who should pay taxes and how much? 
Tax fairness often is related to ideas of justice. Often we assume that if a tax system is just it 
is also fair. But what is a just tax system and what is our conception of justice? As 
Geisenbauer et al. (2015) argue that an answer to these questions would entail discussion at 
several levels:  
- What is the justification of taxation as such and what role should taxation play with 
respect to social justice? 
- How should the tax system and particular taxes be designed to be just? For example, 
specific taxes, like wealth and inheritance taxes maybe especially useful to contribute to 
social justice but they are also the most contested. 
- Following the discussion in Unit 8, what is the global level with respect to justice? 
 
5.2 Fair and just taxation  
Moral aspects of tax fairness include two questions (see also Geisenbauer et al. (2015)). A 
general question which can ask whether taxation is generally justified and a given tax burden 
is just. A more specific one which asks if a given tax burden is fairly distributed among 
taxpayers. Two opposing concepts have been put forward to provide answers to both of these 
questions, the benefit principle and the ability to pay principle: 
 
(a) The benefit principle: The benefit principle is said to first being formally theorized by 
Adam Smith in 1776 and is well connected to contractual social theories. The idea is that 
taxes are the price citizens have to pay for the use of public services which are rendered 
to the public, i.e. to the direct benefit of the individual. Citizens thus should only pay as 
many taxes as are necessary for the services they receive and take advantage of. The 
benefit principle has a contractual root as it combines the revenue raising side with the 
spending side. However, this idea also implies that citizens should not being taxed for 
services they don’t want or need. Public choice authors argue moreover that this idea 
gives strong incentives for taming a possibly overarching state – or leviathan state - and 
is thus best suited to secure democratic standards (i.e. the prevention of state tyranny). 
The benefit principle does support some redistribution via taxation, but it is not the 
proper role of the state to interfere in the property of citizens without offering a service in 
exchange and citizens are assumed to be likely to take advantage of public services in 
roughly the same degree.  
 
(b) The ability to pay principle: The first formal theorizing of the ability to pay principle 
can also be connected with the writings of Adam Smith but also John Stuart Mill. The 
ability to pay principle rests on two main ideas developed in the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 
century: The idea of equal sacrifice (for a short discussion see Musgrave 1959) - if all 
citizens have equal access to public services then there is some equity justification for 
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asking citizens to make equal sacrifices in order to provide those services - and the idea 
developed in economics of the marginal utility of income: marginal utility is diminishing 
if a person gets richer because the needs/wants which are being met by additional income 
are less urgent than the basic needs that have to be met by earlier income. Thus, the 
utility of more income decreases with income. The resulting idea is that every taxpayer 
should make the same (absolute, relative or marginal) sacrifice. Redistribution via 
taxation would be legitimate and morally supported.   
 
In contemporary tax systems, which are built upon a multitude of different types of taxes and 
not upon a single tax, the question is not too choose for one or the other principle but rather to 
ask which principle gives better answers to the detailed problems of (de-)legitimizing tax 
policy decisions on different levels.  
 
5.3 Moral views on underlying concepts of taxation  
 
The normative underpinnings of these two principles are not sufficient on their own to build 
an elaborated theory of taxation and social justice on them. Authors therefore frequently 
connect tax matters and specifically these two principles with a clarification of underlying 
concepts. Of course, a close revision of a tax system may turn this perspective upside down: 
via the analysis of taxation we may infer the dominant and collectively shared view of the 
underlying concepts held by society and government. Some of these concepts can be:  
 
- Normative ideas on the state. Moral tax reasoning should make an argument concerning 
the concept of the state. The state may be seen as a technical instrument to realize tax 
justice considerations, but it is never simply a neutral ground where tax ideas compete and 
the best one wins. Statehood and taxation are narrowly intertwined, and so are taxation, 
poverty alleviation and social justice. 
- Citizenship: Citizenship regimes define which persons are recognized as legitimate 
political actors, bearers of rights and responsibilities before the state, and able to use 
mechanisms of participation in the public and political process in a society. Taxation is 
directly related with citizenship regimes as the ability to pay as well as the benefit 
principle relates taxation to state services. Now the question arises if taxes are paid by 
foreigners, what citizenship status should these persons be granted? Or if there is a certain 
citizenship regime, e.g. an idea of equal citizenship, how can the tax system contribute to 
this idea? 
- Property & Ownership: Taxation directly affects private property. More radical liberal 
and libertarian concepts of property would state that state intervention should be limited to 
a very minimum and private property has to be protected. A historic argument is that 
property and wealth distribution is an expression of the natural order of things and should 
thus be maintained. An example is the Edinburgh-rule of 1833 which stated that taxes 
should not change the relative position of taxpayers, instead, to ‘leave them as you find 
them”, neglecting ethical and political claims for progressive taxation by portraying all 
redistributive effects of taxation as unjust. More modern libertarian positions modify this 
point but also entail an anti-interventionist stance. Take the influential writing of Robert 
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Nozick (1974) who proposes a rights-based libertarian view and a neglect of distribution 
via taxation. 
 
In contrast, there are also radical redistributive claims and social constructivist views on 
property. The principal idea is that property would not be possible without a legal and 
political framework including the idea of property and property rights which enables 
economic activities and network formation. The frequent claim that taxation is evaluated 
against changes in property is thus misleading, as it is property which would not be 
possible without the very legal and political systems taxes are financing. In the words of 
Murphy and Nagel (2002: 8) “Private property is a legal convention, defined in part by the 
tax system; therefore, the tax system cannot be evaluated by looking at its impact on 
private property, conceived as something that has independent existence and validity. 
Taxes must be evaluated as part of the overall system of property rights that they help to 
create”. Such views would thus help to legitimize property taxation. 
 
- Social Justice and Equality: An assessment of whether tax systems are fair and just also 
has to be made against the ideas of equality and justice. What is just and what should be 
equal and how such equality and justice should be pursued is subject to intensive moral 
and normative debates. Most prominent ideas include liberal ideas of equality, e.g. by 
John Rawls or communitarian proposals, e.g. by Michael Walzer or radical libertarianism, 
e.g. by Robert Nozick. These are lively, ongoing and very relevant debates which can 
shape the moral assessment of taxation.  
 
5.4 Global tax fairness  
In a globalized world tax matters also have an increasing transnational dimension. All aspects 
of this transnational dimension of taxation, including tax havens, the difficulty of adequately 
taxing international corporations and capital, issues of international tax competition and 
‘location factors’, the lack of transparency in global (legal and illicit) financial flows and the 
lack of global tax governance have important ramifications for tax justice as well as for 
addressing questions of global and local poverty and justice. However, frequently debates on 
tax justice are limited to a conception of social justice within a certain (national) political 
community or nation state. Most recently there is a growing debate about global tax justice 
and how this could be reached (Pogge and Krishen 2016). This debate is also very much 
present in the work of several non-governmental organizations in the Americas. Some of the 




Group Exercise:  
 
Students write, after a group discussion, a ‘four minute’ paper on the topic “What are just 
taxes?” Guidelines of the exercise: After a discussion in small groups or in plenum 
1) Students are provided with a blank piece of paper  
2) One minute is given to the students to elaborate arguments in a graphical form, e.g. 
Via a mind map, etc. 
3) Two minutes are given to write down the argument and a discussion of the question. 
Students are advised to leave a 3cm space on the right side of the page 
4) Students are given one minute to revise their text and highlight corrections or changes 
in the free space on the right side of the paper. The final product of the exercise should 
be a one/two page text. 
5) Students hand the paper in to the professor. In the following session, the professor 
summarizes the most important points made in the student papers and highlights best 
practices. 
 
Idea: This is a hands-on writing exercise and can be used in any circumstances related to 
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Unit 6: Tax Policy and Reform in Latin America  
The analysis of tax reform is a principal issue of interest in political science. This unit teaches 
the most salient theories applied to tax policy reform in Latin America and beyond. Most of 
these perspectives draw on theories of policy reform (veto player theory, electoral and 
legislative politics, interest and partisan politics, elite politics, etc.) which are widely applied 
in other areas of public policies. By reviewing these in the context of the Latin American tax 
reform experience, students get to know the most important actors, factors and structural 
(economic) variables which impede or enable tax reform in the region. As the reform 
experience in Latin America is heterogeneous, diverse and voluminous, this introduction does 
not pretend to provide a complete empirical summary of tax reforms in the region. Instead, 
the arguments which have been developed to explain reform outcomes are at the center of this 
unit.  
 
Learning goals:  
 
• Learn basic concepts of policy reform process (policy process, veto player, interest groups, 
etc.) and their application to tax reform. 
• Understand and know the main arguments to explain tax policy reform in the region. 
• Be able to analyze a policy reform experience in a Latin American country with the 
concepts and theories learned.   
 
6.1 Tax reforms: What is studied? 
Before summarizing the most salient theories of tax reform it is worth mentioning some 
general differences in these studies. Frequently, tax reform is analyzed as a dependent 
variable (i.e. the goal of studies is to show what explains the failure or success of reform 
initiatives). However, what tax reform is and how it is measured also differs in the literature 
and thus impacts the analysis.  
 
In accordance with other analyses of public policy, the starting point of most of the reform 
literature is the passage of a law via the legislative or executive bodies. Frequently, studies are 
not interested in the mere passage of a tax reform but also provide a description of the 
content, e.g. how the reform aims to overhaul the tax system, improve revenue collection, 
enhance tax equity, or a combination of these objectives. Yet studies may differ in how they 
assess these legislative intends:   
 
(a) Scholars following a legal positivist perspective take the intended effect, as established in 
the law, as the basis for their description of the reform. Frequently, scholars make a 
distinction between the effect of tax reforms on horizontal and vertical equity (see Unit 
1), generalization of tax bases, tax mix or tax levels and rates. Indicators to describe the 
magnitude of reform initiatives are statutory or marginal tax rates (see Unit 1). The 
advantage of this approach is that a construction of large datasets of reforms for various 
countries and time periods (also historic) is possible, allowing large-n comparative and 
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cross-regional research designs and the application of quantitative analysis. However, the 
disadvantage is that the fiscal effects of tax reforms may differ from the desired ones as 
established in the law. The outcome of reforms is not always predictable and can be 
contradictory to the ones established in the law. Various factors can influence reform 
implementation and execution. This may include organizational features (capacity of the 
bureaucracy, etc.), “second-order effects”, e.g. the reaction of tax payers in the form of 
evasion, illusion or burden-shifting (see Unit 1, economic effects of taxes) or changing 
economic circumstances. In other words, changes in revenue collection and changes in 
the legal framework guiding its collection are not always directly the same.  
 
(b) An alternative approach to characterize tax reform is the description of the reform’s 
observed fiscal effect. For such an endeavor, in-depth ex-post analysis of revenue 
collection is necessary. As this approach may require significant knowledge of revenue 
data or even tax incidence analysis, the range of such studies is limited to a rather small-n 
research design, i.e. a few reforms in few countries. Studies draw on effective tax rates or 
incidence analysis (see Unit 1 and Unit 7) to understand the changes in revenue collection 
caused by legal changes. The advantage of this operationalization is a more precise 
description of the effect of the tax reform on revenue collection and the bottlenecks of 
reforms. The drawback of this approach is that, due to data constraints, even with a 
sophisticated analysis the precise effect of tax reforms is not always measurable and that 
it is naturally backward-looking. Therefore, most studies use this kind of approach in a 
simple way to confirm their classification of reform content via a legal positivist 
perspective. 
  
Several explanations have been put forward to explain a) the passage vs. failure of tax reforms 
or b) the type of tax reforms passed. These explanations do not always aim to provide a 
general and unique explanation. Scholarship on reforms includes case studies, comparative 
case studies and large-n quantitative research. Reviewing the reform experience of Latin 
American countries, it is difficult to determine one single explanatory factor as the main cause 
of reform success or reform content. Rather, a combination of different explanatory factors 
may provide the most sufficient framework to explain most reforms or reform outcomes (for a 
reform reviews see Mahon 2004, Bergman et al. 2016, Bernardi et al. 2008). In general, one 
may distinguish among explanations according to their focus on different aspects such as the 
behavior of relevant actors, structural or economic factors, institutional and legal processes, 
collective or discursive influences or a mix of these aspects to explain policy outcomes.   
 
6.2 Tax Reform and structural economic factors 
Reviewing the history of tax policy reforms in Latin American, the frequency of reforms in 
specific economic and social contexts deserves special attention. Structural policy reforms 
appear to be more frequent in times of economic, fiscal or political turmoil. In addition, Latin 
American economies share some common characteristics which are said to impact reform 
design, likelihood and outcome. Latin American economies have not only evolved cyclically 
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– following periods of boom and bust – but are also marked by high inequalities; high 
concentration of (productive) capital and high levels of market concentration.  
 
It is considered common knowledge that capital in Latin America is (although to different 
degrees) scarce, mobile and highly concentrated. High concentration of income, capital and 
wealth poses an important challenge for Latin American countries to impose reforms which 
aim to raise additional revenue (see also Unit 2), for three reasons: 
 
(a) High income inequality shrinks the tax base for income taxes. In addition, it poses a 
threat to the social contract and the willingness of contributors to pay. Upper middle and 
top income groups are taxed proportionally higher while they receive proportionally 
lesser benefits from services. As the relative contribution of the personal income tax to 
overall public revenues in Latin America remains underexplored this problem persists.  
 
(b) High capital concentration is also an important aspect to explain tax reforms as well as 
high levels of tax evasion. First, the tax morals of the top income groups are frequently 
weak due to the rationale explained above or due to other cultural, social, or historical 
factors. As high income groups also have preferential access to policy making (see next 
section) they may be more likely to block reforms. Secondly, tax non-compliance is 
frequent because the high concentration of capital at the personal or corporate level 
increases the benefits of evasion. Due to more possibilities to contract specialized service 
providers (consultancy firms, law firms, etc.) aggressive tax planning also becomes a 
feasible option.  
 
(c) A high level of capital concentration also puts governments in a less favorable bargaining 
position against corporate power and business groups (see next section). 
 
A second important structural factor is the large size of the informal sector in most Latin 
American economies. Informality is a real obstacle for tax collectors. Informality includes 
unclear property rights, additional costs for control and enforcement and an unclear and 
unstable tax base. Frequently, informal businesses – a term which may include street vendors 
as well as large drug trafficking cartels or big corporations – are operating in informality 
because unpaid taxes are part of their business model or paying taxes would expose them to 
public authorities. 
 
Thirdly, one of the most salient characteristics of Latin America economies over the centuries 
is the high volatility they face. Boom periods and crisis periods have closely followed each 
other and had an important influence on tax reforms in Latin America. Crises have a direct 
impact as tax bases crumble and governments face urgent fiscal needs and engage in short 
sighted tax reforms – favoring rapid revenue increases over long run fiscal sustainability. 
Indirectly, in crises, external lenders gain additional influence and press for ad-hoc tax policy 
responses to secure debt payments. Crisis times can also influence domestic actor 
constellations and the institutional setting (democracy or dictatorship) where tax policy is 
negotiated. At the conceptual level, Mahon (2004) argues that crisis and especially 
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hyperinflation creates expectations of widespread economic decline, which then increases the 
probability that political leaders will begin—and voters will approve—structural tax reform 
processes. Crisis in this literature is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to start 
reforms or explain its outcome. However, in specific circumstances it can be decisive.  
 
Finally, exogenous economic factors also impact taxation in Latin America. The most salient 
feature is the intersection of Latin American economies into the global market. The historical 
pattern of exporters of primary goods as the dominant interface between Latin American 
economies and global market has up until the present day been the dominant feature of 
economies in Latin America (see Unit 2). As outlined in Unit 10, the effect of this historic 
reliance of commodity exportation is also reflected in the tax systems in the region, as tax and 
non-tax revenues from commodity production and exportation constitute a significant part of 
overall public revenues in most Latin American countries (see Unit 10). Tax systems in the 
region are therefore related to the overall characteristics of the countries’ economies.  
  
In addition, price hikes in global commodity markets can generate “unwarranted revenues” 
(Girouard and Price 2004) or windfall profits. Windfall profits are characterized by their 
disproportionate revenue-to-cost structure (Olsson and Dalgaard 2006), i.e. high amount of 
revenue with very low costs for raising revenue. Windfall profits in commodity boom times 
can significantly affect the probabilities of tax reform as the urgency for reform is obscured. 
Moreover, the political decision to engage in a certain economic development strategy, e.g. 
outward looking vs. inward looking, will impact the tax systems. For example, countries 
which ultimately adopted a very strongly outward looking development strategy like Mexico 
including the application of free trade agreements will face difficulties to raise certain taxes 
which contradict this strategy (see Unit 8). Finally, the ability to contract foreign or domestic 
debt has also been a frequently used mechanism used by policy makers to circumvent lengthy 
and difficult negotiations about tax reform. In other words, a given economic development 
strategy or paradigm plus a given global economic setting is likely to influence the selection 
of a certain kind of tax policy.  
 
6.3 Actor centered explanations 
Nevertheless, in a comparative perspective, even countries with similar economic 
characteristics and in similar economic situations have different kinds of tax systems, 
including tax levels and tax mix. This highlights the critical role of politics for taxation. The 
following explanatory frameworks have in common that they draw on the outcome of a 
political process which is said to be guided by the constellation and behavior of actors, ideas 
or beliefs or the institutional setting. This political process is thus frequently framed as a 
political bargain between political actors. Frequently, such actor centered explanations 
explicitly or implicitly frame actor’s behavior in terms of rational choice, i.e. actors’ behavior 
is following the maximization of their personal utility function (homo oeconomicus). They 
differ in certain key aspects such as the definition of utility, the question of where the most 
important bargaining takes place and which actors are relevant to explain the bargaining 
outcome. Different explanations for tax policy have been put forward: 
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(a) Policy process and veto player  
 
Tax policy has been analyzed with classic theories of the policy process. Such studies explain 
the political outcome of a legislative process (here the passage of a tax reform bill) by 
theorizing upon the influence of competing actors at different stages of the policy process – 
agenda setting, policy formulation and passage and implementation.  
 
A convenient explanation why tax reforms may pass and what influences their characteristics 
is the veto player theory (Tsebelis 2002). Veto player are those actors in the policy process 
with the capacity to veto a change of status quo. Status quo will be altered if the preferences 
of different veto players match (win set) and the veto can be overcome (analog to a bargaining 
game where all players must reach agreement). Depending on the analysis, the preferences of 
veto players can be deducted from their utility function, ideological stand, clientelistic 
relations, etc. Veto players can be framed along the lines of legislative politics, executive 
politics (veto power of presidents) or within informal politics. However, one weakness of the 
veto player theorem is a) the definition of veto players is empirically challenging, b) in 
political systems with important informal bargaining besides formal political processes, what 
constitutes a veto is not easily observable. Thus, the theorem runs into difficulties in 
explaining the content of reform outcomes if reforms are passed which do not match with the 
win set.   
 
(b) Federal coordination and federal systems   
 
For Latin American federal polities, explanations of tax policy outcome have emphasized the 
importance of federal coordination between government levels as an important explanatory 
variable for tax reform outcomes. Subnational executives (governors, etc.) can be important 
players in the legislative process due to their importance in electoral and party politics, 
especially in cases where a divided government (presidential party does not have the majority 
in congress) exist. Subnational executives (governors, etc.) try to avoid additional taxes levied 
upon their constituencies and thus may trade their reform support for concessions or benefits. 
E.g. neglecting the politically costly option of increasing the tax burden on their own 
electorate and instead prioritize the distribution of federal funds through revenue-sharing 
arrangements, or hindering the implementation of income taxes (Ardanaz and Scartascini 
2013). Especially demos-constraining federal systems (Stepan 2004) with high levels 
(malapportionment) of subnational governments in congress, or universalistic legislatures 
(Inman and Rubinfeld 1996) can decisively influence tax policy and hinder ‘optimal’ tax 
system design.   
 
(c) Electoral and partisan politics & legislative decision making 
 
Other authors see electoral and partisan politics as the principal variable conditioning tax 
policy. Basic argument is that "the rules of the political game under which politicians are 
elected and hold office will condition every policy” (Tommasi et al. 2001). One of the most 
famous electoral-based theories, which comes from political economy, to explain policy 
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outcomes is the median voter theorem. It states that the government’s policy decisions will – 
given a majoritarian electoral system - circle around the preferences of the median voter, 
within a one-dimensional spectrum of political opinion, as politicians want to secure the 
majority of votes and ensure their own re-election. For example, based on this theorem some 
authors argue that if inequality increases, voters would prefer higher taxes so long as these 
taxes are followed by state-enacted redistribution (Alesina and Rodrik 1994) and 
redistribution via taxation would therefore result from voters forming a majority that presses 
for progressivity. Although the theorem is simple and clear, the empirics of tax policy may be 
more complex. Either due to more complicated (mixed, etc.) electoral systems, multiple 
cleavages in public opinion and interests (Roemer 1998) or institutional characteristics of the 
legislative process (veto power, etc.). Furthermore, public opinion is not fixed but fluid and 
capable of being influenced (see next section). 
 
Political parties and party politics are also said to have an impact on tax policy. As tax 
reforms have to pass congress, party politics gain importance in the situations of stalemates 
and conflicts in legislatures. Especially in Latin America’s relative novel democracies party 
systems are weakly institutionalized due to electoral rules such as proportional representation 
and multimember districts, a mixed ideological base and heterogeneous constituents. Thus, 
frequently parties rely on forms of clientelism and personalism to build support and party 
systems are as a result fragmented, polarized, and volatile. Together with presidential political 
systems problems of deadlock between executive and legislature are common. A feasible way 
for executives to get tax legislation passed is therefore to obtain support from legislative allies 
in exchange for spending programs or tax incentives. This certainly affects tax policy 
outcomes, especially regarding the horizontal equity of taxes (tax exemptions, tax 
expenditures). 
 
Finally, the decision-making process in democracies can be a relevant factor influencing tax 
policy outcome. For example, Steinmo (1989) argues that the structure of decision-making 
has definitively shaped tax policy in Britain, Sweden and the United States. Similar 
arguments are quite common among scholars studying decision-making processes in Latin 
America, where veto powers and excesses of presidential power have been observed. 
 
 
(d) Ideology of ruling political actors, parties  
 
Although party systems are weakly institutionalized and parties frequently lack a clear 
programmatic program, some authors argue that the ideology or political beliefs of governing 
political actors can nevertheless explain tax policies. E.g. Hart (2010) hypothesizes that, 
although multinational corporations place significant downward pressure on the corporate tax 
burden, the ideology of a country’s ruling party is still a relevant predictor of taxation in the 
developing world. However, frequently this analysis is confronted with the challenge to 
classify political parties or leaders which do not neatly fit in a one-dimensional left-right axis 




(e) Elite influence and business groups  
 
Given the relatively low contribution of direct taxes to total revenue collection in most Latin 
American countries (see Unit 7) coupled with high income and wealth inequalities, scholars 
have paid special attention to the influence of elites and business groups on tax policy 
making. For these authors, tax policy is frequently an “elite affair”.  
 
Economic elites are said to hold instrumental and structural power (Fairfield 2015). Structural 
power (Lindblom, 1977) of economic elites is higher if, due to capital concentration, the 
relevance of few economic elites and their companies in the domestic market is high. 
Economic elites can manipulate government with threats of de-investment, capital flight or 
reduction or dislocation of production against plans of increase in taxes. Instrumental power 
(Miliband 1969) describes the leverage of economic elites on government via direct 
mechanism. Instrumental power is higher if economic elites have a greater capacity to 
deliberately influence politics, e.g. via lobbying, direct participation in policy making, 
financing of parties and election campaigns, media coverage or other collective action like the 
support or initiation of protests and strikes. The higher the instrumental and structural power 
of elites is the more influence they have on tax policy and are thus likely to block or avoid tax 
policies, like higher income taxes, which run against their interests. 
 
(f) Trust and Interests of Elites & Fiscal contracting 
 
However, high elite power does not necessarily impose a particular kind of tax reform, 
including raising revenues of business and personal income. The fiscal bargaining literature – 
similar to the bargaining literature on legislative politics – argues that states can extract more 
revenue when taxpayers are granted representation or participation in governance or when 
spending benefits them directly (Levi 1988, Timmons 2005, Brautigam et. al. 2008). 
However, this general idea of fiscal contract (see Unit 4) runs into difficulties if taxable 
resources are extremely concentrated and governments need revenue to provide benefits for 
the broader society. In this case, offering elites greater political participation or material 
benefits in exchange for their tax-dollars may be counterproductive. For single case studies, 
authors thus have referred to factors that alter elite interests, like race and civil conflict. For 
instance, the wealth tax introduced in Colombia was explained with the presence of internal 
war (Flores-Macias 2012), due to the earmarking for military spending of revenues gained 
from this tax. Racial considerations and the threat of insecurity are said to have helped to 
obtain elite cooperation to tax reform that increased income taxes in South Africa (Lieberman 
2003: 140-48). Other authors claim that trust plays a central role for elite cooperation. If elites 
can trust in the benefits of future government policies and have established positive relations 
with them, increasing elite contribution via taxes is possible and redistributive tax reform 
more likely (Schiller 2016).  
 
However, the fiscal bargaining between elites and governments are also said to be influenced 
by the social and political context in which they happen. Governments can engage in several 
strategies to alter their chances for redistributive tax policy reform, either via the mobilization 
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of public support or moderating the antagonism against reforms from economic elites who are 
against redistributive tax reform and are likely to bear a higher tax burden. Two strategies are 
named in the literature (Fairfield 2013): a tax side strategy and a benefit side strategy. Tax 
side strategies exploit the possibilities of compensation within the legal margin of tax 
legislation, e.g. via tax deductions or discursively obscuring incidence and impact, etc. 
Benefit side strategies include compensation, earmarking or discursive strategies which 
highlight stabilization or link tax increases in popular benefits.  
 
(g) Networks and intra-organization of business and organized capital 
 
In sum the literature addressing elites and taxation contributes to the explanation of why 
taxation in Latin America is still comparatively low and biased towards indirect taxation. A 
certain shortfall is that this literature takes less interest in the organizational features of elites 
provided in the elite literature. The organizational capacity and characteristics however are 
well treated by scholars focusing on the influence business groups on tax policy. Business 
groups are said to represent the (accumulated) interest of economic or corporates elites. This 
literature claims that if business interest groups are centrally coordinated they will have 
significant organizational resources and leverage to block or at least soften tax reforms which 
are against their interest. This is because they can solve an internal free-rider problem 
(Castañeda 2016), i.e. part of the business groups will support reform if they are compensated 
otherwise and threaten thereby the common front of business against reform. The influence of 
centralized and well-integrated business groups is enhanced if there is an ideological 
convergence between these groups and the political actors engaging in the reform. The lowest 
influence can be found if business groups are decentralized and the agenda setters in the 
government do not share the same beliefs about tax policy.  
 
This literature in a certain way draws on the network character of elites. Network theorists 
argue that more cohesive and dense elite networks gain more leverage over politics. A 
resulting idea of this line of research is then that one has to have an idea about how capital is 
organized and how relationships between business sectors and the government are structured. 
This literature therefore can be connected with research on forms of capitalism (hierarchical 
capitalism, varieties of capitalism), the welfare state and interest representation in modern 
capitalism. For example, taking the economic features in a country into account, one may 
argue that business groups are said to be more influential if the domestic economy depends 
more on their performance and investment flows (Fairfield, 2015; Campello, 2015), i.e. they 
have more infrastructural power. They will also be more influential if the domestic economy 
is less diversified. Some authors claim that for Latin America that business groups are more 
powerful as the industrial production is more concentrated around a few sectors, especially in 





6.4 Society-centered approaches  
The above approaches to tax policy reform are mostly guided by rational choice 
interpretations of bargaining situations. Social and political actors act in their self-interest and 
aim to shape tax policy in a way that best serves their interests (methodological 
individualism). Society-centered approaches in contrast are guided by a holistic understanding 
of human behavior. They draw on collective phenomena to understand taxation and highlight 
the social embeddedness of tax bargains, such as collectively shared norms, ideas and 
discourses.  
 
This literature, which draws on insights from sociology and relates the persistence of certain 
persistent characteristics of tax systems as a result of collectively shared norms related to 
taxation. For example, high levels of tax evasion and exemptions may be related to the 
dominance of ideas on the primacy of private property vs. the common good, or result of 
resistance of individuals to taxation, irrational actors’ behavior (acceptance of regressive tax 
systems by subaltern groups) and principally long term tax policies and persistence. Studies in 
this literature stream study the moral justifications around heritage taxes (Beckert 2004), 
discursive strategies of elites towards regressive tax systems (Atria 2015), or the influence of 
epistemic communities on the Zeitgeist of tax policy design. Some authors even go as far to 
claim that different cultures of taxation exist in countries and blame cultural or social habits 
for these. Interestingly studies in this line of research borrow from psychology, particularly in 
methodological design. For example, they apply (natural) experiments where a group of 
persons participate to detect tax attitudes, stories or metaphors about taxes (Prabhakar 2008).  
 
Common to these studies is that their aim is not always to explain specific reform 
experiences, but rather aim to expand our knowledge to understand in which ways general 
equilibria of social relations are expressed by taxation. They are more likely to expand their 
full potential in explaining continuity than short-term change. In contrast, research focusing 
on tax policy discourse is more specific to particular reform projects. For example, in 
analyzing the media coverage of tax policy reforms, these studies aim to detect discursive 
coalitions, dominant paradigms or narratives or strategies of framing of tax issues that 




Group work – Case Studies:  
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group should select an Andean country of its choice (if more 
groups than countries, groups can select other Latin American countries). The task for each 
group to investigate about one recent experience of major tax reform in the country in 
question. Basis of the group work is either secondary literature provided by the lecturer or 
material gathered together by the group (newspaper, blogs, etc.). The groups should present 
the case in class (case description), following a process design and then develop an argument 
that explains the tax reform outcome. The aim of this group work is that students apply one of 
the theories studied to their own case studies and discuss their relevance to explain the 
outcome of reforms. Group works should be presented in class in a written (blog, paper, etc.) 
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Unit 7: Direct Taxation & Re-distribution in Latin America 
Taxation is one of the principal government tools to redistribute income. This unit reviews the 
redistributive potential of tax systems in Latin America and discusses indicators and 
techniques for measuring the distributive impact of fiscal and tax policy. Aside from this 
empirical assessment, this unit connects the verifiably low distributive potential of tax 
systems in the region to political, economic and institutional factors may explain this fact as 
discussed in the other units.  
 
Learning goals:  
 
• Students will become familiar with the redistributive potential of tax systems in the region. 
• Students will be able to critically discuss and understand measures and indicators used to 
measure the distributive impact of taxation.  
• Students will become familiar with tax incidence analysis and understand how such 
analysis is applied and can critically reflect upon this application. 
 
7.1 Measuring the influence of taxation on equality  
How do taxes influence inequality? In order to address this question consistently two concepts 
have to be specified. What kind of inequality is to be examined, and how should the influence 
of taxes be measured? Economists frequently focus on income effects of taxes and thus the 
question “who carries the burden of taxes?” stands at the center of tax incidence analysis. 
Their approach to inequality is consequently a concept based on personal or household 
income, less often it is based on wealth. Feminist economic scholars add that taxes do not 
only alter inequality in income but also between persons of different genders or races. The 
influence of taxes on both types of inequality is often measured by economists via incidence 
analysis.  
 
The following section explains briefly the general concepts of progressive and regressive tax 
systems, outlines the basic rationale of incidence studies, the main indicators used in this kind 
of analysis and their main shortcomings. Recent estimates of the effect of tax systems on 
income inequality in Latin American countries are presented along with an overview of 
limitations of the focus on income as the main framework for understanding inequality.  
 
7.2 Vertical and horizontal equity in tax systems 
In Unit 1 we presented the idea of vertical and horizontal equity in the tax system. Vertical 
equity was defined as the principle that individuals with more resources should pay higher 
taxes than individuals with fewer resources. Horizontal equity was stated as the principle that 
similar individuals who make different economic choices should be treated similarly by the 
tax system (see also Gruber 2012). It was also mentioned that tax systems can be progressive, 
proportional or regressive. Economists refer here to the change of the effective average tax 
rate (an individual has to pay) on his income. This effective average tax rate rises with income 
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in progressive tax systems, falls with income in regressive tax systems and does not change in 
proportional tax systems.  
 
Horizontal equity in taxes is more complicated to measure. In a general perspective one can 
argue that tax deductions, tax credits as well as tax subsidies are concepts which threaten 
horizontal equity in the tax system, as they grant taxpayers with specific characteristics 
(marital status, location, number of children) with preferential treatment not available to other 
taxpayers without these characteristics. Tax deductions allow taxpayers to reduce their taxable 
income by a certain amount. Tax is then assessed on the reduced income. Tax credits, in 
contrast, allow taxpayers to reduce the amount of tax they owe the government by a certain 
amount (see also Gruber 2012: 546). Although both may distort horizontal equity 
considerations, credits and deductions do not apply for all taxpayers with similar income and 
therefore their effects on vertical equity are different. In general, the literature claims that tax 
credits are more equitable than deductions (Gruber 2012). This is the case because the value 
of a deduction rises with one’s tax rate and therefore one’s income. As this means that 
deduction amounts are higher as a share of income for higher–income taxpayers, making 
deductions regressive. Credits on the other hand, are progressive because they are available 
equally to all incomes (credit amounts are lower, as a share of income, for higher-income 
taxpayers). 
 
Economists frequently are interested in the total revenue loss generated by tax credits, 
deductions or exemption on the tax base. Therefore, they calculate the tax expenditure (for 
each tax). Tax expenditures are the revenue not collected attributable to tax law provisions 
that allow special exclusions, exemptions, or deductions from the gross taxable income, or 
that provide a special credit, preferential tax rate, or deferral of liability. In sum, tax 
expenditure is the potential tax revenue collection minus the observable collection. High tax 
expenditures do not only prejudice revenue collection but also lead to a tax system that is 
more complex and more difficult to administer. 
 
7.3 Incidence studies to understand the effect of tax on income distribution 
One major concern of economists is to understand how taxes affect markets and if they lead to 
distortions of pareto-optimal allocation of goods. For this it is necessary to determine who 
ultimately bears the burden of paying taxes (Gruber 2012). This question is principally 
analyzed via tax incidence analysis. Tax incidence studies are diverse and may focus, inter 
alia, on questions of optimal design of rates and tax bases, effects of taxes on markets and 
actor behavior, tax design, but also on equity considerations concerning taxation (see Unit 1). 
The following text only outlines the latter purpose, i.e. the use of incidence studies for 
understanding the effects of taxation on income distribution. In any case, one should keep in 
mind that this is a subtopic of incidence studies.  
 
Incidence analysis has been widely used to assess the redistributive impact of taxes in Latin 
America in recent years. The principal reason behind the “boom” in incidence studies is, next 
to the persisting high income inequality in most countries in the region, the significant 
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improvements in survey and census data. In some countries, e.g. Mexico incidence analysis 
has become a mandatory reporting practice for the main income and consumption taxes 
published with the annual budget law.  
 
The main idea of incidence analysis is to observe the progressive or regressive effect of taxes 
on individual or household income. The basic purpose behind the incidence analysis is to 
determine how much a person (or household) loses of its total income because of paying taxes 
and compare the distribution of these losses within the population with a reference 
distribution, for example a distribution of income or consumption per capita. Via this 
comparison, the degree of progressivity can be assessed. Classic measures for progressivity 
are (a) visually: the Lorenz and concentration curves, (b) in a summarized form the Kakwani 
measure (of tax progressivity) or (c) the Reynolds-Smolensky measure of redistributive 
capacity. Frequently, because of its wide publicity scholars also use the Gini coefficient to 
assess the progressivity of taxes. 
 
The basic logic of how to calculate the incidence of taxation is a three-step process. First, the 
effective incidence of each tax has to be defined. Note that the statutory incidence – who is 
legally responsible for paying the tax - is not sufficient because as we know from Unit 1 the 
tax burden can be shifted, e.g. from producers to consumers or other distortions can affect the 
real individual payment (tax deductions, etc.). As the effective tax rate is not known the 
researcher has to make assumptions who really bears the burden for each tax. These incidence 
assumptions are guided by theoretical considerations, empirical studies or logical reasoning. 
E.g. Value added tax or fuel tax is frequently considered to be shifted onto consumers, but 
whether this effect applies for corporate income tax is more debatable. If capital is not entirely 
internationally mobile a simple guideline may assume that half of the tax is born by 
consumers the other half by owners, and so on. Incidence assumptions can be debatable and 
may lead to different final results. The second step consists of computing the size of each tax. 
A pragmatic solution is to use the effective tax rate, but more sophisticated solutions aim to 
reconcile the size of each tax as estimated by applying the statutory tax rate with data 
obtained by national accounts. The third step is using the tax rates (and associated incidence 
assumptions) to calculate the burden of each tax and household. For direct taxes household 
income data is necessary, while for indirect taxes expenditure data is used.
4
 Only via both 
calculations can the incidence of the tax system be assessed. The final step is to compile 
measures that reveal the distribution of the tax burden among all tax payers. Typically, for 
this endeavor, measures of distribution are constructed. The most common are, as mentioned, 
the Lorenz curve, for a visual display, the Kakwani measure to assess tax progressivity, the 
Reynolds-Smolensky measure of redistributive capacity as well as the Gini coefficient. 
 
The calculation of the Lorenz curve (as shown in figure 6.1) is a handsome graphical measure 
to highlight the progressiveness of a tax. Following the three-step process outlined above one 
                                                 
4 Note that in order to calculate the incidence of direct taxes (levied on income) information on household income broken 
down by source is needed. For the calculation of indirect taxes (levied on expenditure), information on household spending 
patterns with a substantial degree of detail is needed. Not in all countries in Latin America such data is fully available as e.g. 
household surveys are restricted in their degree of detail or geographical reach (only urban centers, etc.), or have other flaws.  
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can calculate the percentage of household income paid as tax allocating this data in means of 
groups, such as quintiles (five groups of the same proportion of the total linear income 
distribution sorted form the poorest to the richest). Figure 7.1 shows this exercise graphically 
for three hypothetical calculations. We can see that the distribution of the mean share of the 
individuals in the groups pay as taxes varies in the three figures. The distribution is 
progressive (poorer pay proportionally less than richer), proportional (all groups pay the same 
share) or regressive (the payment of poorer to richer individuals regresses as one moves up 
the income scale. 
 
Table 7.1 Histograms for Income Tax as a Percentage of Income 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on hypothetical data. 
 
The problem with aggregated data (here into quintiles) is that there is a loss in information. 
An attractive solution is a graphical visualization of the data along two dimensions showing 
cumulative income per capita. The result is the Lorenz curve (bold curve) in figure 2.2. The 
diagonal line, in contrast, represents the line of perfect equality (increase in income per capita 
increases the cumulative tax payment in the same size). Finally, the figure also shows the tax 
concentration curve. This curve represents the cumulative percentage of tax paid on the 
vertical axis (for individuals still ordered progressively by income). As this curve is further 
away from the reference line of perfect equality than the Lorenz curve of income distribution 




Figure 7.2 Lorenz and Concentration Curves for a Tax  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on hypothetical data (panel A).  
 
This visual exploration of tax progressivity is optically attractive as it is clear and easy to 
comprehend. However, a summary measure can also be useful enough that visualization is not 
always necessary. The Kakwani measure of tax progressivity and the Reynolds-Smolensky 
measure of the redistributive capacity of a tax. To compute these measures, we first have to 
introduce the Gini coefficient, an aggregated measure of the income distribution: 
 
- The Gini coefficient is in mathematical terms a measure of dispersion in a population. Its 
use is very popular and includes other areas besides income inequality, such as banking, 
machine learning or natural science. Building on figure 2.2 one can calculate the Gini 
coefficient via the formula A/(A+B); where A is the area between the Lorenz curve and 
the Line of Perfect Equality (see figure 2.2) and B is the area under the Lorenz curve. 
(Certainly, there are other approaches to calculation of the Gini without applying referring 
the Lorenz curve). The Gini coefficient is 1 for perfect inequality and 0 for perfect 
equality. Contemporary Gini coefficients in Latin America range around 0.45-0.5.  
  
Besides its wide popularity, one of the advantages of the Gini is that it is relatively easy to 
comprehend and to calculate. The downside of this index is its relative high sensitivity to 
outliers. However, other measures of dispersion, such as the Atkinson Index exist. A more 
important aspect is that frequently researchers use the coefficient without proper 
knowledge. It is important to remember that the Gini coefficient – as any other coefficient 
– reduces complexity (of the distribution of income in the whole group) to a single 
number. If the researcher is not aware of the process of calculation, misinterpretation can 
occur. For instance, a Gini of 0.5 may represent (at least) two completely different 
distributions of income in a group. Take figure 2.3. Here two different Lorenz curves (red 
and blue) are pictured. Both have the same Gini coefficient of 0.4 but have a different 
distribution of income along the income quantiles. In the case of the red curve 50% of 
income is distributed among the first 90% of the population, while in the case of the blue 
the first 50 percent of the population concentrate only 10% of income and the other 50%, 
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90% of income. Thus, a researcher should be aware of the complexity reduction entailed 
in the calculation of the Gini coefficient if comparisons are made. 
 
Figure 7.3 Different Lorenz curves with the same Gini coefficient  
 
  
Source: Own elaboration.  
 
- Kakwani measure of tax progressivity: If we have calculated the Gini coefficient for the 
income distribution, Gy, we then calculate in the same way the Gini coefficient for the 
concentration curve (that is, C/(C+D), where C is the area between the Concentration 
Curve and the Line of Perfect Equality, and D is the area under the Concentration Curve), 
CT. The formula for computing the Kakwani measure is then:  
K = –[GY – CT]. 
The Kakwani measure is positive for a progressive tax, zero for a tax that is proportional, 
and negative for a regressive tax.
5
 One may determine whether the result is statistically 
significant by bootstrapping to estimate the standard error of the estimate of K.   
 
- Reynolds-Smolensky measure of the redistributive capacity of a tax. While the Kakwani 
measure indicates the progressivity of a tax, it does not serve as a good guide to the 
impact that a change in the tax would have on income distribution or poverty. The 
Reynolds-Smolensky measure provides a solution to this. To compute this measure first 
the Gini coefficient of pre-tax income has to be calculated (as extracted from household or 
tax data), GY. Then the Gini coefficient of the post-tax income (after paying taxes, -t) has 
to be computed, GY–T. The formula is RS2 = GY – GY–T 
  
 
                                                 
5 Note that some authors define the term without the initial negative sign, so care is needed when making comparisons 












0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Perfect Equality 90% & 10% 50 % & 50%
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If RS2 is positive it indicates a progressive tax, because the after-tax distribution of 
income (as measured by GY–T) is more equal than its pretax distribution (as measured by 
GY). If the measure is (positive and) relatively large the tax has a higher probability to 
make the overall tax system more progressive (depending on its share in the total tax 
revenue). However, the redistributive capacity of a tax depends both on its progressivity 
and on the tax rate. It can be shown that RS2 ≈ (t/(1–t)) K, where t is the average tax rate 
relative to pretax income.   
 
7.4 Taxation and Income Distribution in Contemporary Latin America  
Socio-economic inequality is one of the major challenges in Latin American societies. The 
focus of policies which aim to reduce these high and enduring income inequalities in the 
region are frequently limited to spending policies (cash transfers, pensions, etc.). However, 
tax policy can also be an important policy tool to achieve a more equal society (at least in 
fiscal terms). Compared to other regions in the world like the OECD or the European Union, 
the tax state in Latin America hardly contributes to a better distribution of income. Incidence 
studies can provide us with empirical data to support this assumption. Figure 7.4 shows the 
Gini coefficients for household income after the giving hand of the state (in the form of 
pensions or other social transfers) and after the taking hand (when income is reduced due to 
taxes). As observable in the EU 15 the Gini can be reduced from 0.49 to 0.3, but in Latin 
American countries this is not the case and income distribution after the tax state (calculated 
as income tax and social security contributions) hardly improves. Only state benefits, and here 
especially pensions have, in most countries, a more significant effect on income distribution.  
 




Gross income only 
with pensions (B) 
Gross Income (C) Disposable effective 
income (D) 
(B= A + public 
pensions) 
(C= B + public 
cahs transfers) 
(D= C - PIT - SSC) 
Argentina 0.536 0.49 0.484 0.469 
Chile 0.546 0.526 0.51 0.499 
Colombia 0.531 0.537 0.531 0.52 
Ecuador 0.481 0.467 0.461 0.453 
Mexico 0.496 0.494 0.484 0.46 
Peru 0.487 0.485 0.482 0.461 
LAC 0.5     0.47 
OECD 0.47     0.3 
UE-15 0.49     0.3 
Source: Own elaboration with database compiled by Hanni, Martner, Podestá (2015), OECD from OECDSTAT. 




Let’s see if this has to do with the design of the income tax. As stated in Unit 6, one aspect of 
tax reform in Latin America has been the re-design of income taxes, although structural tax 
reforms seldom took place. Figure 7.4 shows the different measures of progressivity 
explained above for six Latin American countries for the personal income tax: a) the share of 
gross income paid by income group, the Kakwani Index, concentration of collection among 
bottom 40% and top 30% and Gini index for and after the tax and the Reynold-Smolensky 
Indicator. For all countries, we can observe that personal income tax is progressive and that it 
contributes to income distribution, with Mexico as an outstanding example. However, this 
effect is low, basically because the weight of the personal income tax in the tax system is still 
limited. 
 
There are different explanations for the Latin American allergy to the personal income tax. 
Arguments against heavy progressive taxation can be found in economic theory and 
contemporary national as well as international discourses in which parties, governments, 
pressure groups or international organizations participate. Explanations of the pattern of the 
low contribution of the tax state to income distribution in Latin America can be historical (see 
Unit 2), related to the political economy of reform (see Unit 6), the predominance of 
structural economic factors such as the importance of revenues from natural resources (see 
Unit 10), problems of federal coordination (see Unit 11), the capacity of the state to extract 
revenues and its weak legitimization (see Unit 3), the dominant social configuration in a 
society (Unit 3), or the predominant perspectives on equality, justice and fairness (Unit 5). 
Explanations of the low distributive impact of Latin American tax systems, a decisive 
characteristic of Latin American tax systems compared to their European counterparts, thus 
seems to refer to various aspects and different perspectives.  
 
Figure 7.4: Progressivity Indicators and re-distribution of the personal income tax, 6 Latin 
American countries (2011) 
 
Country 














(in % of gross income) 







Argentina 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,4 0,9 2,5 9,1 3,9 0,42 0 96,1 0,484 0,467 0,017 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,1 0,3 0,9 7,1 3,2 0,44 0 98,5 0,51 0,495 0,014 
Colombia 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,8 4,4 2,1 0,37 1 93,1 0,531 0,523 0,008 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,5 0,9 0,52 0 99,9 0,461 0,457 0,005 
Mexico -2,1 -1,9 -1,4 -0,9 -0,2 0,6 1,4 2,6 4,7 10,6 5 0,44 -3,6 94,7 0,484 0,461 0,023 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0,1 0,2 0,4 0,8 1,5 5,8 2,5 0,41 0,1 93,7 0,482 0,472 0,01 




Group work – Case Studies:  
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group should select an Andean country of its choice (if there 
are more groups than countries, then groups can select other Latin American countries). The 
task for each group is to research the characteristics of the direct taxation in the country in 
question. Each group should present contemporary and historical data on direct taxation in the 
country (indication of data sources is given by the lecturer), provide a summary of types and 
characteristics of direct taxes and present the overall re-distributive impact of taxation in the 
country (based on desk research). At best, each group should present some hypothesis on why 
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Unit 8: The Transnational Dimension of Taxation  
Globalization increasingly shapes the lives and realities of people all around the world. In 
social science, this reality is increasingly visible as the nation state, far too long the principal 
reference point and “container” in which social and political processes where studied, is 
losing importance for the sake of transnational flows, movements or processes. With respect 
to taxation, the transnational dimension remains remarkably underexplored. This is not to say 
that there is no awareness that globalization and transnational processes such as transnational 
mobile capital are of imminent importance for taxation, however research from a social 
science perspective is still in its footsteps.  
 
Nevertheless, there are several issues which have been treated in the literature and which will 
be treated in this Unit: the effect of economic globalization on tax systems, global and 
domestic tax competition, challenges of taxation of mobile vs. fixed capital in times of 
globalization (tax shifting, transfer pricing, tax avoidance). In addition, attention is given to 
the question of global tax governance, visible today in multilateral efforts to impose 
regulation in international tax matters (BEPS initiative, ICRICT, etc.).  
 
Learning goals:  
 
• Students will become familiar with current challenges to cross-border taxation and their 
relevance for Latin America. 
• Students will understand perspectives on tax competition and their possible effect on 
domestic tax systems. 
• Students will become aware of the influence of transnational actors and institutions on 
Latin American tax regimes and the challenges this influence entails.  
• Students will be able to argue if global tax governance is probable and which challenges 
exist. 
 
How did globalization affect tax systems? In order to find an answer one first has to define 
what is meant by globalization. As there is no consensus in the literature, different effects are 
observed and conclusions drawn. Studies conceptualize globalization differently, they are 
concerned with increased global capital mobility, free trade (and its regulations), movements 
of economic actors or increased illicit or licit financial flows. Second, the literature differs in 
what changes within tax systems have been observed. Here the literature focuses on 
aggregated indicators like tax level or structure, specific taxes and their characteristics, or the 
reactions of tax agencies or governments to increased globalization. 
 
8.1 Economic globalization and tax systems, global and domestic tax competition 
One of the basic features of globalization is increased capital mobility. Since the abolition of 
fixed exchange rates within the Bretton Woods System, the importance and mobility of 
international capital has steadily increased and has been identified as one of the most salient 
parts of the “increasing” globalization, in the sense of global economic interconnectedness 
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(Cox 1996; Robinson 2004). As this characteristic was observed in the 1990s, investigators 
explored if the increase in international capital mobility introduces changes in domestic 
politics, especially in welfare and tax policies. In this time, several hypotheses were put 
forward:  
(a) A “compensation hypothesis”, i.e. that an increase in international capital mobility in a 
country will either have no effect or even increase forms of social protection (Swank 
2002, 32). This expectation is based on the experience of industrialized countries, because 
governments were assumed to “protect” their citizens from the perils of globalization.  
(b) A “curvilinear hypothesis, which assumes that such a compensation may be possible in 
the short-term perspective, but in the long run, under high levels of asset mobility, 
international financial openness will undercut the ability of governments to finance social 
welfare mechanisms (Hicks 1999; Rodrik 1997), due to the reduction in tax levels and the 
global competition for cheap labor (costs).  
(c) A “negative hypothesis” which argues that a reduction in tax burdens on corporate profits 
and high income-earners will follow in the wake of increased capital mobility (Steinmo 
1993, 1994) and thus in a reduction in welfare spending. 
(d) Hypotheses which are driven by changes in the behavior of (government) actors. Such 
changes are said to be caused directly and indirectly. Direct effects are, e.g. in the sense 
that governments take the potential effect of international capital to economic growth 
explicitly into account when designing policies, thus adapting their policies via 
“anticipatory obedience” to globalization. Indirectly because international capital mobility 
(and its importance) may strengthen domestic social and political forces, for example 
business groups or organizations, that advocate for a neoliberal economic agenda (Swank 
2002: 21) and thus a reduction in tax levels or a shift towards indirect taxation. In 
contemporary times, such a perspective is complemented by research which observes 
dynamics of elite networks and trans-nationalization.   
 
After more than two decades we have a clearer picture of the general tendencies of the effects 
of globalization on tax systems, however most of the concrete mechanisms through which this 
process functions in detail is still unclear:  
 
- There is consistent evidence that, at least in industrialized countries, large welfare states 
have survived globalization, under the condition that these countries were able to develop 
a tax system with a significant base in (indirect) consumption taxes (Hays 2003). That is 
globalization has led to a change in the tax structure in industrialized countries. Income 
taxes, especially on corporate income have decreased consistently since the 1970s, while 
indirect taxes, especially taxes con consumption (VAT, etc.) have filled this revenue gap. 
Nevertheless, there is constant pressure that labor costs are too high and most 
industrialized production now moved to Asian countries or was replaced by of 
automatization or digitalization of industrial production.  
 
- In Latin America one can observe two long term trends. First, trade taxes have been the 
backbone of Latin American tax systems (see Unit 2) for a long time, but beginning in the 
mid 1980s with the rise of policies of economic liberalization they were significantly 
68 
 
reduced or dismantled. Trade taxes now play, if at all, are marginal role for state 
financing. In addition, following their peers in the OECD world, much of Latin American 
countries now reformed tax income laws allowing for taxation of capital income, although 
frequently at a lower rate.  
 
Figure 8.1 Marginal maximum tax rates in Latin America*, 1975-2014 in % 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Morán and Pecho 2017. *simple average of countries for years selected; CIT = Corporate 
Income Tax; PIT = Personal Income Tax; VAT = Value Added Tax 
 
- Secondly, top marginal tax rates, especially in the (corporate and personal) income tax are 
falling since the beginning of the 1970s, following a pattern that is observable in much of 
the industrialized countries. Average marginal maximum rate of PIT fell from 55.1 in 
1975 to 27.4 in 2015 and marginal maximum rates fell of CIT fell from 45.2 in 1975 to 
26.8 in 2015 (see figure 8.1). In addition, several Latin American countries have made 
intensive use of tax exemptions to attract foreign capital investment. As Table 8.1 shows 
tax incentives in different forms are much more frequent in the LAC region than in the 
OECD world, but similar to Asian countries. Worse, however, is that tax incentives are 
made in areas which are not bound to clear conditions, e.g. investment in research and 
development (R&D) but are made temporarily (tax holidays). However, incentives such as 
tax holidays are seen by many observers as the least effective measure to attract foreign 


























Table 8.1 Prevalence of tax expenditure in Latin America, OECD and East Asia and Pacific 
region, share of total countries in region (2014)  
 














East Asia & 
Pacific 
92% 75% 67% 83% 92%% 83% 
LAC  88% 32% 52% 12% 72% 40% 
OECD  21% 36% 64% 76% 67% 33% 
Source: Own elaboration with data from James (2014): https://tinyurl.com/ybrngyvz; LAC 25 countries, OECD 33 countries, 
EA&P 12 countries.  
     
- Some Latin American countries, most notably Panama or some Caribbean countries opted 
to base their economic development models on low to zero income taxes for foreign 
capital, effectively functioning as tax havens for capital owned by corporations or 
individuals from countries of industrialized but also of non-industrialized and Latin 
American origin. With recent data leaks and growing global tax cooperation, these 
strategies of economic development are increasingly questioned. 
 
- Despite this trend of adaption of tax systems to the global competition for capital 
investment in some Latin American countries, important heterodox tax policies have been 
implemented in crucial moments. This was the case for Argentine export tax after the 
default in 2001/2, taxes on bank debits and temporary taxes on wealth in Colombia, or the 
renegotiation of tax regimes for the extractive sector during the commodity boom (see 
Unit 10). In sum, although in many areas of taxation economic globalization and global 
competition have shaped tax regimes in the continent, in the long run important domestic 
factors keep influencing tax policy and may explain differing paths of tax systems (see 
Unit 2 and 6). 
 
8.2 Transnational companies and global tax compliance  
Critics of liberal economic globalization hold that transnational enterprises are the principal 
beneficiaries of the contemporary global trade regime. In particular, transnational capital is 
said to be able to exploit differences in tax regimes around the world and global tax 
competition to reduce their tax dues and/or not comply with their tax liabilities. Measurement 
of such behavior is difficult and complex. However, contemporary studies suggest that such 
illicit financial flows are particularly damaging for non-industrialized countries. For example, 
some authors assert that the money drain caused by illicit financial flows is far greater than 
development aid by other countries and international organizations combined (Reuter 2012). 
With respect to corporate global tax non-compliance – one important part of illicit global 
capital flows - strategies of global tax behavior of multinational or transnational corporations 




- Profit shifting. Estimates suggest that revenue losses suffered by non-industrialized 
countries due to corporate profit shifting range between approximately US-$ 35 billion 
and US-$ 160 billion per year worldwide (Fuest and Riedel 2010). Profit shifting 
describes activities by corporations to move profits from a country where the activity 
occurs to territories where profits are taxed at lower rates and expenses to where they are 
deductible at higher rates. This is possible because companies generally have to pursue 
separate accounting systems in the countries they conduct their activities and thus can 
move profits and expenses between different national accounting systems. However, it 
could be argued that large corporations also use some company items, services, etc. in 
several countries simultaneously and therefore a clear national split between the activities 
of one corporation in several countries cannot be made.  
 
Profit shifting largely happens within one firm and may be part of wider corporate tax 
planning strategies. These strategies can be technically legal and take advantage of the 
variety of tax rules and principles in multiple countries. Some of these strategies can also 
violate the law. The overall effect of this behavior is the erosion of the corporate tax base 
in many countries, whether industrialized or non-industrialized. The exact magnitude of 
this corporate behavior has not yet been identified properly due to challenges to 
measurement and calculations. 
 
- Transfer pricing. While profit shifting largely operates within firms, transfer pricing 
functions between firms, or at least legally independent entities of one corporation. For 
example, multinational firms set transfer prices for intrafirm trade in order to separate 
profits generated in different countries. This can include the artificial splitting of 
ownership of assets between legal entities within a group, and transactions between such 
entities that would rarely take place between truly independent entities. This also applies 
to the location of intangible assets like e.g. patents in low tax countries or the use of 
intrafirm debt and other financial instruments to shift income from one country to another. 
While some of this is legal, practices which involve severe mispricing or faked 
transactions in order to reduce tax payments have to be classified as tax evasion. 
 
- Tax havens. The existence of tax havens is widely criticized. In these territories, low tax 
rates are often combined with fiscal secrecy. Recent publications show that tax havens are 
widely used by wealthy individuals all around the world (but especially of non-
industrialized countries). Tax havens are often associated with tax evasion and can also be 
useful for organizations or individuals operating in illegality. Given that several Caribbean 
islands and countries fall in this category, tax havens should also be a Latin American 
concern. With respect to the discussion around tax havens several topics such as tax 






8.3 Global governance of taxation – from competition to cooperation? 
Countries not only compete in tax matters, they also cooperate. Perhaps the oldest form of tax 
cooperation is the bilateral tax agreement between two countries to avoid double taxation. Of 
more scholarly interest are forms of multinational cooperation in tax matters with the aim of 
reducing tax evasion. The literature on global tax governance uses insights from studies of 
cooperation in international relations (IR) in other areas (security, environment, etc.). As there 
is no global authority with rule-making and especially rule enforcing powers, states find 
themselves in a dilemma either to pursue short term gains or to cooperate with the hope that 
their peers will do the same and do not engage in free-riding. Cooperation thus hinges on 
interest calculation, multilateral negotiation and coordination. Maybe the only specificity in 
tax matters is that some authors argue that taxation is a particular sensitive policy area, as it is 
seen as one of the cores of state sovereignty. 
 
Nevertheless, institutions of global tax governance are emerging. Take for example the BEPS 
initiative put forward by the OECD or international agreements to share tax and fiscal data 
between countries. This shows that countries can overcome the collective action problem, 
give up part of their sovereignty and engage in necessary global policy initiatives. Scholars 
interested in these processes now try to understand: 
(a) When cooperation is possible;  
(b) What kind of cooperation occurs (e.g. which institutional setting emerges?);  
(c) What kind of topics are subject to cooperation and why they are selected, and  
(d) How the globally set norms feed back in domestic policies or in other policy areas linked 
to taxation. 
 
Group work – Case Studies  
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group should select an Andean country of its choice (if there 
are more groups than countries, groups can select other Latin American countries). The task 
for each group is to present: a) data on the magnitude of transnational tax evasion and 
avoidance, b) the countries position to global tax governance initiatives c) present a resume of 
the impact of the Panama Papers in the country in question. With this information in hand 
they should prepare a short brief of the importance of the transnational dimension of taxation 
in the country in question. The group should present the ‘report’ before the class and show 
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Unit 9: Tax Compliance, Avoidance and Evasion 
Tax avoidance and evasion are serious challenges to taxation in Latin America. Thanks to the 
contemporary very high levels of evasion and avoidance in the region, Latin American 
countries fall short of collecting the full potential of established taxes and thus lose necessary 
fiscal resources. Besides the negative effects on tax collection, avoidance and evasion also 
have wider impacts. They pose an imminent threat to the vertical and horizontal equality of 
tax systems (see Unit 1) and threaten the cohesion of societies in general. Without tax non-
compliance, tax administration would be able to collect an equal amount of revenue of a tax 
but with lower tax rates (horizontal equality) and, as tax evasion is especially severe in taxes 
on personal income and in upper income groups, tax non-compliance impedes a more just 
society (vertical inequality). In addition, avoidance and evasion can seriously undermine the 
legitimacy of tax systems and foster increasing levels of non-compliance and de-
legitimization in general. Low tax morals – as some authors describe the persistent patterns of 
non-compliance by taxpayers – may therefore be coupled with citizen's perceptions of the 
state, public services or corruption, i.e. low tax morals can be seen as a proxy for a broken 
fiscal contract.  
 
How can we explain persistent levels of non-compliance by taxpayers even if the quality and 
quantity of public services increases? Soon we see that explaining high levels of tax evasion 
and avoidance is challenging. This unit provides an overview of the most salient approaches 
to explain tax evasion and avoidance in Latin America, including technical (tax design), 
economic, political, society-centered as well as individual centered arguments. But before 
these approaches are exposed, the unit engages in conceptual clarification by discussing how 
evasion and avoidance can be measured and a short overview over actual patterns of evasion 
and avoidance in Latin America.  
 
Learning goals:  
 
• Students will become familiar with concepts of tax evasion, avoidance and compliance.  
• Students will become aware of the challenges to measure tax evasion and avoidance and 
have an overview of levels of evasion and avoidance in the main taxes in Latin American 
countries. 
• Students will learn and be able to apply different approaches to understand and explain tax 
evasion and levels of compliance in Latin America. 
 
9.1 Tax evasion and avoidance in Latin America – Measurement and Evidence  
Tax evasion and avoidance are two different concepts describing the non-compliance of a 
taxpayer (physical or juridical person) with its tax obligation, i.e. tax non-compliance 
(incumplimiento tributario). Most frequently tax non-compliance which is accomplished via 
illegal means, violating the law, is called tax evasion. Tax avoidance, in contrast, is frequently 
defined as tax non-compliance pursued within the law, for example using legal loopholes (tax 
credits, tax exemptions), taking advantage of irregularities in the tax code or, in the case of 
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corporations, engaging in strategies of aggressive tax planning with the help of law firms and 
taking advantage of aspects related to the transnational dimension of taxation (see Unit 8). In 
practice drawing the line between tax evasion and avoidance is often difficult as the 
boundaries between both concepts are fluid. While non-declaration or underreporting of 
income as observed in the informal sector may be identified easily as tax evasion, the practice 
of transnational companies using strategies of transfer pricing or profit shifting are often 
pursued in a grey zone between avoidance and evasion, including both concepts.  
 
How can tax evasion be measured? Several approaches to estimation exist but two general 
categories can be distinguished, according the data sources the methods use (Jorratt and 
Podestá 2010). The first group compromises estimation techniques related to measures of the 
global economic system, systems of macro-economic behavior or indirect approaches. These 
calculations make use of economic aggregates such as national accounts, take advantage of 
household surveys or relate tax collection to the use of physical inputs used in the production 
of goods and services. The second group joins approaches related to partial systems of the 
economy, micro measurements or direct approaches. Estimations in this group infer, based on 
a sample considered as representative, the behavior of a determined group of tax payers. The 
data used in such estimations is taken from special auditing programs or other samples of tax 
data or behavior. In any case, caution has to be taken with the accuracy of all calculated 
measures. All tax evasion measures aim to quantify a phenomenon, the principal 
characteristic of which is that it is hidden from measurement and statistics (otherwise 
presumably if a tax administration would know about non-compliance, they would also 
enforce payment) and thus should be regarded as approximations with room for error. 
 
Among the most common approaches to quantify tax non-compliance is the method that 
draws on information from economic aggregates. Such calculations also known as macro 
accounting methods, draws on the underlying idea that the tax gap which can be identified via 
the discrepancies between the national and financial accounts of a country can be explained 
by tax non-compliance.  
 
One application of such a method is estimating the potential collection of a tax from the 
national accounts data and to later compare this potential collection with actual or effective 
collection, obtaining a gap that is usually attributed to tax evasion. This approach is most 
useful for quantifying evasion for a flat rate tax with a tax base which is related to some 
macroeconomic aggregate. This is why it is mostly used for estimating evasion in VAT and 
corporate income tax (CIT). The main advantages of this method are that it is relatively easy 
and inexpensive to calculate and that it allows measuring evasion for a time series (annual 
data) which can show the evolution over a given period. The most mentioned limitations are 
the reliability of the sources used for calculation and, particularly in the case of the VAT, that 
it requires a theoretical definition of assumptions on how to calculate the potential revenue 
ex-post.   
   
In the case of VAT, the method of tax potential of the economy requires calculating a 
theoretical collection of the tax - which must then be compared with the tax actually collected 
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- for which there are two alternatives: a) the method of production, which consists in 
estimating - with sectoral data from the national accounts - the sales and purchases with right 
to a tax credit, which determine the debit and the tax credit, from which the net VAT of the 
entire economy is generated; or b) the method of consumption or “non-deductible VAT”, 
which seeks to calculate the total amount of transactions that generate VAT and that 
subsequently do not have right to tax credit within the value added chain, i.e. those 
corresponding to final consumption of goods and services taxed and the purchase of taxed 
goods and services that are used in the manufacture of exempt products. This second variant, 
because it is more independent of the level of disaggregation of the information used as input, 
is the most widespread among the studies carried out in the countries of the region. 
 
With regard to corporate income tax, the methodology usually used estimates the theoretical 
tax revenue from the surplus of national accounts, which is the macroeconomic aggregate that 
is closest to the concept of taxable profit (utilidad tributaria). This aggregate is then subject to 
a series of adjustments to gain the potential tax base, for example by adding interest and land 
rents, deducting the operating surplus from exempt and non-affected sectors and activities, 
adding the differences between tax depreciation and financial depreciation, among other 
corrections. The application of the statutory tax rate on this theoretical tax basis gives the 
theoretical collection, which, compared with actual tax collection, allows tax evasion to be 
determined. 
 
For the calculation of evasion in the ISR (impuestas sobre la renta) of natural persons, the 
most used methodologies are those that are based on the estimation of the potential collection 
with data from household surveys. Due to the progressive nature of these taxes, the use of 
these data bases which allow different rates to be applied in different groups is most 
appropriate. The method consists of calculating the tax that each individual should pay, 
depending on the income of the individual - corrected and adjusted by non-response and 
underreporting of income - if the corresponding scale of tax rates were applied. Subsequently, 
the calculated collection is grouped in the different percentiles of income and is compared 
with the effective collection obtained by the tax administration for each similar fraction of the 
population. The main advantages of this method are its simplicity and low cost while a 
limitation is expected to be a frequently high level of omission and underreporting by 
respondents. 
 
Other methods in the indirect approaches are the money demand approach and the physical 
input approach. Both try to estimate the overall size of the shadow economy which is assumed 
to be the main driver behind tax evasion. The physical input method uses proxies, such as the 
electricity demand, to measure (overall) economic activity in a country. Compared to 
economic activity in the official GDP data, the unofficial GDP is identified and the 
subsequent loss in tax revenue can be calculated (see e.g. Kauffmann and Kalibera 1996). The 
money or currency demand method, by contrast, aims to estimate the extent of the shadow 
economy based on the idea that many activities in this area involve cash payments to avoid to 
be traced. Via econometric models, such studies estimate the influence of certain indicators 
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on the “excess” demand of currency and can also provide estimates for the size of the shadow 
economy. However, both methods have their disadvantages.  
 
Other, more direct, methods – which fall in the second group of micro approaches mentioned 
before – are fixed-point sampling methods. These methods use data from audits of a sample 
of taxpayers from which precise information on the evasion rates can be obtained and then 
inferred for a wider population via statistical methods. Although these calculations have the 
main advantage that various types of statistical techniques can be applied, their effectiveness 
depends, among other factors, on the experience of those who carry out such audits. In 
addition, the extrapolation of the results to the rest of the population is very complex due to 
the implicit bias caused by the tendency to focus audits only on those tax payers who are 
more likely to evade taxes. In non-industrialized countries such micro level data is frequently 
not available at the required level of quality.  
 
However, if information is based on randomly selected taxpayers the estimates of tax gaps are 
said to be more reliable and informative than results of macro approaches. If micro data of 
sufficient quality is available, this not only allows estimation of tax gaps more accurately but 
also more detailed information on characteristics and sources of tax evasion (which income is 
subject to evasion, which groups are more likely to evade and what are their characteristics). 
In Latin American tax administrations, have pursued such studies but this information is 
frequently not made public. 
  
9.2 How severe is tax evasion in Latin America? 
One of the good news in Latin America is that society and public authorities have become 
increasingly aware of the importance of the problems of tax evasion and avoidance. In this 
sense, most of the countries in the region are following a general trend around the world, 
which has gained additional momentum with the publication of large data leaks such as the 
Panama Papers in 2016. Nevertheless, other than in the EU countries where a common 
methodology and periodical estimates are published, no country in the region officially 
measures tax evasion periodically for all tax items. This seriously undermines the efforts to 
understand tax evasion and other phenomena related to evasion, to set milestones or establish 
an empirically based plan to fight tax evasion as well as it impedes to assess the efficiency 
and effectivity of tax authorities in Latin American countries. In the few countries in which 
tax evasion is measured this practice is largely restrained to the measurement of evasion in the 
VAT. Evasion in other large taxes is measured only in a few countries such as Mexico.  
 
In Chile, the Servicio de Impuestos Internos (SII) measures evasion in VAT annually and has 
established ambitious measures to reduce noncompliance. In Colombia, the Dirección de 
Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN) and in Uruguay in charge of the Dirección General 
Impositiva (DGI) have made an effort to elaborate, actualize and, most importantly, publish a 
series of quantitative studies by which it is possible to observe the level of evasion over the 
last ten years. Mexico is a particular positive case where the Servicio de Administración 
Tributaria (SAT) has for some time the legal obligation to publish studies on tax evasion 
78 
 
annually in which at least two national academic institutions have to take part. The result is a 
diverse set of studies with a global perspective or a focus on specific aspects and dimensions 
of evasion in some core taxes, VAT and income tax which enable them to gain a more 
complete picture of the trends and current reality of tax noncompliance in the country. 
 
Table 9.1 includes the results of some of these studies and adds results from other studies as 
summarized by Gómez Sabaini and Morán (2016) for estimates of tax evasion in the VAT for 
the period 2000 to 2014. The numbers indicate the share of potential revenue collection lost 
by noncompliance of tax payers. All of the listed countries present measures that decrease 
over time and suggest that evasion in VAT has decreased and the work of tax authorities to 
better tackle the problem of noncompliance has turned out to be effective. Still these numbers 
are quite high, especially in comparison with data on tax evasion in the EU countries. One 
should also remember that the VAT is generally viewed in the literature as a tax that is 
relatively easy to collect, as the tax burden passes through several economic agents, which 
reduces incentives for evasion and increases the ability for successful control by revenue 
authorities. In most Latin American countries (Argentina, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Mexico, Uruguay) more than 20% of possible VAT income is evaded. In countries 
like Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Bolivia, the evasion rate is even as high as 
30% or more (Gómez Sabaíni et. al 2012). More recent data for Chile, Uruguay, and Mexico 
in 2014 show a decline in the rates in each country but still show a tax evasion rate under 15% 
only in the case of Uruguay. 
 
Figure 9.1: Estimates of tax evasion in value added tax, % of potential revenue (2000-2014) 
 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Argentina 
 
29.6 34.8 32.3 24.8 23.3 21.2 19.8 
       
Chile 
   




             
Mexico 
    




49.5 48 45.9 44.2 42.9 39.4 38.4 37 
      




42.4 39.2 38.8 37.4 39.1 35.4 30.4 34.2 36.3 39,2 33,1 
    
Uruguay 39.9 37.4 40.1 36.1 30.8 30.1 27.8 22.7 20.2 17.2 14.4 14 13.4 
  
Source: Own elaboration with data from Gómez Sabaini, Morán (2016) 
 
In addition, although with a positive trend, revenue gaps in the six countries are still far from 
as low as the ones found in industrialized countries in Europe, with the exception of the 
countries of Eastern Europe and two European cases with historically very high rates of 
evasion, Greece and Italy. Table 6 shows the calculation of evasion in VAT for European 
countries with a standard and comparable methodology. The countries with a larger informal 
sector or economies suffering a prolonged recession since 2008 - Poland, Greece and Italy - 
have higher evasion rates. The rates of the six Latin American countries, although calculated 
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with more unreliable data and a different methodology, are lower than in these countries in 
Europe, indicating a positive result in anti-evasion efforts of tax agencies. But in comparison 
with the countries of the European economic nucleus, rates are twice as high. However, given 
the economic volatility in Latin America and the large informal sectors - two very negative 
factors for better compliance with VAT - it is questionable if the positive trend in the 
reduction of evasion can be prolonged. 
 
Figure 9.2 Rates of tax evasion in VAT for 6 Latin American & selected European countries 
(year 2013), in % 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Gómez Sabaini, Jiménez and Podestá (2010)   
 
Despite the achievements in combating tax evasion in indirect taxes such as the VAT, tax 
non-compliance in direct taxes such as the income tax remains broad and a real challenge for 
countries in Latin America. Figure 9.3 shows that the selected Latin American countries lose 
between one-third and more than half of potential income tax revenue. Interestingly, almost 
always the rate of tax non-compliance in corporate income tax is higher than in the case of 
personal income tax. This may have several reasons. One is that there may be greater 
incentives for evasion (informality, existential advantages) but also greater professionalism in 
practices of evasion and illusion via the help of intermediaries (audit companies or law firms) 
using strategies of aggressive tax planning to lighten the corporate tax burden. In addition, the 
cases of transnational companies’ strategies of transfer pricing and profit shifting are also a 
major concern (see Unit 8). Still, evasion of the main progressive tax, the income tax on 
individuals is also very high and lowers its contribution to reduce income inequality and 
restore tax fairness. In addition, for many scholars, the high levels of tax non-compliance are 






































Figure 9.3 Estimates of tax evasion of corporate and personal income tax in selected Latin 
American countries, % of potential collection (various years) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from Gómez Sabaini, Jiménez and Podestá, A. (2010); Colombia: DIAN 
 
 
9.3 Tax expenditures and tax non-compliance  
Another salient feature of Latin American tax systems are multiple exemptions, exclusions, 
deferrals, allowances, deductions, reduced tax rates and special regimes that persist in all 
countries in the region. All of these concepts can be summarized in the concept of tax 
expenditure. The idea behind this term is that all of these exceptions comprise a kind of public 
expenditure. However, this expenditure is not clearly integrated in the public budget and thus 
frequently escapes congressional debates on the annual budget. Nevertheless, it can be 
perceived as expenditure as it is a government decision to deny – out of certain reasons - the 
collection of certain types of taxes.  
 
Tax expenditure can have a geographical limitation (free-trade zones), a temporal limit (tax 
holiday) among others. Arguments in favor of tax expenditure are diverse but often render 
their assumed positive effect on: attracting or increasing (foreign direct) investment, 
stimulating savings, developing financial markets, developing backward regions, export 
promotion, industrialization, employment generation, environmental care, technology 
transfer, diversification of the economic structure, human capital formation, etc.. However, 
there are several studies that could show that there is no necessary causal relationship between 
the expected goals and tax expenditures in every case, for various reasons. More importantly 




























 they weaken the tax base and create revenue losses;  
 tax expenditures threaten horizontal tax equity; 
 they pose a threat to fiscal transparency and political accountability; 
 they make tax legislation more complex, increase the costs of tax collection and 
complicate the auditing of tax payers by tax agencies; 
 as a form of expenditure they are less visible in the budgetary process and debate; 
 as legislative and public control of them is more difficult, they are frequently more 
vulnerable to the capture of lobbying, business groups or special interests or even 
corruption; 
 as they increase the complexity of the tax system and increase the cost of effective 
control and tax system management they can favor tax non-compliance. 
 
In Latin America numerous studies show that the risks of tax expenditure should be taken 
seriously and frequently out rule the expected gains. Most importantly these are expenditures 
that, given the low levels of tax collection in many countries, the states cannot afford. 
  
The measurement of tax expenditures is still much debated in Latin America. A common way 
to measure tax expenditure is to compare the actual tax collection (of a tax) with a previously 
established benchmark of expected collection. However, how this benchmark is set is subject 
to major debates and can vary substantially. This is the main reason why no common standard 
of calculation is shared among countries, and researchers should be cautious when comparing 
estimates based on different methods of calculations among countries, as estimates are not 
necessarily comparable.  
 
Table 9.1: Estimations of tax expenditure in selected Latin American countries 
  
Tax ARG CHI COL ECU MEX PER average 
VAT 1.17 0.83 2.51 2.4 1.53 1.32 1.63 
Income Tax 0.56 3.62 0.9 3.11 2.23 0.37 1.80 
PIT (Personal Income Tax) … 2.77 0.3 0.71 0.84 0.15 0.95 
CIT (Corporate Income Tax) … 0.85 0.6 2.4 1.39 0.22 1.09 
Social Security 0.33 … … … … … 0.33 
Selective/Special taxes 0.31 … … … 1.15 0.07 0.51 
Trade 0.12 … … … … 0.17 0.15 
Others 0.03 … … … 0.08 … 0.06 
Total (% of GDP) 2.5 4.5 3.4 5.5 5 1.9 3.80 
Total (% of tax collection) 6.8 21.4 17.4 27.2 25.5 10.7 18.17 
Source: own elaboration with data from Gómez Sabaini y Morán (2016) 
 
With this restriction to cross-country comparisons in mind, Table 9.1 shows that the 
magnitude of tax expenditures is highly relevant in the presented six Latin American 
countries. Between 2 and 5.5 points of GDP or between 7 and 27% of the total tax pressure is 
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lost to the state for these exceptions. On average, of the 6 countries represented in Table 4, 
this means a loss of collection of 3.8 points of GDP, which represents more than 18% of the 
existing collection. Countries such as Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico collect more than 4 GDP 
points less, equivalent to more than 20% of their annual tax revenues. Tax expenditures are 
more relevant for important taxes such as VAT and income tax. For both, on average for the 
total of the 6 countries their magnitude is similar in both categories. However, there are 
special cases like Chile and Ecuador that lose more than 3 points of GDP in tax expenses for 
the income tax. 
  
9.4 Explaining tax evasion and avoidance in Latin America  
 
It is common wisdom that nobody likes to pay taxes. However, this common wisdom alone 
does not necessarily explain evasion or avoidance of taxes. So, what can explain tax non-
compliance? In general, there is no straight forward answer and in fact tax revenue losses due 
to tax non-compliance can occur out of a number of reasons. First, the reasons may be related 
to the type of evasion we are talking about. One principal difference should separate tax non-
compliance which is related to domestic dynamics and the transnational component of tax 
non-compliance which is much more related to transnational dimension of taxation discussed 
in Unit 8. In the literature, discussion of these two different kinds of phenomena are 
frequently separated. The transnational forms of non-compliance are closely related to the 
topics in Unit 8 and forms of global governance of taxation. Literature on the domestic aspect 
of evasion has a longer tradition and is closely related to structural aspects of the economy, 
tax design, behavioral aspects of tax payers, but also to administrative capacities and societal 
dynamics. All of these aspects will be presented briefly in the following section.  
 
Contextual and structural economic factors  
 
1) In the literature, there are few doubts that tax evasion is connected with the size of the 
“shadow economy”. In fact, as we have seen revising the methods used to calculate tax 
non-compliance, the size of the shadow economy has been used as a proxy to infer to the 
quantity of tax payments evaded. Definitions of what is the shadow economy vary. Some 
authors claim that it is all “unreported income from the production of legal goods and 
services, either from monetary or barter transactions, hence all economic activities that 
would generally be taxable, [if they] were they reported to the tax authorities” (Schneider 
and Enste 2000: 78-79). This definition is very close to what we have defined as tax 
evasion.  
 
In Latin America, many economists also speak of informality or the informal sector 
instead of the shadow economy. Their claim is that a large informal sector, i.e. business 
which are not registered or whose employees do not possess a legal labor contract, has a 
negative impact on tax evasion. This is because the comparative advantage of most firms 
or persons operating in informality is based on evading or not paying taxes and social 
security fees. Either because of the business operating in illegality or linked to criminal 
activities, or because the only way small companies can compete against dominant 
83 
 
corporations in the domestic market (which can reduce costs due to the economies of 
scale) is via evading taxes. In addition, these companies also face structural challenges as 
they lack the capacities to comply with their tax debts or are unable to administer the 
company’s fiscal accounts properly. 
 
Nevertheless, one should be cautious with the assumption that all economic activity 
operating in informality or the shadow economy can be taxed. This is because a large 
informal sector or a sizable shadow economy is a result of a deliberate policy choice (e.g. 
informal care work, etc.) and thus a reduction would neither increase revenues nor benefit 
the welfare state. In addition, informality as well as measures of the shadow economy 
include illegal activities in which, even if they could be stopped, no tax revenues would 
arise. In any case, there is solid evidence to believe that a large informal sector directly 
and indirectly poses a major challenge to tax collection. Directly because taxes are evaded 
but also indirectly as it negatively impacts collective tax morals and delegitimizes the 
state (see section above). 
 
2) Economists also assume that economic growth has a positive effect for constraining tax 
evasion in the long run. Supported by empirical studies, these authors claim that economic 
growth has (on average) a positive (long term) impact on several economic, institutional 
and social aspects and ultimately also on tax evasion and non-compliance. One argument 
is for example that economic growth fosters state capacity which in turns increases 
administrative capacity the ability to administer taxes which in turn will lead to a 
reduction of the shadow economy and thus a reduction in tax evasion.  
 
3) Especially for the transnational component of tax non-compliance the intersection of a 
country into the global economy is decisive. All aspects discussed in Unit 8 - competition 
for capital investment, the relevance of investment treaties, and the role of tax havens - 
have an important impact on the amount of tax non-compliance, particularly in the case of 
the taxation of mobile capital and in the case of tax payers who have the means to take 
advantage of global tax competition.  
 
Broadening this perspective, high levels of tax non-compliance can be connected to what 
is discussed in Unit 10, i.e. the specific intersection of Latin American countries into 
global market via the exportation of non-renewable products. Here various critical aspects 
interrelate. Companies in the extractive industry are mostly transnational or state 
controlled. Taxation of the extractive sector is complex, includes various tradeoffs and 
entails more knowledge and technical expertise, thus requiring highly capable tax 
agencies. In addition, most Latin American countries are bound to trade agreements and 
investment treaties which interfere with the operation of these companies. Finally, as this 
industry is seen as strategic and entails high capital investment management, extractive 
industries are prone to illegal political activities such as corruption or bribery with 




Tax legislation, administration and design  
 
Tax system transparency is said to have a positive effect towards tax compliance and 
acceptance. Most public finance scholars therefore agree that a transparent tax legislation 
helps a) tax payers to comply with their tax dues and b) enables tax administrations to collect 
revenue successfully and control tax payers. This said, authors highlight additional aspects 
related to tax legislation, administration and design: 
 
 In Latin America, tax agencies have made significant progress in terms of funding, 
professionalization of staff and management and exchange of information (Gómez Sabaini 
and Jiménez, 2011). All these achievements, although with room for improvement, have 
increased their efficiency and their capacity of control and auditing of the taxpayers. 
Indeed, the literature highlights the proper functioning of tax administration as crucial to 
fight tax evasion. This includes organizational and technical aspects, digital infrastructure 
and personal, political independence as well as cross-country cooperation. 
  
 Tax design and legislation also has been identified as being crucial to tackling tax non-
compliance. Complexity increases costs of control of administration and control. Frequent 
changes in tax codes challenge administrations to re-adapt and challenge tax payers to 
understand and comply with the new rules. In certain cases over-regulation can be a 
severe problem which pushes small business into illegality.  
 
Based on this argument, almost all Latin American governments have introduced 
simplified tax regimes for micro companies or small and medium businesses. These 
regimes aim to enable them to better comply with their tax obligations at a reduced rate 
and with a reduced amount of administrative costs. However, the success of these 
simplified tax regimes, termed differently in the region e.g. Monotributo in Argentina, has 
been questioned for various reasons. In any way, the large informal sector remains a 
challenge also for the revenue system, as not only VAT but also CIT, other corporate 
taxes and especially social security contributions are evaded. Besides this initiative, tax 
design is one of the principal topics of public finance scholarship following the rationale 
of optimal tax theory.  
 
 In countries which are prone to corruption, clientelism and a lack of the rule of law, 
politicians or public authorities can exploit their positions to grant tax exemptions in 
return for direct payments or services. Indeed, studies show that corruption and tax non-
compliance are interrelated. In a more general perspective this means that there are 
interrelated challenges to fight tax evasion which may have to do with corruption, rule of 




Macro institutional explanations  
 
Relating levels of tax evasion to wider social and political phenomena is the core argument of 
macro institutional explanations to tax non-compliance. Here the literature refers to topics 
discussed in Units 3, 4 and 5: 
 
For example, the question of fiscal contract: where public service provision is of poor quality 
or absent, high tax burdens are expected to spur evasion as the implicit contract of tax 
payments for public services is broken. Generally, it is assumed that individuals will be more 
willing to comply with government tax policy if they expect that the benefits for them, or 
their peer groups, in the form of a higher level of expenditures will roughly match or exceed 
the corresponding increase in their tax liabilities.  
 
Other authors assume that tax evasion also has to do with political participation. That is if 
individuals can participate in a political community there are more willing to contribute to this 
community (thus paying their tax dues). The idea behind this is that via participation, the 
legitimacy as well as the accountability of the political community increases.  
 
Other arguments refer to the behavior of others: the idea is that if tax payers are aware that 
other tax payers do not pay their taxes they are more willing to do the same. Tax evasion is 
socially accepted and may even be socially and discursively rewarded.  
 
The idea of tax morals tries to combine the influence of all of these factors – governance, 
participation, legitimation, accountability and collectively shared norms – within one concept. 
Tax morals describes the willingness of a tax payer to comply with the given norms. Studies 
that use this concept show that tax morals can explain tax evasion (Torgler, 2007).  
 
However, the question remains how to measure it. Here frequently studies make use of survey 
data or other proxies. Figure 9.4 shows an indicator for tax morals from the World Value 
Survey, one of the few surveys which includes both time series data and non-industrialized 
countries. As a proxy to the level of tax morals, the mean response to the question if cheating 
on taxes is justifiable on a 1 to 10 scale is indicated. Clearly, from this measure we cannot 
deduce the actual degree of tax evasion but it may be possible to observe shared norms and 
perspectives on taxation within society. Still, there are some downsides to the use of survey 
data: this kind of data neither captures any deeper sub-text nor offers room for clarifications 
from the respondents’ replies; it rather provides a snapshot view of individuals’ attitudes and 
behavior. While this snapshot may change with changing circumstances, different 
questionnaires or other circumstances (survey design is something researchers should be 
aware of) it is still one of the few opportunities to obtain micro-level data which is reasonably 
comparable across countries. Works based on this data can thus provide another angle of the 
dynamics of tax morals. 
 
Cross-country research claims that tax morals are influenced by structural economic variables 
(economic crisis, depression, or a large informal sector), state capacity and quality of 
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government (services, bureaucratic capacity, etc.) but also may have to do with micro-level 
perceptions of quality of public services, state accountability but also social status. This 
shows that the concept of tax morals may be useful but the operationalization of it is still 
questionable and consistent time series survey data for all Latin American countries is still 
rare.  
 
Figure 9.4 Tax Morals Indicator, World Value Survey, 6 Latin American Countries, 1981-
2014 
  
Source: Own elaboration with data from World Value Survey: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 
Mean response to question: Is cheating on taxes justifiable? 1 = Never justifiable, 10 = always justifiable. 
 
In general, high levels of tax evasion can hardly be reduced quickly. In order to explain this 
persistence, the idea to think levels of tax evasion in terms of equilibria is useful. A certain 
equilibria of tax non-compliance may arise for example if norms of non-compliance is 
collectively accepted and shared, including dominant views on an exploitive state or wide 
misuse of public funds and corruption. Once such equilibrium of norms, perceptions and 
habits is found it requires more than simple policy changes to fight evasion, but include wider 




Behavioral explanations   
 
The behavior of tax payers is also the focus of studies that focus on the micro sociological or 
individual level. Here research on tax evasion is influenced from different disciplines: 
economics, sociology, psychology, neuroscience or other areas with the aim to explain human 
behavior. Frequently, such studies make use of surveys, tax data, experiments or other 
methodological approaches which allow them to trace the behavior of individuals within a 
specific setting. For example, orthodox schools have attributed tax compliance to the 
taxpayer's fear of being caught and punished by authority (Allingham and Sandmo 1972). 
However, such explanations do not account for states in which the probability of sanction and 
audit is very low but, paradoxically, the compliance level is very high.  
 
Consequently, tax compliance is a phenomenon that, although possibly dependent on control 
and sanction, is also influenced by multiple factors, including those of a subjective nature. 
Such personal attitudes towards tax compliance can be influenced by collectively shared 
norms and values, contextual factors, procedural aspects or even knowledge of taxation. Yet, 
these studies often find explanations at the micro-level which are not always easy to 
generalize and derive policy proposals from them. Maybe the most prominent and at the same 
time creative policy linked to these approaches is the idea to reward consumers with lottery 
tickets printed on the receipts they obtain when purchasing goods. As issuing these tickets 
would mean that businesses would document sales and thus include VAT, the behavioral 
incentives of winning in a lottery increases tax compliance. Today such tax ticket lotteries 
exist in numerous countries such as China, Thailand, Portugal, etc. 
 
Group Exercise:  
 
Student groups of 2-5 students get together and compile information about tax non-
compliance and tax attitudes in an Andean country of its choice. Data on tax attitudes/tax 
morals may be obtained from the last round of Latinobarometro in the Andean country of 
their choice. Based on this data students can explore the relationship of this indicator with 
other measures (income, participation, etc.) in the survey. Alternatively, students can use data 
from the World Value Survey, where online analysis is possible. Within their group they can 
discuss if their results can help them to explain tax non-compliance and if their results are in 
line with the proposition of variables influencing tax morals. Student groups can share the 
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Unit 10: Taxation of Non-renewable Natural Resources  
The dependence on natural resources is an enduring reality in Latin American economies and 
public finances. This dependency has, thanks to the commodity boom and the repremarisation 
(reprimatisación) of Latin American economies, increased since the turn of the century. As a 
consequence, revenues from the extraction and sale of non-renewable resources make up an 
important share of state budgets in several countries. This unit reviews the literature 
highlighting the economic, socio-political and ecological challenges which are connected to 
the fiscal reliance on taxation of extractive industries (resource curse, price volatility, 
economic shocks, and ecological impact) and provides students with an overview of the 
current situation of natural resource taxation in the region. Students become aware of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the distinctive country approaches of taxing extractive 
industries and the consequences these entail. In the end, students should be able to discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of specific revenue instruments applied to the extractive sector.   
 
Learning goals:  
 
• Students will be able to assess revenue instruments (tax and non-tax) applied to levy the 
extraction of non-renewable natural resources. 
• Students will become familiar with the importance of revenues from non-renewable natural 
resource extraction in Latin America.  
• Students will become familiar with the political, ecological and economic consequences of 
high dependence on fiscal revenues from non-renewable natural resources.   
 
10.1 The context of revenue instruments applied to extractive industries 
Converting a country’s wealth in natural resource into public revenue is not as easy as it may 
appear at first glance. Different than in other economic sectors, only few companies are 
engaged in the extraction of non-renewable natural resources, extraction takes places at fixed 
sites with high capital investments and the domestic commodity chains are limited as products 
are frequently produced for export. These are all factors which should facilitate tax collection, 
nevertheless taxing the extractive sectors appears to be challenging and studies show that 
developing countries seldom take full advantage of the revenue potential of non-renewable 
resources (IMF 2012). Once the decision to allow the extraction of non-renewable resources 
is taken, public authorities have to balance several conflicting interests and make choices with 
competing short-term vs. long-term results in choosing the right (combination of) revenue 
instrument(s). In addition, although in theory there may be an optimal mode to pursue, in 
practice the choice which revenue instruments are applied in a given country is the result of a 
political process, which in itself is contingent upon historic, political and social circumstances 
(i.e. politics). 
 
Political actors face several dilemmas, particularly if we remember that most Latin American 
capitalist economies are of a hierarchical nature including a high concentration of capital, few 
powerful business groups, a historical lack of (domestic) capital, and face significant spending 
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needs due to social grievances (high inequality, deficient social security systems, etc.). In 
addition, to these structural features of Latin American economies with respect to the 
extractive sector, they often lack sufficient technical expertise and a record of low 
institutional and regulatory capacity is common. Coupled with high macro-economic 
volatility these features make non-renewable resource taxation and fiscal policy in general 
less stable and more complex and conflictive.  
 
Choosing the right fiscal regime for the taxation of the extractive industry frequently includes 
questions of risk-sharing between private investors (companies) and the public authorities: 
Extraction of non-renewable resources usually demands high up-front investment 
governments don’t want to or cannot spend as well as technical expertise and capacity public 
companies do not have. Private companies can provide both of these resources but need 
assurances that their investment will turn profitable over time. This results in possible 
insecurity on both sides. Private companies frequently face high sunk costs (up-front 
investment outlays before product is extracted and sold), which may not be cashed in if the 
project is terminated. In terms of negotiating power once these costs are sunk (spent) the 
balance of power shifts from the investor to the host government. Before the start of 
extraction project, even the best-intentioned government has an incentive to offer attractive 
fiscal terms, but afterwards—as the tax base becomes much less elastic— authorities may 
want to change the fiscal terms to its favor. This can result in a “hold-up” problem; investors 
feel that the risk for their investment is too high due to possible modifications in the fiscal 
regime which discourages investment in the first place. In addition, as commodity prices are 
volatile, private investors – as well as the public authorities (see above) – have to include 
risks related to volatile prices in their investment decision. Finally, potential exhaustibility of 
deposits can be a concern for private investors. At the project level, exhaustibility is a key 
opportunity cost, as extracting today means that future extraction is foregone. In sum, private 
investors have an interest in a fiscal regime which is stable and enables them to extract as 
much profit as possible from their investment.  
 
Governments on the other hand face the risk of underexploring possible fiscal rents if their 
confidence in private companies is unrestricted. Public authorities may underestimate 
problems related to asymmetric information. Private investors undertaking exploration and 
development are likely to be better informed than host governments on technical and 
commercial aspects of a project and the likely real output. Public authorities can misjudge the 
project potential and select a fiscal regime with sub-optimal allocation. Another risk 
government face to control extractive companies is associated with sector specific factors. 
First, private companies are mostly transnational. This can raise complex tax issues - with 
multinationals likely having more expertise than most developing country administrations - 
and sensitivities regarding sharing the benefits from national resources. Taxation of 
transnationally operating companies may be restricted due to multilateral or bilateral 
investment treaties signed by the host country. In addition, changes in the fiscal regime, 
production sharing contracts or even nationalization of private companies can result in legal 




Secondly, producers may have substantial market power as they control a significant part of 
global deposits. In mining, for example, most internationally traded supplies of iron ore are 
shipped by just three companies. Market power can be related to price dynamics as well as 
technical expertise and increases the bargaining power of private investors. Some of these 
concerns of asymmetric information and control can be circumvented by state owned 
enterprises. i.e. nationalization of resource extraction. But such enterprises raise other 
questions, such as the efficiency of operations, the allocation of taxing responsibilities and 
political influence. In sum, public authorities favor a flexible and easy to administer fiscal 
regime, which provides a stable and maximum amount of revenue and is responsive to rises in 
commodity prices (i.e. higher prices, higher revenue).  
 
As can be seen, the private and the public side both face risks in engaging in the extraction of 
non-renewable resources and have different preferences concerning the fiscal regime. Fiscal 
instruments are likely to influence the balance of risk taking and shift investment risk either to 
the private or public actors. However, there is no uniform solution for applying the right fiscal 
instrument. Not only do investments depend on local and national conditions or market and 
price dynamics, there are also differences between the sectors, i.e. the mining and 
hydrocarbon sector. Three of them are worth mentioning and may explain the differences in 
fiscal regimes in the both sectors. First, the exploration is often costly and riskier for 
petroleum. A deep water well, for instance, can cost over US$100 million, and the chance of 
success in a new basin may be 1 in 20 or less (IMF 2012). But the risks in the ‘development’ 
phase (bringing a discovery to extraction), and of failure during the extraction phase, may be 
greater for mining. Mining may also involve greater political and environmental risks: mines 
are typically based on land rather than offshore and may have a significant environmental 
impact (minería a cielo abierto). Secondly, commercial structures tend to differ between 
petroleum and mining. For tax, financing, or sometimes technological reasons, unincorporated 
joint ventures (UJV) have been common in petroleum projects, with capital separately 
provided by the partners and production shared. This sets up conflicting interests from which 
tax authorities can benefit in controlling costs. UJVs have been much less common in mining, 
with major companies owning majority stakes in locally-incorporated vehicles. Finally, the 
extractive sectors are changing and new technologies are affecting exploration activities. This 
is especially true for the hydrocarbon sector where the “fracking” technology (hydraulic 
fracturing), enabled a fuller or new exploitation of onshore unconventional oil and gas 
deposits. These dynamics do not only affect long term price trends or production costs; they 
also raise new issues of social and environmental concerns which states have to balance. In 
sum, these major differences highlight the need for sector specific application of fiscal 
instruments. 
 
Given this background it is possible to understand the trade-offs public authorities face in 
choosing the right fiscal regime. In the government’s ideal scenario, a fiscal instrument 
should comply with several goals. Governments wish a fiscal regime that: 
 Provides stable fiscal revenues. This is important for governments as they want to have a 
sustainable revenue base upon which they can plan. However, given the price volatility in 
commodity markets, stable revenues are seldom assured.  
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 Has low administrative costs. Although there are only few companies in the extractive 
sectors monitoring all of them can be costly and complex. Given that tax authorities in 
most developing countries already struggle to fight tax evasion in other areas (Unit 9) the 
supervision of a complex fiscal regime may challenge tax authorities.  
 Results in high compliance by tax payers. Tax avoidance is a major concern in every Latin 
American country (Unit 9) and also present in the extractive sectors, as transnational 
companies have the ability to engage in aggressive tax planning strategies. For example, 
in the case of Peru a recent study by Ojo Publico highlighted significant revenue loss due 
to tax avoidance by mining companies (Ojo Publico 2016). 
 Is efficient (Unit 1). 
 Is neutral in the sense that the revenue generation avoids distorting investment and 
operating decisions and thereby dissipate the revenue potential (Unit 1).  
 Is progressive. Progressivity has a different meaning than discussing the income tax (Unit 
7). It can either be used to describe the extent to which revenue increases as the price of 
the commodity rises or production costs fall (i.e. it shapes the sharing of risk between the 
private and state side).
6
 It can also be used within a time dimension, expressing how the 
present value (PV) of taxes varies with the lifetime PV of a project.  
 Minimize government risk.  
 
Given the particularities of the extractive sector, achieving all of these goals with one fiscal 
instrument is unlikely. For example, there is a permanent tension between the objectives of 
maintaining reasonable investment dynamism and achieving, at the same time, a progressive 
state participation in economic rents derived from natural resource extraction. In this sense, 
some balance is required between them, in particular referring to efficiency, equity, and fiscal 
revenue collection and administrative and compliance costs. Each fiscal instrument has 
different implications for these competing goals. It also will affect the balance of risk taking 
between the government and the private sector as discussed before.  
  
10.2 Fiscal instruments (tax and non-tax) applied to extractive industries 
 
There are several fiscal instruments which can be applied at extractive industries. Frequently, 
multiple instruments can be found in one country and countries may change the instruments 
applied. The table prepared by the IMF (2015): 16 (see 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/081512.pdf). lists the major instruments which 
are of relevance in countries with important extractive industries.  
 
Principally, these instruments can be classified following two major divisions: 1) What is 
taxed? In other words, to what is the fiscal instrument being applied? A division can be made 
between those instruments levied upon earnings (or any definition of income net of related 
costs) of the extractive company against those that are determined by the physical amount or 
the economic value of production, regardless whether they fall on reserves or on inputs and 
                                                 
6 Tax efficiency requires that more risk be borne by the party better able to bear it. In developing country contexts, this may 
often be private investors, given their ability to diversify across deposits (though the exposure of even large multinationals to 
single large projects should not be underestimated). 
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services used in the exploitation. 2) Does the state participate actively or passively in the 
production?   
 
In general terms one can distinguish seven different instruments (see also IMF 2012). The 
specific characteristics of these instruments may vary considerably between each specific 
country: 
 
- Production sharing: Is a fiscal scheme for extraction of natural resources (mostly 
petroleum, gas) in which production at a surface delivery point is shared between a state 
entity and a private contractor. Production sharing can take different forms in applying:  
(a) A fixed production share;  
(b) Based on the daily rate of production (DROP): Here the government share of profit 
petroleum increases with the daily rate of production from the field or license, often with 
several tiers;  
(c) Cumulative production from the project: In this case the government share of profit 
petroleum increases as total cumulative production increases;  
(d) R-Factor production sharing scheme: government’s profit share increases with the 
ratio of contractor’s cumulative revenues to contractor’s costs (the “R factor”). It is said 
that this scheme improves on a DROP scheme in being a more direct measure of 
profitability, but at the same time, it does not recognize the time value of money;  
(e) Rate of return (ROR): Government’s share of profit petroleum is set by reference to 
the cumulative contractor rate of return. 
- Fixed charges or fees. 
- Bonus: Bonuses are single (or sometimes staged) lump sum payments paid by a company, 
frequently for rights for extraction. Bonuses can be set in legislation or negotiated, and 
could be biddable (auction). Signature bonuses become a sunk cost for companies that 
they may recover only in the event of successful development, and even then, the fact that 
they are sunk may pose new political risk if a project is especially profitable.
7
 
- Royalty: A charge for the extraction of natural resources (mostly minerals) by a company 
(specific amount per unit of volume). Usually it is calculated ad valorem, a percentage of 
gross revenues (fixed royalty ad valorem). It can also be a specific charge by volume or 
weight of production (fixed royalty production). Royalties can also vary with price 
(contingent royalties), with production, operating ratio/profit. It can also be applied to the 
operating margin (net profits royalty).
8
  
- Indirect Taxation (VAT, export tariffs): VAT, if companies, sectors or regions, are not 
exempted, applies to all companies in the extractive industry as to other domestic 
companies. Note that, VAT, as discussed in Unit 1 can, under certain circumstances, be 
passed to consumers of the commodities produced. Tariffs on the other hand are said to be 
very easy to administer, as the control of commodities leaving or entering the country 
requires less state intervention. Although tariffs have been one of the standard fiscal 
                                                 
7 Bonuses in some petroleum exploration rights auctions have been very large (over $1 billion as a top bid in Angola’s 2006 
round) but are much more modest, for example, in the USA’s offshore auctions. In Latin America, the latest auction has 
taken place in Mexico in 2016/7. 
8 Term also used in “net profits royalty” where some costs are deducted, in which case similar to an income or rent tax. 
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instruments applied to extractive industries in the beginning of the 20
th
 century in Latin 
America and much of the world, due to the increasing deregulation of world trade they 
have long played a marginal role (until the Trump presidency). 
- Corporate income taxes: CIT to the EIs can ensure that the normal return to equity is taxed 
at corporate level just as in other sectors. Note that some countries apply a higher than 
standard rate on the usual CIT base; others have separate income tax regimes addressing 
sector-specific issues. There are also some special options such as a variable income tax 
(VIT), which uses the CIT base, but varies the rate of tax according to the ratio of profits 
to gross revenues. Note that in some cases (notably the U.S. and Canada) provincial CIT 
can additionally be applied. In recent times, there has been special attention to problems 
of profit shifting related to the corporate income tax by transnational enterprises (Unit 8). 
Profit shifting occurs when companies transfer their profits to subsidiaries of the same 
enterprise in low income tax countries and avoid payment of domestic income tax in the 
higher income tax countries. This mechanism is viable for companies operating in the 
extractive sector.  
- Diverse forms of state ownership: In some cases, the state participates actively in the 
extractive industries via different forms of state ownership. State participation can have 
various forms. Extraction of minerals or oil can be pursued by state owned enterprises 
(such as in the case of Chile (CODELCO) or Venezuela (PDVSA)). State participation 
can be rooted in historical circumstances and based on strong traditions. Take the decision 
of nationalization of the oil industry in Mexico by President Lázaro Cárdenas in 1939 
which was implemented in the Mexican Constitution and only recently removed in 2012. 
State ownership of oil industry is standard in many Middle Eastern countries, notably 
Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. State ownership of extractive companies can lead to state 
revenues via different mechanisms:  
- the government receives percentage of dividends without payment of any costs (Free 
equity);  
- government contributions received by investors and recovered from dividends with 
interest (Carried equity);  
- the government pays its share of costs (Paid equity).  
Standard arguments against state owned enterprise are concerns about efficiency or 
forms of political “use”, e.g. via patronage and political corruption. To explore such 
arguments the discussion on the liberalization of the oil and the capitalization 
problems of the state-owned PEMEX are enlightening. 
  
10.3 Characteristics of fiscal instruments applied to extractive industries 
 
Each instrument has its advantages and disadvantages with respect to the impact on tax 
neutrality and effectiveness, investor behavior, the sharing of risk between the government 
and investor, the administrative and compliance costs and for securing stable long term 
revenues. In addition, the instruments have different impact on progressivity.  
 
The table prepared by the IMF (2015): 16 (see 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2012/081512.pdf). shows how these fiscal 
96 
 
instruments relate to some of the defined goals. For example, royalties, a frequently used 
instrument in the mining sector, are – in their simplest form – easy to administer but they are 
regressive and entail risks for governments to correctly measure and valuate the extracted 
resources. Soon it becomes clear that there is no gold standard in taxing extractive industries.  
 
10.4 Revenues from non-renewable resource in Latin America  
 
Latin America provides 11.2% of global oil production in the year 2015 and possesses almost 
20% of the worlds proved oil reserves. Meanwhile Chile and Peru together provide 39% of 
the world copper production.
9
 In addition, there are several countries in Latin America with a 
very high share of non-renewable resources products in total exports. Countries whose export 
basket is dominated by mineral and oil products include Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Venezuela.  
 
Scholars interested in the export composition of Latin American countries can consult data 
from two classification systems: the UN-COMTRADE Harmonized System (HS) and the 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC). Table 10.1 below provides one way to 
calculate the total amount of commodity exports products via the SITC. Independent of which 
classification system is used the analysis of contemporary Latin American exports reveals that 
a high reliance on commodity exports dominates. For example, in the year 2014 among the 
top 25 economies with the highest net primary commodity exports 11 Latin American 
countries (note that Venezuela is not included) are listed. The high dependence on commodity 
export is also visible in a historical perspective. Although the share of commodity exports is 
not as high as in the early 1960s such exports constitute still the major share in the export 
basket. Yet there are different patterns agricultural exports are traditionally of special 
importance in Argentina and Brazil, while minerals in Chile and Peru and hydrocarbons in 
Colombia and Venezuela. Mexico is somehow the exception as commodity exports lost 
importance since the 1980s with the change of the development model of the country. To 
learn more about the composition of exports in Latin American countries students can consult 
the online tool “The Atlas of Economic Complexity” provided by the Center for International 
Development at Harvard University: https://tinyurl.com/ya6oq3zo. 
  
                                                 
9 The largest share goes for Chile with the 31% of the total world production. 
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Table 10.1 Definition Primary Commodities, SIC 
 
Energy Metals Agriculture 
SITC 3 SITC 27,28 and 68 SITC 0,1,2 and 4 










Food and live animals (e.g. 
soybeans) 
Beverages and tobacco 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats 
and waxes (e.g. soybean oil) 
Source: Own elaboration, Standard International Trade Classification 
 
The budget of most Latin American economies reflects this commodity export dependence. 
Public budgets of several countries in Latin America are highly depended on revenues from 
natural resources. Table 10.2 shows that this dependence is particularly relevant in oil 
exporting countries Ecuador, Mexico (over 30% of revenues are due to the extractive 
industry) and countries with an important mining industry such as Colombia, Peru and Chile 
(around 15%).   
 
As we can appreciate from Table 10.2, the fiscal dependence on revenues from extractive 
industries remains significant in several Latin American countries since the beginning of the 
21
st
 century. This is true for the period of the commodity boom, in which commodity prices 
were exceptionally high, as well as for the contemporary period (2010-2014) in which global 
economic uncertainty has increased and commodity prices have deteriorated. Still the 
importance of commodity related revenues is different in Latin America. In some countries, 
namely Colombia and Ecuador, the importance of these commodities has increased making 
their fiscal position more exposed to global price volatilities. In other countries, Peru and 
Argentina, this exposure has reached its peak in the period of high prices, 2005-2008, and 




Table 10.2, Selected Latin American countries, share of PIB and share of total revenue 





As share of the countries’ GDP  As share of total fiscal revenue 
2000-2003 2005-2008 2010-2014 2000-2003 2005-2008 2010-2014 
Argentina 
hydrocarbons 
0.8 1.6 1 4.5 7.3 3.4 
Argentina 
minerals  
0 0.1 0.1 0 0.4 0.4 
Argentina 0.8 1.7 1.1 4.5 7.7 3.8 
Colombia 
hydrocarbons 
1.6 2.4 3.4 5.6 8.2 12 
Colombia 
minerals  
0.2 0.5 0.4 0.5 1.5 1.3 
Colombia 1.8 2.9 3.8 6.1 9.7 13.3 
Ecuador 
hydrocarbons 
5.7 8.7 12.8 29.3 35.3 38.2 




3 5.9 5.3 21.1 38.3 32.7 
México 
minerals  
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.8 1 
México 3 6 5.5 21.4 39.1 33.7 
Peru 
hydrocarbons 
0.5 1.1 1.4 3.2 5.9 6.9 
Peru  
minerals  
0.2 2.1 1.3 1 10.6 6.4 
Peru 0.7 3.2 2.7 4.2 16.5 13.3 
Chile 
minerals  
0.8 6.9 3 4 28.1 13.8 
Chile  0.8 6.9 3 4 28.1 13.8 
Source: Own elaboration with data form Economic Commission of Latin America and the Caribbean, ECALC  
a
 Does not include own income of the state owned petro company PEMEX. 
 
10.5 Fiscal instruments applied to extractive industries in Latin America 
 
How do Latin American countries tax extractive industries? Over the past decades a strong 
diversification in the range of fiscal instruments -both tax and non-tax- took place in 
extractive industries in most countries in the region. These instruments include royalties; 
resource rent taxes, windfall taxes, corporate income taxes and diverse forms of state 
ownership. However, there are significant differences, as shown in the descriptions of the 
fiscal regimes in nine Latin American countries in Table 4 (Cuadro 4) of Rossigniolo 2015: 
47 (https://repositorio.cepal.org/handle/11362/39625).  
 
Related to the discussion above, this can be explained by the differing objectives governments 
want to reach. It may also have to do with the circumstances in a given country. For example, 
countries which host many projects, or with strong credit market access, may be less 
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concerned about ensuring early payment by each company in isolation. Or those with ready 
access to alternative sources of revenue may be less concerned by risk-sharing. In addition, 
political pressures to show acceptable revenue from national assets, acceptably responsive to 
current prices, can be powerful. For example, as the experience in Argentina and Bolivia 
shows, governments were able to reach broad public support in re-nationalization of 
extractive companies. On the other hand, in some countries lobbying efforts of companies in 
the extractive sector have been fruitful and effective taxation of extractive industries is still in 
its footsteps, such as in the Central American countries. 
 
Since the year 2002, Latin American countries have made several important changes – tax 
and non-tax – to the fiscal governance of the extractive sector. The principal motivation 
behind these changes was to benefit from the extraordinary windfall profits caused by unseen 
high and stable commodity prices. Without describing the particular details of these changes 
in every country these measures included: 
 
- Several reforms were pursued to re-gain state control of non-renewable natural resources, 
principally in the hydrocarbon sector. Such reforms included the nationalization of the 
sector, re-negotiation of contracts or the nationalization of companies or mines and could 
be observed in Venezuela (2005-2007), Bolivia (2006, 2012), Ecuador (2010). 
 
- Except for Peru, all countries now participate directly in the extractive sector via state 
owned enterprises, although in Mexico the recent reform (2012) of the oil regime ends 
with the monopoly of the state-owned PEMEX. Often, these companies are subject to 
special tax regimes, including additional income or production taxes and other additional 
payments.  
 
- Given the high prices in mining products countries also reformed their system of royalties, 
often including variable rates and scales. This was the case in Bolivia (2005), Ecuador 
(2010), Colombia (2011) and Peru (2011). 
  
- Also, new fiscal instruments to the extractive sector were enacted during the commodity 
boom (2005-2013). For example, Impuesto Directo a los Hidrocarburos in Bolivia, 
Impuesto Específico a la Actividad Minera in Chile, rise in rates of the Impuesto sobre la 
Renta del petróleo (up to 50%) in Venezuela or the Impuesto Especial a la Minería and 
the Gravamen Especial a la Minería in Perú. Other countries opted to install levies on 
extraordinary utilities as in Colombia, Ecuador or Trinidad y Tobago, principally in the oil 
industry. 
 
- In general, during this period, advances in the progressivity of fiscal regimes can be 
observed, although in a more consistent way in the hydrocarbon sector than in the mining 
sector.  
 
- However, given the fall in prices, several countries have put an end or reversed the higher 
taxation of the extractive industries. Examples include Mexico or Argentina where export 
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taxes have been dismantled or tax regimes adapted. Falling prices always entail claims by 
producers that the profitability of their projects is no longer secured and that taxation may 
pose at risk employment and extraction.  
 
10.6 Economic, political and social consequences of fiscal dependence on non-renewable 
resource revenues  
 
A high fiscal dependence on non-renewable resources can have several negative political, 
economic, social and environmental consequences. Such dependence is not only frequent in 
Latin America but also observable in Africa and Asia and is for many countries a historical 
constant. This is why the literature on the development prospective of commodity exporting 
countries is old and manifold. Although empirically there are countries which have 
successfully transformed from a commodity based economy to an industrialized economy 
(South Korea, etc.), high dependence on natural resources is still seen as a major challenge to 
economic development, especially if such dependence is not adequately managed. Without 
the claim of completeness, this Unit proposes to treat some of the main debates surrounding 
resource dependence and public finances.  
 
- Fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic volatility 
After more than a decade of fiscal and economic bonanza commodity prices in Latin America 
eventually tumbled in 2015 and so did economic and fiscal indicators in almost all countries 
in the region. This highlights the importance of macroeconomic volatility for economic and 
fiscal regimes in the region. In fact, in Latin American countries the volatility of commodity 
prices is one of the principal determinants of fiscal revenues and threatens fiscal 
sustainability. Macroeconomic volatility of main export products is especially important for 
Latin American countries. This is because: a) it has increased contemporary importance. In 
several countries, the relative share of collected revenues based on extractive activity 
increased in the 21
st
 century (e.g. Colombia, Ecuador) or remained high (Mexico, Venezuela, 
etc.) b) macroeconomic volatility is almost a historical constant in the region and has shaped 
Latin American economies producing boom and bust cycles and has gained Latin America the 
reputation as the most crisis-ridden continent. Crisis on the other hand had negative social, 
political and public spending effects but also has marked the development of the fiscal and tax 
regimes, due to ad-hoc policy responses of short term solutions to fiscal deficits. 
  
In the public finance literature on Latin America this caused a focus on several topics: a) How 
should tax and fiscal regimes be designed to effectively confront macroeconomic volatility. 
Here topics as automatic stabilizers, diversification of revenue and an increase of direct taxes, 
but also fiscal stabilization funds are explored; b) How should fiscal policy change along 
macroeconomic cycles? Here the design of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, and the political 




- Dutch disease 
Since the very beginning of development economics economists have tried to understand the 
effects of commodity dependence for economic development. As economic dependence on 
natural resources was linked to underdevelopment and industrialization was regarded as the 
only way to reach development, one principal concern has been to explore the conditions 
under which the transition from a commodity based economy towards an industrialized 
economy can be best achieved (see Ross 1999 for a short revision). While in the 1950s 
abundance in natural resources was seen as a benefit, especially by scholars linked to the 
tradition of modernization theory (because states could overcome capital shortfalls thanks to 
commodity exportation and attraction of FDI, government revenue collection should be easier 
and more public goods could be financed) since the 1960s and 1970s, and especially after the 
price shocks in the 1980s, commodity abundance was viewed much more critically. In 
addition, based on empirical investigations, scholars concluded that economic growth was 
less stable and strong in economies with natural resource abundance than in economies 
without this feature. Suddenly, the arguments of structural economists, which highlighted the 
unfavorable terms of trades of commodity exporting countries, gained popularity. Other 
authors blamed the high economic volatility linked to commodity exports. Still, others pointed 
to the limited forward and backward linkages commodity exports would create with other 
economic sectors, both harmful for economic development.  
 
In fiscal terms, these arguments pointed to the fact that commodity dependence generate too 
little public revenue from their exports. In an opposing standpoint, another argument points to 
the fact that natural resource abundance may lead, via a boom in exports, to economic 
stagnation via the generation of too much revenue, particularly in foreign reserves. This 
effect, termed, the Dutch Disease, describes a combination of two effects: the appreciation of 
the country’s real exchange rate caused by the sharp rise in exports: and, second, the tendency 
that in an economic boom period the resource sector draws capital away from the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors, thus raising production costs. Together this would 
result in a decline of the manufacturing and agricultural sector and inflate the costs for goods 
and services which cannot be imported. Although much in vogue in the 1980s this argument 
has turned out to be relatively rare in developing countries and the model is built on some 
flawed basic assumptions (fixed capital and labor supply, perfect substation of domestic and 
imported goods, etc.) that rarely hold in practice (see Ross 1999: 306).  
 
In sum, neither of these arguments was convincing to explain the comparatively less favorable 
economic development of resource rich economies. This anomaly, the fact that natural 
resource rich economies grow less, was termed the ‘resource curse’ and in the following 
years the economic literature on the resource curse has, next to the exploration of specific 
economic effects of resource abundance focused on the political economy of the resource 
curse. In other words, scholars gave more attention to factors of the political system which 
prevent governments to “handle” successfully the resource abundance in terms of economic 
development. This was deemed necessary as some resource rich countries like Norway 
managed the resource curse very favorable while others (in Africa, Latin America or 
elsewhere) did not.  
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- Political economy considerations of resource curse & rentier state theory    
In the political science and political economy literature, the availability of abundant natural 
resources was linked with state capacity, state building and forms of representation (see also 
Unit 3 & Unit 4). This literature argued that the "resource curse" of developing countries pose 
a threat to state building, political participation and government accountability. The prime 
example of all ills which come hand in hand with the resource abundance are autocratic 
political regimes in the Arab world (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, but also recently Venezuela). Such 
regimes, which seemed to survive thanks to almost unstoppable fiscal flows from natural 
resources, were termed rentier states. Rentier states combined all the ills western scholars did 
not label as modern: low accountability of public authorities, no political participation and 
stable autocratic rule, excessive and ineffective state apparatus, low economic productivity in 
non-extractive sectors, etc.). However, the classic rentier state literature (from political 
science) as well as the resource curse literature largely failed to engage in micro-level analysis 
to explain variation among resource rich countries in terms of policies, government and (fiscal 
and economic) development. Current research suggests that this general idea of a resource 
curse itself is misleading and that the internal constellations of actors, especially between 
different elite groups in specific economic cycles have to be taken into account in order to 
explain the different trajectories of such countries.  
 
A side topic of the resource curse literature has to do with political and violent conflict, such 
as civil wars. These contributions are especially relevant for African countries that assume 
that resource abundance in some regions can propel, foment or prolong violent conflict under 
certain instances. As natural resources are highly demanded abroad, extraction can be 
converted into desperately needed cash to maintain or gain military power. In the case of 
Latin America, natural resource conflict in contrast has much more to do with local 
mobilizations against labor exploitation, environmental contamination, threats to self-
determination of local communities and their rights or as a sign of political protest to attract 
national attention and influence.  
 
- Commodity dependence and tax reform 
The policy reform literature is interested in the incentives generated by natural resource 
abundance for governments. The main idea in these contributions is that if governments gain 
the impression that they can rely on a steady stream of fiscal revenue thanks to abundance in 
non-renewable natural resources, they become uninterested in revenue raising tax reform and 
diversification of the tax system. Natural resource abundance is thus expected to reduce the 
likelihood of revenue raising tax reform. In Latin America, this hypothesis does not hold 
empirically in a comparative perspective, as quantitative studies confirm (Unit 6). However 
fiscal and economic crisis related to commodity price cycles do have an impact on the 
likelihood of reform or the perception and planning of governments. 
 
- Environmental, territorial and social challenges 
Finally, although these are not primarily fiscal challenges one should not forget that natural 
resource extraction is likely to have negative effects on the environment and affected local 
groups, which challenge the possible fiscal benefits of extraction. In fiscal terms, one of the 
103 
 
main debates here surrounds the topic of compensation. Compensation is meant in terms of 
balancing local or regional fiscal participation vs. nationwide fiscal participation (see Unit 
11), or in the form of counterbalancing environmental damage (e.g. the investment of 
extractive companies in environmental projects) or in global terms (take the example of the 
TIPNIS initiative of Ecuador). All these debates show that taxing extractive industries has to 
confront not only fiscal goals but also social and environmental ones.  
 
 
Group exercise:  
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group should select an Andean country of its choice (if more 
groups than countries, groups can select other Latin American countries). The task for each 
group is to elaborate a short country report of natural resource taxation in the country in 
question. What are the effects of this type of tax regime, who bears the risk, what are the 
outcomes? On which grounds this tax regime may be criticized. Groups should present the 
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Unit 11: Challenges to Local and Subnational Taxation in Latin America  
In many Latin American countries, local and regional governments play an important role in 
fiscal policy. Although in a comparative perspective, subnational governments other than in 
Brazil lack significant tax authority, expenditure decentralization has increased significantly 
since the 1980s. This poses several challenges of management and coordination between legal 
jurisdictions (national, regional, local) and within nation states in terms of tax policy, revenue 
distribution and tax and spending authority. Not all of these challenges have been successfully 
addressed and many open questions still exist in the region.  
 
This unit aims to give an overview of the multiple ways taxation and fiscal decentralization is 
organized in the region and the challenges that exist for subnational taxation. Against this 
empirical background, the most important theories of local and regional taxation are discussed 
and their applicability is examined. It is important to note that the aim of this unit is not to 
find the perfect and unique solution to the challenges in fiscal coordination or subnational 
taxation. Such a solution is likely to be non-existent. Optimal local and regional taxation 
always depends on many factors exogenous to fiscal policy, e.g. the political system, 
population dynamics or historical factors. Instead, the aim of this unit is to give a critical 
introduction to the many perspectives existent in the literature and to get students thinking 
about an aspect of fiscal policy very much dominated by expert discourse but of direct 
importance for every citizen.  
 
Learning goals:  
 
• Students will become familiar with positive theories of local and regional taxation, tax 
coordination, and theories of fiscal federalism.  
• Students will know the importance and the challenges to local and regional taxation and 
fiscal coordination among national subunits. 
• Students will learn which factors (economic, political, social) influence local taxation and 
fiscal coordination. 
  
11.1 Subnational taxation in contemporary Latin America  
 
Latin American states underwent some important decentralization processes since the return 
to democracy in the late 20
th
 century. Different processes of political (local and regional 
authorities are elected directly), administrative (provision of public goods, rule making 
authority) and fiscal (tax authority or spending authority) decentralization have taken place 
and revalued the importance of local and regional political arenas for public policy. The 
outcomes of these decentralization processes were largely contingent upon the countries’ 
historical determinants. Although similar reforms could be observed, Latin American 
countries differ in many ways with respect to decentralization. First, countries differ in the 
number of levels of government that exist and the constitutionally and legislatively mandated 
relationships among them. Second, local authorities differ in their degree of political 
decentralization and political legitimacy. Some have significant political power and are 
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popularly elected, while others are appointed councils that follow the directives of a more 
centralized level of government. Third, local authorities differ in their degree of autonomy in 
revenue-raising and expenditure decision making. In recent years, several authors have 
studied decentralization processes in Latin America, principally with the aim to find answers 
to the question why federal governments decentralize parts of their authority (O’Neil 2005) 
and what factors condition decentralization processes (Falleti 2010). 
 
Figure 11.1: Tax revenues by level of government, 2013 (% of total) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data from OCDE/CEPAL/CIAT/BID (2016): https://tinyurl.com/y86mur4u    
 
Although it is important to keep the first two dimensions in mind, we will focus on the latter, 
particularly on revenue raising (tax) authority. Figure 11.1 provides us with some actual data 
about the share of local and regional/state governments by level of government. We can 
clearly see that in countries with a long federal tradition such as Argentina and Brazil local 
and regional governments collect more taxes. An exception would be Mexico, which although 
federalist by constitution, is highly centralized in the revenue raising dimension. Quasi-
federalist countries like Colombia and perhaps Bolivia have also made efforts to decentralize 
tax authority while some unitary countries like Chile and Ecuador remain highly centralized. 
However, for several reasons outlined above, decentralization of tax authority is challenging 
and in most countries, subnational governments still struggle to take full advantage of the tax 
bases assigned to them. In most countries, other non-tax sources of income (fees, royalties, 
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Figure 11.2 Subnational tax revenue structure in Latin America, 2014 (% GDP) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data form ECLAC, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; Ecuador and 
Bolivia with data from 2013 
 
Latin American countries not only show differences in the amount of tax revenue collected 
but also in the type of revenues they collect (tax revenue structure). Figure 11.2 shows these 
differences by two measures (as share of total subnational tax revenues and as share of GDP). 
Subnational governments in Argentina and Brazil can take advantage of their authority to 
collect taxes on economic activity (in Brazil the famous state VAT and in Argentina, a tax on 
ingresos brutos). Income taxes are marginal; Note also that local or regional authorities are 
responsible for collecting taxes on immobile property in all cases but which only ends up 
contributing marginally to revenue raised. In sum, important differences between the 
countries can be observed with some decentralized outliers (Argentina, Brazil) and some 
quasi-federal cases (Colombia, Bolivia) catching up. 
 
In most countries, the degree of revenue raising authority stands in contrast to the expenditure 
authorities of local and regional governments. Today local and regional authorities in Latin 
America are partly or totally responsible for diverse public policies such as social 
infrastructure, (primary) education, environment or health (for more information about 
spending authority see e.g. Sabaini et. al 2017 or IMF data). In order to fill this gap between 
revenue and expenditure, local and regional authorities are largely dependent on federal 
transfers. Federal transfer systems tend to be complex and often entail a mix of unconditional 
automatic (free to use transfers) or conditional (bound to a specific spending item) transfers. 
Transfers generally aim to share the (federal) revenue collected by tax or non-tax means and 
distribute this revenue in accordance with different criteria (based on effort, equalization, 
most needed, etc.). Economic scholars have labelled this aspect of public finance “fiscal 
federalism”, i.e. the system of how tax and spending authority and revenue sharing is 
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phenomena is not limited to federalist countries only but may include quasi-unitary or even 
supranational (like the EU) political regimes. Connected with classic public finance 
contributions and modern political economy, this research area has developed some 
assumption and theories summarized below.  
 




Source: Own elaboration with data form ECLAC, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean; Ecuador and 
Bolivia with data from 2013 
 
11.2 Local public finance theory and fiscal decentralization 
 
In general, the fiscal federalism literature can be divided into two camps: an early normative 
perspective and subsequent empirical positivist works. Although mostly not addressing it 
explicitly, normative literature is largely in favor of an increase in subnational authority (in 
specific areas), while the current empirical contributions highlight the adverse effects and 
challenges of (forms of) decentralization or a specific federal state design. 
 
The early normative works praised a decentralized (federal) state as an “engine of prosperity”, 
because it increases “institutional congruence” in public service provision or helps to secure 
competition between subnational governments and thus “preserves markets”. Institutional 
congruence is claimed because it is assumed that a decentralized state is superior in the 
provision of public goods (Oates 1972, 1977). This provision is superior as the beneficiaries 
of such goods, decision makers and taxpayers are better matched and hence problems of 
aggregation are reduced. It is assumed that (subnational) policy decisions can be better 
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effective and efficient (Oates 1977). This argument is also known as the decentralization 
theorem (Oates 1972, 35). 
 
The decentralization theorem, in its early form, was criticized for underestimating likely 
externalities (spillovers), for example a public hospital which attracts patients from other 
provinces or localities) or economies of scale in the provision of public goods. If strong inter-
regional externalities – positively in the form of benefit spill overs, or negatively in the form 
of cost spill overs – between subnational units occur, an institutional incongruence between 
consumption and provision of the public good exists. This can promote free riding behavior of 
some subnational units at the expense of their neighboring jurisdictions, e.g. a province will 
not invest in public health because most citizens can use a hospital of the neighboring 
province. Moreover, due to the economy of scale effects of some public goods, for example 
national public goods like defence, should be provided by a centralized agency. 
 
This is also a challenge to fiscal policy, very well described by the problem of fiscal 
equivalence. The principle of fiscal equivalence is fulfilled if every citizen (beneficiary) is 
connected to the costs and benefits of local expenditures. In other words, the group of 
beneficiaries is identical with the group of cost bearers, and decision makers. Fiscal 
equivalence is meant to prevent fiscal illusion and to strengthen fiscal transparency and sound 
fiscal policy. Fiscal illusion is a concept widely used in public choice and first introduced by 
the Italian economist Amilcare Puviani in 1903. It suggests that when government revenues 
are not completely transparent or are not fully perceived by taxpayers, then the cost of 
government is seen to be less expensive than it actually is.  
 
The second justification for a decentralized state is based on the writings of Tiebout (1956). 
Theorizing about the beneficiaries’ behaviour towards a decentralized public good provision, 
Tiebout argued that jurisdictions providing local public goods enter into a market-like 
competition to attract mobile households. Households like consumers can “vote with their 
feet” to choose the best jurisdiction - maximal public services for the minimal costs -, which 
in consequence will foster competition between subnational units. In the long run this will 
lead to an overall optimal provision of public goods. Although Tiebout’s reasoning is based 
on several strong assumptions (full information, mobility, etc.), scholars of the “second 
generation of fiscal federalism” developed this idea further, incorporating incentives 
structures and the possible behavior of political decision makers in the concept of a market 
preserving federalism (Weingast 1995). Increasing competition of (at least partially) 
independent subnational governments is here a kind of “silver bullet”, making markets more 
competitive and efficient, reducing corruption, fostering allocation efficiency of public goods 
or even promoting good (local) governance (Qian and Weingast 1997; Weingast 2009). 
 
Decentralizing policy authority (also some tax authority) is also supported by another 
argument connected with this literature. This is the belief that a market like federal setting 
fosters policy experimentation and innovation. Subnational governments are assumed to react 
better to local or regional needs and to adapt their policies accordingly. Assuming that 
subnational governments have the authority over policy issues, innovative subnational 
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“problem-solving” policies can emerge and spread via diffusion or adaption towards other 
units or even the central state level. 
 
Pro-decentralization arguments based on the idea of the virtue of competition, however have 
one principal blind spot: they cannot give a credible answer to the question of how 
competition is stabilized so that (1) competition among jurisdictional units does not become 
so severe that it undermines all potential economic gains and (2) the coercive authority of the 
national government is kept in check so that the "property rights" of subnational units are not 
repealed (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004, 21). With respect to tax policy the first 
problem has to do with tax competition between subnational units and a race to the bottom of 
tax rates (comparable to what was mentioned in Unit 8). The second problem may pose 
adverse incentives for subnational tax collectors if their authority is not guaranteed.   
 
Contemporary empirical research is much more cautious about the positive claims for 
decentralized state, and especially in Latin America, not every decentralized policy was a 
success, especially tax and fiscal policy. In some cases of a high degree of fiscal and political 
decentralization, regional income disparities or the size of government and spending 
increased, corruption was stimulated or macroeconomic stability was threatened. In sum, this 
empirical literature shows that the political and economic effects of subnational (fiscal) 
authority are multidimensional and often contingent on a number of other factors and by no 
means always positive. 
 
But besides these grand theories arguing for more or less decentralization of (fiscal) political 
authority, how should subnational taxation be best designed? The classic textbook advice 
would name several guidelines (Smoke 2014: 289-90, Bird 2011): 
 
1. Efficiency: local taxes should be as neutral as possible in terms of their effect on 
economic behavior and distortions of economic decisions made by individuals and 
firms should be minimized (see Unit 1). 
2. Congruence: benefits and costs of local taxes should be clear to those for whom 
services are to be provided (see the problem of fiscal congruence). In other words, 
ensuring correspondence between payments and benefits. 
3. Equity: basic equity standards should be meet (see the challenge to externalities), i.e.  
and a fair treatment among equals (horizontal) and across different groups (vertical) - 
in terms of income – should be assured (see Unit 1). 
4. Capacity: subnational tax authorities should be capable of administer assigned taxes in 
order to minimize costs of administration and compliance. This includes 
administrative feasibility in terms of ensuring that the scale and complexity of 
administration is consistent with available capacity and affordable to the subnational 
government. 
5. Adequacy: public revenue generation should cover subnational budgetary needs. Here 
experts advise to follow the “finance follows function” principle. 




7. Stability: tax revenues should be stable and large fluctuations in revenue should be 
avoided. Unstable revenues jeopardize local public service provision. 
8. Autonomy: subnational governments should have the discretion to make independent 
decisions, in order to create a link between revenue generation and service delivery. 
9. Political feasibility: local taxes should be in line with the local political reality, i.e. 
with the acceptance of a tax by local society.  
10. Integration/consistency: “ensuring the logic of the full set of subnational revenues and 
consistency with the rest of the national fiscal system (e.g., limiting overlap with 
central taxes and revenue disincentives in transfer and lending mechanisms).” Smoke 
(2014: 289-90).  
 
All of these points sound relatively straightforward. Given the high economic and social 
regional disparities, challenges to the quality of public service provision due to geographic 
and infrastructural circumstances (remote areas, etc.), political challenges and generally high 
economic volatility, the realization of these guidelines is rather complex. In order to visualize 
this complexity this unit can revise some challenges to local public finances. 
 
11.3 Challenges to local finances in contemporary Latin America  
 
1. Fiscal decentralization, public service provision and federal fiscal bargaining   
Regarding public service provision, central governments naturally have national goals and 
may aim to establish interjurisdictional equity that justifies intergovernmental transfers and 
service standards. In contrast, the optimal criteria for assigning revenue sources to local 
authorities will generally differ from the perspectives of central and local governments. This 
is because each subnational politician responds to his/her subnational political base and is 
interested in being reelected. This is a natural and expected outcome of a federal system. 
However, two challenges occur in Latin America with respect to taxation. In the case of a 
mismatch between spending and revenue authority, voters may or may not be aware of the 
links between local- and regional-level tax policy and the outcome of broader reforms 
(Wibbels 2005). 
 
Secondly, there will be a constant bargaining process between local, regional and national 
authorities and political actors on fiscal policy. However, as such bargaining frequently takes 
place in an informal setting in Latin America, e.g. on a personal level or within parties, the 
wider political context matters for fiscal policy outcome. Electoral systems and legislative 
design also matter and may yield suboptimal results. Take the example of low personal 
income taxation in the region, which is suboptimal for re-distribution via taxation. Some 
authors argue that this is the case because of overrepresentation of low populated provinces 
and typically conservative provinces or states in the congress. This is one example of how the 
political dynamics of actual situations make it difficult to apply textbook advice.  
 
2. Low budget constraints and subnational fiscal free riding in the 1990s 
Weak subnational budget constrains for subnational governments (state and provincial) were 
one of the highly disputed topics in the fiscal policy in Latin America in the 1990s (Dillinger 
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and Webb 1999; Fukasaku and Haussman 1998). Critics argued that the accumulated public 
debt which eventually led to major state defaults in Argentina and fiscal crisis in Brazil where 
partly due to the unsustainable spending policies and debt taking policies of subnational 
governments. The story behind this claim was that in both countries (in Brazil more than in 
Argentina) a high vertical fiscal imbalance in the fiscal federal system existed. While federal 
governments were largely responsible for tax collection, the greater part of the expenditure 
was decentralized. Subnational governments thus would increase expenditure (e.g. because of 
an increase in the subnational public sector with which subnational governments could secure 
political support) while hoping that the federal transfers, with which they financed the 
expenditure, would do the same. As they did not, subnational governments would turn to 
issuing debt, largely through (public) provincial or state banks, and securing these loans with 
guaranteed automatic transfers from the federal government. This behavior, as long it is not 
limited by national or provincial legislation (i.e. hard budget constraints) would cause 
subnational debt to rise to unsustainable levels, and in times of economic turmoil, subnational 
governments would eventually threaten to default. On many occasions, federal governments 
had no other option to either bail out subnational governments directly via ad-hoc transfers or 
via nationalizing public local banks – thus priming unsustainable fiscal behavior by 
subnational governments. These countries had run in what is known as a “common pool” 
problem (Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981), in which subnational units fail to internalize 
real costs of spending and drive the federal government to costly bailouts because of the 
existence of soft budget constraints. 
  
The most probable solution in both countries, as well as in Mexico and other countries was 
the establishment of hard budget constraints for subnational governments. Based on national 
law, subnational governments are prevented from unsustainable spending, e.g. by restricting 
debt taking or restricting current expenditure. In addition, federal fiscal or judicial institution 
was installed to solve conflicts between the federal and subnational levels. However, although 
the existential threat of state default may be prevented by these regulations the core problem 
of persisting high vertical fiscal imbalances is still a major issue in most Latin American 
federations and quasi-federations. This is highlighted by contemporary single episodes of 
fiscal conflicts between the federal government and single subnational jurisdictions, e.g. in 
contemporary Argentina.  
 
More generally, there has also been criticism of hard budget constrains for subnational 
governments as they curtailing their ability to engage in counter-cyclical spending in crisis 
times. In the case of Latin America such counter-counter-cyclical spending proved to be 
positive in some circumstances, for example in the wake of the global economic crisis in 2008 
(Ter-Minassian and Jiménez 2011).  
 
3. Horizontal fiscal imbalances and revenue allocation from natural resources 
An important aspect of Latin American subnational finances is the imbalances of revenue 
effort generated between state or local jurisdictional units within the same country. These 
imbalances, frequently described as asymmetries in the horizontal fiscal (federal) distribution, 
or horizontal fiscal imbalances, can be found in every Latin American country. Frequently, 
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these imbalances reflect long term economic patterns of these countries (allocation of 
industrial clusters, cities, location of headquarters, etc.) but may also have to do with the 
location of extractive industries. As we know from Unit 10, revenues from non-renewable 
natural resources (oil, gas or minerals) are an important revenue source in many countries in 
the region, but the extraction of natural resources frequently takes place in remote areas, with 
significant social and environmental costs, as the fiscal regimes applied to extractive 
industries also regulate that local and state governments where the exploitation of these 
resources takes place will benefit from extraction. In addition, in many countries a part of 
these non-tax revenues is distributed via mechanisms of transfers to other jurisdictional units. 
In addition, subnational governments are also financed by duties, fees, etc. that can be 
counted as non-tax revenues.   
 
This is the cause of the importance of non-tax revenues for subnational finances in Latin 
America as stated in Figure 11.4. The figure shows that in some countries like Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, or Mexico, 40% or more of revenue is allocated according to this concept. In other 
countries, Brazil, Colombia, or Chile, this figure is still at 25% or more. In any case this 
shows not only the weak tax collection effort by subnational governments but also their need 
of additional financing as well as the effects of windfall profits via extractive industries. In 
general, the result of these circumstances is that horizontal fiscal imbalances are very high.  
 
This confronts these countries with the challenge to implement effective mechanisms of 
cross-regional or cross-local revenue distribution. On the one hand, they have to use these 
resources to provide collective (nation-wide) public goods and thus engage in a kind of re-
distribution or centralization of these revenues. On the other hand, local and regional 
jurisdictions will call for revenues to compensate for natural resource extraction, not only 
because of the social and environmental costs that go hand in hand with extraction. Finally, as 
natural resource revenues are not endless, fiscal regimes ideally should also result in 
investments in the future, e.g. in stabilization funds, expenditure in technological progress or 
education.  
 
This is why many countries in the region apply not only different fiscal mechanisms for the 
taxation of extractive industries (see Unit 10), but they also have established complex transfer 
mechanisms by which several of these goals ought to be accomplished.  
 
However, research on rent distribution has found that several of these transfer mechanisms, 
increase corruption, foster unsustainable fiscal mismanagement, overstrain the spending 
capacity of local governments or are designed to fulfill political or partisan purposes. 
Although the distributional systems of resource revenues partly tend to equilibrate territorial 
disparities between producing and non-producing regions or localities, frequently the 
political, normative or legal aspects are more important than technical aspects (environment, 
economic or social). Finally, resource rents are spent right away and are rarely used for long 




Figure 11.4 Tax and non-tax revenues of subnational governments in Latin America, 2013 (% 
of total subnational revenue, % of GDP) 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration with data form ECLAC, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean   
 
4. Subnational tax competition and externalities   
Public choice theorists emphasize that competition can lead to a disciplining effect on local 
government’s tax policy and hence foster overall welfare as it keeps the “leviathan” (i.e. the 
government) small and effective (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). However, tax competition 
between subnational units can also lead to sub-optimal provision of public goods (Oates 
1972:72). The basic problem of subnational tax competition is its interconnectedness: the 
selection of a tax rate by one unit will directly affect other units. Higher capital taxation in 
one unit will lead to a capital outflow to another unit. Thus, subnational governments may not 
select tax rates based on their financing needs but with respect to compete with other units. 
This can lead to an under-provision of local public goods, as individual and collective 
rationality are falling apart (Wilson 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski 1986).  
 
Tax competition in Latin America is a less important issue than in North America or Europe. 
This is principally due to the lack of tax authority of subnational governments in the region. 
In Brazil, however, tax competition between state governments can occur and was part of a 
concern in the 1990s, as Brazilian states as well as municipality have the right to levy taxes. 
Brazilian states do collect a kind of sales tax (state VAT) next to the federal sales tax (federal 
VAT) next to other property or inheritance tax. A race to the bottom due to tax competition of 
Brazilian states, however, has not appeared but the Brazilian tax system is said to be 
increasingly complex, with multi-leveled legislation, recurrent legal conflict between 
jurisdictions, and multiple tax exemptions at various levels of government and thus less 






























5. Local property taxation and re-distribution  
In Unit 2 we already encountered the argument for the fragile tax regimes and low re-
distributive impact of taxation in the region is the historically low progressive taxation of 
property, wealth and high income at the local level. In this argument, this was related to the 
type of colonization of Latin America and the then established pattern of social discrimination 
and inequality. One may not stick to this argument, but looking at property and wealth 
taxation in Latin America in a comparative perspective a pattern of low redistributive effort 
via taxation becomes visible. Revenue effort from taxes on immobile capital, i.e. property on 
land, houses, etc. is comparatively low. In Latin America, as figure 11.2 shows, tax revenue 
from immobile property tax do not surpass 0.7% of GDP (in Colombia). In international 
comparison, for example with the OECD average where property tax allocates to about 1.9% 
of GDP in 2014 - with countries like France or the UK collecting more than 3.7% of GDP – 
this is very low. Given that most Latin American countries are prone to high levels of 
inequality in landownership, wealth and property these numbers are even more striking. 
While technical or administrative reasons are frequently blamed for these shortcomings (lack 
of updated cadaster, low professionality of local financial authorities, etc.) there are also 
political and social dynamics responsible. For example, in the case of Mexico until recently 
local authorities were only elected for three years providing no incentives for recently elected 
authorities to seek conflict with organized interests in reforming property taxation which then 
would pay out in future years after they have left office.   
 
Group work – Case Studies:  
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group should select an Andean country of its choice (if more 
groups than countries, groups can select other Latin American countries). The task for each 
group is to present a review of the current situation of a) local taxation and b) the transfer 
system in the country in question. What are the most salient challenges to this system and 
which explanations have been put forward to explain the current characteristics of the system? 
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Unit 12: Wrap Up & Transfer: Taxation & Sustainability in the Andean Region 
 
Rather than a classical wrap up of the previous sessions, this unit proposes a final group work 
exercise in which the relationship between taxation and sustainable development from an 
interdisciplinary social science perspective is explored and applied to the Andean countries. 
Such group work has several advantages: 
 
- There are still very few scholarly works that explicitly explore the relationship between 
taxation and sustainable development. Although there is a historical concern about the 
fiscal sustainability of Latin American countries and the role taxation plays to reach such 
fiscal sustainability (balanced budgets, etc.), few studies explore the role taxation can play 
for other dimensions of sustainability. Such a limited focus is also present in research on 
the issue of “green” or environmental taxes – taxes which eventually aim to limit the 
pollution or contamination of the environment –that is at present principally limited to 
discussions on climate change. In sum, there is ample room to explore the nexus between 
sustainable development and taxation at an empirical and theoretical level.  
 
- Such an exercise may also help to internalize the multidimensional perspective on taxation 
outlined in this course. As we have set out from the beginning, tax dynamics may be a 
symptom as well as a cause of social change. With this dual perspective on taxation at 
hand, students can explore which characteristics of tax systems and tax indicators may 
help to evaluate the progress towards sustainable development. In addition, students can 
explore the effects taxation may have on the multiple dimensions of sustainable 
development. For example, which role do tax systems play for social or political 
sustainability apart from the challenge to adapt tax systems to increase revenue collection.  
 
- Based on the previous group work exercises in Unit 3, 4 and 6 to 11, students have gained 
a considerable understanding of the characteristics of the tax regimes in the Andean 
countries. This empirical knowledge can help them to connect their knowledge on 
sustainable development learnt during the master course with the multiple dimensions of 
taxation.   
 
- This exercise enables a comprehensive revision of the previous sessions and enables 
students to apply and practice their knowledge gained in the previous units via a concrete 
task and outcome. 
   
How can we connect what we have learnt in the previous session about taxation with 
sustainable development? A first step could be to define what is meant by sustainable 
development and to distinguish between social, economic, fiscal, environmental or political 
sustainability and to define concrete phenomena which challenge sustainability in these 
dimensions, like inequality, environmental damage, etc.. To all of these aspects, tax research 
can make a contribution based on discussion in the previous sessions and a connection 
between taxation and sustainable development can be drawn. This final unit offers a 
possibility to explore this nexus.  
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Group exercise:  
 
Divide the class in n groups of n students. Each group should have a minimum of 2 and a 
maximum of 5 students. Each group should select an Andean country of its choice (if more 
groups than countries, groups can select other Latin American countries); preferably the 
country selection follows the previous group exercises. The task for each group is to choose 
an aspect of sustainable development, e.g. social, economic, fiscal, environmental or political 
sustainability. Based on this selection the group should discuss which concrete problems are 
existent in the country of interest in this aspect of sustainability (inequality, education, 
participation, accountability, contamination, etc.). The group should then elaborate, based on 
the material in the previous sessions, how these challenges are connected to taxation. In 
particular, the groups should respond to two questions: what characteristics and tax and public 
finance indicators improve our understanding of these challenges and why? What effect has 
the tax regime in the country on these challenges to sustainability in the country and why? 
The groups should prepare a short presentation for the class on these topics and discuss their 






This is a wrap up unit and thus the literature of the previous units is also relevant. Lectures 
may also use literature on sustainable development presented in the related master classes. 
Finally, the following titles may be of interest.  
 
Arenas de Mesa, A. (2016): Sostenibilidad fiscal y reformas tributarias en América Latina, 
Santiago de Chile: Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe. 
 
Bird, R. M. (2003): Taxation in Latin America: Reflections on Sustainability and the Balance 
between Equity and Efficiency, at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1393962 (Last access 
13.06.2019).  
 
Center for Economic and Social Rights (n.d.): Lima Declaration on Tax Justice and Human 
Rights, at: http://www.cesr.org/sites/default/files/Lima_Declaration_Tax_Justice 
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